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When adults with terrible child abuse histories or with 
chronic and serious substance abuse or mental illness problems 
have a new child, one might expect child protection agencies to 
take proactive steps to prevent the newborn babies these adults 
produce from suffering maltreatment. These biological parents 
pose a high risk of abusing and/or neglecting the baby,1 and 
maltreatment during the developmentally crucial first year of 
life is likely to cause serious and permanent damage to the 
child.2 Moreover, the state would have little difficulty identify-
ing most such parents at the time of birth, because it maintains 
records of parents who have previously committed child abuse 
or neglect, hospitals report all births to a state agency, and 
hospitals are legally required to notify local child protection 
agencies whenever a baby tests positive for in utero exposure to 
illegal drugs.3 Yet the reality is that, despite federal legislation 
intended to induce a more proactive and preventive approach to 
child maltreatment,4 states rarely act to protect at-risk new-
born babies before they incur abuse or neglect. Instead, states 
continue to confer legal parenthood on biological parents with-
out regard for any history or condition that renders such per-
sons presumptively unfit to parent and continue to allow such 
persons to take newborn babies home with no monitoring.5 This 
state practice is the root cause of intergenerational transmis-
sion of dysfunction in our society and a tragic injustice to the 
babies who could be protected.6 
To avoid this injustice and social cost, child protection 
agencies need to identify, at the time of birth, biological parents 
with obvious high risk factors, such as previous termination of 
parental rights as to another child, having been convicted of 
 
 1. See infra Part II (discussing the risks faced by children of unfit par-
ents). 
 2. See, e.g., FRED WULCZYN ET AL., BEYOND COMMON SENSE: CHILD 
WELFARE, CHILD WELL-BEING, AND THE EVIDENCE FOR POLICY REFORM 32 
(2005). 
 3. See Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 5106a(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000 & Supp. 2004). 
 4. See infra Part III (discussing several federal statutes that have at-
tempted to address child mistreatment but which have fallen short). 
 5. See infra Part I (discussing how current laws favor the biological rela-
tionship of a parent and child). 
 6. See CHING-TUNG & JOHN HOLTON, TOTAL ESTIMATED COST OF CHILD 
ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN THE UNITED STATES 4–5 (2007), http://www 
.preventchildabuse.org/about_us/media_releases/pcaa_pew_economic_impact_ 
study_final.pdf (estimating annual spending nationally of $33.1 billion on di-
rect costs and $70.7 billion on indirect costs of child maltreatment). 
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criminal child abuse or neglect, having serious drug abuse or 
mental health problems, or being currently incarcerated. The 
agencies should assess such biological parents and their home 
situation before the parents take the baby home. States should 
aid parents who, the assessment suggests, can adequately par-
ent with some assistance. With respect to parents who most 
likely can not adequately parent within the babies’ first six 
months of life, even if services are provided, states should ter-
minate the parents’ legal relationship to the newborn child and 
create a parent-child relationship instead with qualified appli-
cants for adoption. States should not wait until birth parents 
have maltreated and damaged the baby and should not place 
newborn babies in temporary care situations for prolonged pe-
riods while they attempt to reform deeply dysfunctional par-
ents. That conclusion is radical but sound. As this Article de-
monstrates, newborns are simply different from older children, 
a basic fact that the child protection system and legal scholars 
have failed to fully recognize. Other scholars emphasize the 
rights of the parents, often to the detriment of the child; this 
Article serves as an important counterbalance. 
Since the mid-90s, Congress has passed several laws de-
signed to push states to take a more proactive, preventive ap-
proach to child maltreatment. Two in particular promised to 
ensure that local agencies would intervene to protect newborn 
babies from unfit parents and quickly secure healthy, perma-
nent family placements for them. The Adoption and Safe Fami-
lies Act of 1997 (ASFA)7 required that states authorize courts 
to terminate parental rights without waiting for child protec-
tive agencies to attempt to rehabilitate parents, in certain cases 
where parents have demonstrated unfitness through egregious 
conduct toward their other children.8 The Keeping Children 
and Families Safe Act of 2003 (KCAFSA)9 required states to di-
rect birthing facilities to report to a local state child protective 
agency all births in which babies manifest in utero exposure to 
illegal drugs, thus bringing to the attention of child protection 
agencies newborn children at high risk of maltreatment be-
cause of parental drug abuse.10 KCAFSA also required states to 
 
 7. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 
2115 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 8. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B), (D) (2000). 
 9. Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-36, 
117 Stat. 800 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5102–5119 (2000 & Supp. 
2004)). 
 10. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
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implement a plan to ensure the safety of such offspring of drug 
addicts.11 
However, resistance among social workers and judges to 
“disqualifying” biological parents from raising their offspring 
has rendered these legal developments largely ineffective. No 
matter how troubling biological parents’ histories are, the state 
still routinely sends newborn children home with them unsu-
pervised.12 When child protection agencies do take custody of 
children at birth, they typically put such children in provisional 
foster care while undertaking lengthy and usually futile paren-
tal rehabilitation efforts.13 Achieving the congressional aim of 
child-maltreatment prevention requires further federal or state 
legislation to fill gaps in current law that allow local child-
protection agencies to continue traditional, reactive practices. 
This Article explains why these promising federal reform ef-
forts have largely produced only a pretense of maltreatment 
prevention at the state and local level, and it identifies further 
legal reforms needed to make better parentage choices for 
children born to unfit biological parents. 
Part I explains the state’s generally overlooked role and re-
sponsibility in family formation and custodial placement of 
children after birth. Part II draws on child-development litera-
ture to explain why it is vital that children receive consistent 
nurturance during the first year of life, that the state not dis-
rupt any attachment infants form with a good caregiver, and 
that child-protection law and policy take account of the ways in 
which the situation of a newborn differs from that of older 
children. Part III describes the federal government’s substan-
tial role in the realm of child protection, particularly the provi-
sions of ASFA and KCAFSA that create the potential for a 
more proactive approach to preventing child maltreatment. 
Part IV details the ways in which state law and local practice 
are frustrating those legislative aims. Finally, Part V sets forth 
proposals for filling the gaps left by federal legislation, to en-
sure all children a healthy start in life, free of abuse, neglect, 
and family disruption. Part V also addresses likely objections to 
more aggressive child-protection measures—in particular, the 
conflict with supposed rights of parents and the disparate im-
pact on poor and minority-race parents. 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. See infra Part IV. 
 13. See infra Parts II, IV (discussing how laws favor biological parents 
even when they are clearly unfit to parent when the child is born). 
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I.  STATE CREATION OF PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS   
A parent-child relationship is a legal relationship entailing 
rights, responsibilities, and liabilities. The legal relationship 
ensures an opportunity for a social relationship to arise, yet the 
legal relationship arises without mutual consent between the 
private parties. State maternity and paternity laws place 
adults and newborn children into legal relationships with each 
other, always without the consent of the children and some-
times without the consent of the adults.14 Such state action is 
presumptively inconsistent with western society’s commitment 
to a limited state that leaves private parties free to choose their 
own social relationships and to decide whether to request state 
protection of the social relationship through legal recognition.15 
It therefore requires strong justification and careful constraint. 
An obvious justification for the state’s creating legal family 
relationships for a newborn child is that newborns need to be in 
relationships with adult caregivers immediately yet cannot 
choose those adults themselves. The state appropriately steps 
in, as parens patriae protector of the welfare of these non-
autonomous persons, to act in their behalf, choosing for them. 
In fact, this is the only plausible justification for the state to in-
trude so profoundly into a child’s life—the only justification 
that adequately respects the equal moral status of children rel-
ative to adults.16 It is the same justification the state must in-
voke for creating a legal caretaking relationship between an in-
competent adult and a competent adult—that is, for a 
“guardianship of the person” for a disabled adult.17 In neither 
context can it be a plausible justification that some persons’ in-
capacity simply creates an opportunity for the state to take 
over their lives and to place them in the care of others in order 
to serve state aims or the desires of other persons. Vulnerabili-
ty does not justify treating a person instrumentally. Thus, the 
law governing adult guardianship makes the desire of particu-
lar adults to serve as a guardian for an incompetent adult a ne-
cessary but not sufficient condition for appointment.18 It is also 
 
 14. See James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children’s Existing Rights in 
State Decision Making About Their Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
845, 859–81 (2003). 
 15. See JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 95–
122 (2006). 
 16. See id. at 205. 
 17. See id. at 82–85. 
 18. Id. 
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necessary that the appointment of one particular person as 
guardian, rather than any other person who might wish to 
serve, be the best choice for the ward.19 The state, in this con-
text, acts in a proxy capacity, choosing for the incompetent 
adult as he would if able, with judicially determined “best in-
terests” controlling in the absence of an actual choice by the 
prospective ward prior to becoming incompetent.20 Likewise, 
with the law governing adoption of children, the state, in a pa-
rens patriae role, investigates potential adoptive parents, quali-
fying some for adoption and disqualifying others, and places a 
child in a parent-child relationship with adopters only if that is 
in the child’s best interests—that is, if the child would, if able, 
choose to be in that relationship.21 In both of these other con-
texts in which the state creates legal relationships for non-
autonomous persons, only those persons are viewed as having 
rights in the matter and only their interests are relevant. 
We should similarly view the state, when it creates the 
first legal parent-child relationships for newborn children 
through parentage laws, as acting in a proxy role, choosing on 
behalf of the child and constrained to choose as the child would 
if able, which presumptively means based on the child’s best in-
terests.22 Ideally, then, legal rules for parentage would place 
children in parent-child relationships that are, all things consi-
dered, the best ones available for them. The state would place a 
child with those adults, from among all those who wish to serve 
as parents for that child, whose serving as parents would best 
promote the child’s welfare. 
Against such a “best available parent” standard, existing 
parentage laws are at best a very rough approximation of the 
ideal. The state currently assigns children to adults for up-
bringing purposes almost exclusively on the basis of biological 
parentage. In every state, with rare exception, the law makes 
the birth mother a child’s legal mother.23 And in every state, 
with rare exception, the law makes men legal fathers almost 
exclusively on the basis of rules that directly or indirectly pre-
 
 19. Id. There are generally statutory priorities for some categories of per-
sons over others in selection of a guardian, but these are based on assump-
tions about who is likely to be the best caregiver, and statutes direct courts to 
depart from the priority order when necessary to serve the ward’s welfare. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Dwyer, supra note 14, at 882–83. 
 22. See DWYER, supra note 15, at 205. 
 23. Dwyer, supra note 14, at 859–65. 
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dicate parentage on biological paternity.24 This legal regime 
approximates the ideal described above to some degree because, 
all else being equal, it is considered to be best for children to be 
raised by their biological parents. This is in part because we 
culturally value the biological connection within parent-child 
relationships and in part because biological families are still 
regarded as “natural,” which is of some significance to older 
children.25 However, many parental characteristics other than 
a biological connection are relevant to a child’s well being, yet 
the law makes those other aspects irrelevant.26 Some biological 
parents are so lacking in the capacities or commitment re-
quired for parenting that their serving as a child’s parents 
would, on the whole, be worse for the child than if some other 
available adults took on that role. That this is so is evidenced 
by laws authorizing courts to terminate the parental rights of 
biological parents even after they have formed a social family 
relationship with a child and even when the biological parents 
want to remain legal parents.27 Because rules for establishing a 
child’s first legal family currently do not reflect this fact,28 
children born to such biological parents typically must first suf-
fer serious maltreatment and disruption of an established fami-
ly life before the state places them with adequate caregivers.29 
Some departure from the ideal of state proxy relationship 
decision making for newborn children is unavoidable. Our 
knowledge of what makes for a good upbringing for children is 
limited. Further, though we do have substantial confidence in 
our belief that certain forms of upbringing are very bad, the 
state, arguably for good reason, usually does not have sufficient 
information about first-time parents to identify in advance eve-
ryone who is likely to create a very bad upbringing.30 In addi-
 
 24. Id. at 865–81. Certain statutory presumptions of paternity—for ex-
ample, that based on a man’s being married to the birth mother or a man’s 
“holding out” a child as his offspring—historically were based largely on an 
assumption that such status or behavior signaled that the man was most like-
ly the biological father. Id. at 865–68. 
 25. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Guiding Principles for Picking Parents, 27 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 323, 334–35 (2004). 
 26. See Dwyer, supra note 14, at 859–81. 
 27. See id. at 952–66. 
 28. See infra Part III (discussing how parentage laws favor biological par-
ents to the detriment of the child). 
 29. See generally Dwyer, supra note 14, at 952–66 (describing the high 
threshold under state law for terminating parent-child relationships). 
 30. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the lack of information available to 
state agencies about new parents). 
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tion, some departure from the ideal because such decisions are 
difficult to administer; state agencies cannot be expected (or 
perhaps trusted) to make fine judgments among potential par-
ents or to make individualized decisions with respect to a sub-
stantial percentage of newborn children.31 Thus, we must ex-
pect and accept some bluntness in the legal rules by means of 
which the state makes proxy family-relationship choices for 
newborn children, and most children cannot reasonably com-
plain later in life that they would have been somewhat better 
off, all things considered, if the state had chosen different par-
ents for them. 
However, it is not tolerable for the state to make no indivi-
dualized parentage decisions for any children on the basis of 
potential parents’ relative capacities and commitment. Some-
times the state is aware that expectant birth parents are so ut-
terly lacking in the capacity for and/or commitment to caring 
for a child—so likely to cause children to experience things 
known to be very bad for children—that it is inexcusable for the 
state to place children in a legal relationship with those adults 
and to send children home from the hospital to live in their cus-
tody. This situation is just as inexcusable as it is to send a child 
who has already been seriously abused home with a parent who 
is very likely to abuse her again. Nevertheless, the state does 
this today, routinely.32 There is no basis in the parentage laws 
of any state for excluding some adults from parentage of a child 
on the grounds that they are not minimally qualified to serve 
as parents or are at very high risk of committing serious child 
maltreatment.33 Even maliciously killing a child today does not 
legally disqualify one from being named the legal parent of 
another offspring tomorrow.34 Being found guilty of such an 
atrocity does not even require one to make some showing to the 
state that one is not likely to maliciously kill that next child as 
well, in order to be named legal parent of the new baby. By way 
of comparison, it is inconceivable that any adult would similar-
ly choose a spouse without giving any consideration to that per-
son’s history in intimate relationships and, in particular, any 
 
 31. See infra Part IV (discussing the complexity in determining whether 
someone will be fit to be a parent at the time the child is born). 
 32. See Dwyer, supra note 14, at 959–66 (describing the high threshold 
under state law for terminating parent-child relationships based on abuse and 
neglect). 
 33. Id. at 859–81. 
 34. See Adoption and Safe Familes Act of 1997 § 103(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 675(5)(E) (2000). 
 2008] CHILD PROTECTION 415 
 
history of partner abuse that person might have.35 Likewise, it 
is inconceivable that the state would approve any applicant for 
adoption of a child who has a history of severe child maltreat-
ment. The fact that parentage law today completely disregards 
such disqualifying history or characteristics is difficult to ex-
plain on any grounds other than an exaggerated notion of the 
importance of being raised by one’s biological parents and/or a 
morally untenable notion of parental ownership of biological 
offspring.36 
II.  WHY IT IS CRUCIAL TO GET IT RIGHT AT BIRTH   
This Part explains what is concretely at stake for newborn 
babies and why there is a particular urgency to securing good, 
permanent families for newborns whose birth parents are unfit. 
A. NEWBORNS’ DEVELOPMENTAL NEEDS 
Abundant research demonstrates that the state’s creation 
of a legal parent-child relationship has an enormous impact on 
a child’s brain development, basic psychological health and 
emotional make up, capacity for self-regulation, and physical 
health and growth. Parents largely determine an infant’s expe-
rience of the world, and that experience has a tremendous ef-
fect on every aspect of the child’s development. Of crucial im-
portance to each child’s healthy development are early 
satisfaction of physical needs, freedom from trauma, and—less 
commonly known—“a secure attachment to a sensitive, respon-
sive, and reliable caregiver.”37 Infancy is “a period of extreme 
vulnerability in which specific child welfare experiences have 
the potential to have devastating, long-term consequences.”38 
Thus, the state’s creation of parent-child relationships ef-
fectively determines the basic life prospects of persons and the 
likelihood of their experiencing happiness and fulfillment. Ar-
 
 35. Cf. International Marriage Broker Regulation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-162, § 833(d)(2)(B), 119 Stat. 3066, 3072 (2006) (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1375a(d)(2)(B) (2006)) (requiring international marriage brokers to 
conduct criminal background checks on their male clients). 
 36. See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEG-
LECT, FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE 7 (1999) (referring to 
the legal system’s inordinate valorizing of biological parent-child relationships 
as “blood bias”). 
 37. Douglas F. Goldsmith et al., Separation and Reunification: Using At-
tachment Theory and Research to Inform Decisions Affecting the Placements of 
Children in Foster Care, JUV. & FAM. CT. J., Spring 2004, at 1, 2 (2004). 
 38. WULCZYN ET AL., supra note 2, at 32. 
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guably there is nothing else the state routinely does to private 
individuals that has a greater impact on their well-being and 
that plays a more determinative role in whether their lives go 
well or poorly. This action by the state has the potential to 
damage them severely, and it in fact does so in a large number 
of cases, many of which are quite predictable. As discussed be-
low, empirical studies show that some birth parents—in partic-
ular, those who have previously abused or neglected a child, 
those who are serious and chronic substance abusers, and those 
who have a serious mental illness—are likely to create a quite 
negative experience of the world for a baby, including trauma 
and severe deprivation.39 That the state now does such a pro-
found thing to persons in such a blunt and indiscriminate fa-
shion, without taking this known danger into account, is re-
markable. Tragically, most child maltreatment today befalls 
the youngest children.40 
Evidence for the fundamental importance of a child’s first 
year comes from the neurobiological literature on brain devel-
opment and from the social scientific literature on attach-
ment.41 The neurobiological literature reveals that, during in-
fancy of a normal child, most brain development is complete 
and the basis for cognitive and perceptual processes is in 
place.42 Healthy development of various parts of the brain de-
pends on avoiding or receiving certain experiential inputs.43 
 
 39. See infra notes 73–77, 88–97 and accompanying text. 
 40. See Safe Babies Act of 2007, H.R. 1082, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (“The 
Congress finds as follows: (1) Children three years of age and younger have 
the highest rates of victimization. Infants and toddlers are twice as likely as 
all other children to become victims of child maltreatment. . . . (4) Children 
under the age of four account for 81 percent of child fatalities, and children 
under the age of one account for 45 percent of such fatalities.”). 
 41. For a concise summary, see generally Julie Cohen & Victoria Youcha, 
Zero to Three: Critical Issues for the Juvenile and Family Court, JUV. & FAM. 
CT. J., Spring 2004, at 15. 
 42. See Charles A. Nelson, The Neurobiological Bases of Early Interven-
tion, in HANDBOOK OF EARLY CHILDHOOD INTERVENTION 204, 210 (Jack P. 
Shonkoff & Samuel J. Meisels eds., 2d ed. 2000) (“[S]ynapse elimination in the 
human brain appears to occur late in gestation and early in the postnatal pe-
riod, during a period when the nervous system is highly sensitive to environ-
mental influences.”); id. at 215 (“[T]he most dramatic development—that of 
structures, sulci, gyri, and so forth—occurs during the first few years of life.”); 
see also Sheryl Dicker & Elysa Gordon, Building Bridges for Babies in Foster 
Care: The Babies Can’t Wait Initiative, JUV. & FAM. CT. J., Spring 2004, at 29, 
30 (arguing that “more brain growth and learning occurs during infancy than 
any other time of life”). 
 43. See, e.g., Laurie Miller Brotman et al., Children, Stress, and Context: 
Integrating Basic, Clinical, and Experimental Prevention Research, 74 CHILD 
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Deleterious to neurological development are not only physical 
maltreatment—that is, physical trauma and malnutrition,44—
but also social deprivation and stress during infancy.45 Studies 
of children who spent time after birth in institutional care—
where they were safe and had basic physical needs satisfied but 
received little caregiver attention—find that “these children 
suffered from metabolic deficits in the areas of the brain be-
lieved to be involved in higher cognition, emotion, and emotion 
regulation.”46 Studies of children with attachment disorders 
caused by parental neglect also show an adverse impact on 
brain development.47 Impairment of brain development caused 
by social deprivation in turn hinders intellectual, linguistic, 
emotional, and social development.48 
Social science literature amply documents the crucial deve-
lopmental importance of a secure attachment, which is a child’s 
psychological identification with and emotional connection to a 
caregiver. A secure attachment to a caregiver is the basis of a 
child’s understanding of and feeling about the world and about 
 
DEV. 1053, 1053–57 (2003) (discussing the effects of stress on the brain and 
other physiological development); Nelson, supra note 42, at 215 
(“[E]nvironment plays a critical role in regulating and determining both pre-
natal and early postnatal brain development.”); id. at 218 (“There are now 
numerous illustrations from a variety of species that demonstrate the influ-
ence of positive or negative early life experiences on both the function and the 
structure of the brain.”). 
 44. See WULCZYN ET AL., supra note 2, at 27 (noting the effects of neglect 
and trauma on brain development); Nelson, supra note 42, at 215 (“[P]oor nu-
trition during the first several years of postnatal life has been shown to affect 
a wide range of both behavioral and neurological functions as a result of its 
adverse impact on myelination, which in turn has been shown to affect con-
duction velocity.”). 
 45. See, e.g., MARGARET G. SMITH & ROWENA FONG, THE CHILDREN OF 
NEGLECT: WHEN NO ONE CARES 60 (2004); Brotman et al., supra note 43, at 
1053–54 (noting the effect of maternal deprivation on brain development); 
Charles A. Nelson III et al., The Effects of Early Deprivation on Brain-
Behavioral Development: The Bucharest Early Intervention Project, in ADO-
LESCENT PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND THE DEVELOPING BRAIN: INTEGRATING 
BRAIN AND PREVENTION SCIENCE 197, 209 (Daniel Romer & Elaine Walker 
eds., 2007) (“[I]nstitutionalization is associated with profoundly negative ef-
fects on child and brain development.”); Nelson, supra note 42, at 218, 221. 
 46. Charles H. Zeanah et al., Designing Research to Study the Effects of 
Institutionalization on Brain and Behavioral Development: The Bucharest 
Early Intervention Project, 15 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 885, 888 (2003). 
 47. See SMITH & FONG, supra note 45, at 68. 
 48. See, e.g., WULCZYN ET AL., supra note 2, at 27 (noting that the im-
pairment of brain development as a result of abuse or neglect makes children 
“persistently vulnerable to mental health problems and other developmental 
difficulties”). 
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himself and therefore plays an “essential formative role[] in 
later social and emotional functioning. Infant-parent attach-
ments promote a sense of security, the beginnings of self-
confidence, and the development of trust in other human be-
ings.”49 A secure attachment initially entails a desire to stay 
close to a strong, protective, and nurturing figure, and ulti-
mately, “its effective operation brings with it a strong feeling of 
security and contentment.”50 That security enables a child 
eventually to explore the world without great anxiety and 
therefore to master tasks and develop a sense of competence 
and self-worth.51 It also “creates a positive expectation from the 
child’s view that relationships can be fulfilling, helpful, and 
provide sufficient protection in a world that may at times be 
overwhelming,”52 an expectation that will later make possible 
positive peer and family relationships and healthy intimacy.53 
As a result, securely attached children become “more indepen-
dent, socially competent, inquisitive, and cooperative and em-
pathic with peers; have higher self-esteem; and demonstrate 
more persistence and flexibility on problem-solving tasks.”54 
They possess a “greater capacity for self-regulation, effective 
social interactions, positive self-representations, self-reliance, 
and adaptive coping skills.”55 Conversely, if a child fails to at-
tach to any caregiver or forms only an insecure attachment, 
many negative consequences for many aspects of development 
are likely, as discussed below. 
Whether a child forms an attachment at all and whether 
any attachment formed is secure depends on the child’s interac-
tions with caregivers during the attachment phase of infancy, 
between seven months and two years of age.56 In this period 
especially, babies need “sensitive and responsive care from fa-
 
 49. Joan B. Kelly & Michael E. Lamb, Using Child Development Research 
to Make Appropriate Custody and Access Decisions for Young Children, 38 
FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 297, 298 (2000). 
 50. John Bowlby, Postscript to ATTACHMENT ACROSS THE LIFE CYCLE (Co-
lin Murray Parkes et al. eds., 1991). 
 51. See Goldsmith et al., supra note 37, at 3. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See Cohen & Youcha, supra note 41, at 17. 
 54. Kelly & Lamb, supra note 49, at 303. 
 55. Goldsmith et al., supra note 37, at 2. 
 56. See Kelly & Lamb, supra note 49, at 299–301 (describing the attach-
ment phase). 
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miliar adults in the course of feeding, holding, talking, playing, 
soothing, and general proximity.”57 
In short, babies need regular, positive interactions with 
capable and permanent caregivers in a variety of contexts in 
order to form the psycho-emotional foundation they will need 
successfully to traverse later developmental stages and atten-
dant challenges.58 
Accordingly, it is not sufficient for a child’s healthy devel-
opment that a parent simply not physically endanger the child. 
Even if a parent is consistently present and not dangerous, a 
child might fail to form a secure attachment as a result of poor 
parenting, including “disturbed family interactions, parental 
rejection, inattentive or disorganized parenting, [and] neg-
lect.”59 Children can therefore fail to form a secure attachment 
as a result of a parent’s being present but frequently changing 
environments, present but operating randomly rather than fol-
lowing a regular schedule, present but largely distracted, 
present but incapacitated for significant periods, or present but 
uncaring.60 Any of these might result from a parent’s substance 
abuse, mental illness, or dysfunctional relationship with anoth-
er adult; “[p]reoccupation with personal stressors diminishes 
the parent’s ability to respond in this way.”61 Parents addicted 
 
 57. Id. at 298. 
 58. Goldsmith et al., supra note 37, at 3; see also id. at 11 (“[Parents need] 
insightfulness regarding the impact of their own emotional states on the 
child’s behavior.”); Kelly & Lamb, supra note 49, at 300 (“In the absence of 
such opportunities for regular interaction across a broad range of contexts, in-
fant-parent relationships fail to develop and may instead weaken.”). 
 59. Kelly & Lamb, supra note 49, at 302. 
 60. See SMITH & FONG, supra note 45, at 40; Laurel K. Leslie et al., Ad-
dressing the Developmental and Mental Health Needs of Young Children in 
Foster Care, 26 J. DEVELOPMENTAL & BEHAV. PEDIATRICS 140, 141 (2005) 
(“Numerous studies . . . suggest that the development of social, emotional, and 
behavioral problems in children is due to deficient family management skills 
characterized by harsh and inconsistent discipline, low levels of supervision 
and involvement in the child’s life, and lack of appropriate prosocial rein-
forcement.”); LUCY HUDSON ET AL., ZERO TO THREE, HEALING THE YOUNGEST 
CHILDREN: MODEL COURT-COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS 2, 14 (2007), http:// 
www.abanet.org/child/practice&policybrief_march07.pdf. 
 61. Goldsmith et al., supra note 37, at 3; see also id. at 4 (noting that re-
peated changes in caregivers, as might occur when parents come in and out of 
a child’s life, can produce Reactive Attachment Disorder); Kelly & Lamb, su-
pra note 49, at 302 (discussing impact of parental discord); id. at 305 (discuss-
ing locational stability and its importance for infants and “predictable comings 
and goings of both parents, regular feeding and sleeping schedules, consistent 
and appropriate care, and affection and acceptance; John M. Leventhal et al., 
Maltreatment of Children Born to Women Who Used Cocaine During Pregnan-
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to drugs are likely to be mired in a myriad of dysfunctional 
conditions that prevent them from parenting adequately and 
that create an environment for children antithetical to their 
healthy development.62 And of course, children likely will fail to 
form even an insecure attachment with parents if parents are 
absent for long periods,63 as when parents abandon or neglect a 
child or go to prison,64 or if a child’s interactions with parents 
are often painful rather than nurturing, as when parents phys-
ically abuse a child.65 All these negative experiences can pre-
 
cy: A Population-based Study, 100 PEDIATRICS e7, 1 (1997), http://pediatrics 
.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/100/2/e7.pdf (“Studies show that mothers who 
use cocaine have difficulties interacting with their infants, in particular, de-
monstrating more intrusive and hostile behaviors toward their infants.”) ”); 
Substance Abuse and Child Maltreatment, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, 
Dec. 2003, at 2, http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/subabuse_ 
childmal.pdf [hereinafter CWIG, Substance Abuse] (noting that substance-
abusing parents have a diminished capacity to function as parents because of 
drug-related activities and are often also afflicted with mental illness, high 
levels of stress, and dysfunction in their larger family). 
 62. See SHEIGLA MURPHY & MARSHA ROSENBAUM, PREGNANT WOMEN ON 
DRUGS: COMBATING STEREOTYPES AND STIGMA 8 (1999) (horrible childhood 
environment); id. at 9 (low self-esteem); id. at 12 (dysfunctional social envi-
ronment); id. at 13 (poverty, STDs, violence); id. at 15 (AIDS, criminal activi-
ty); id. at 17–18 (maltreatment as children); id. at 18 (lack of education and 
employment, partner abuse); id. at 19 (horrible neighborhoods, lack of control 
over life); id. at 20–21 (80% on welfare, one-third homeless, one-third living in 
housing projects or motels, more than one-half convicted of crimes); id. at 21 
(lost custody of prior children or left prior children in care of other adults); id. 
at 21 (lack of relationship with their own parents); id. at 26 (own parents also 
substance abusers); id. at 29 (70% abused as children, surrounded by violence, 
fatalistic); id. at 33 (“Many lived in a virtual reign of terror in neighborhoods 
with high rates of crime and violence. [The neighborhoods were] veritable 
combat zones. Between gang warfare, police raids, random shootings, and 
drug dealing, fear became a way of life.”); id. at 45 (other parent typically also 
a drug addict); id. at 46–48 (prostitution); id. at 49 (lack of personal agency); 
id. at 51 (submission to violence by male partner, 70% battered by male part-
ner); id. at 58–59 (fear that telling father about the baby will trigger violence); 
id. at 68 (pregnancy and beatings by partner, pregnancy interfering with pros-
titution, thereby reducing income); id. at 70 (one-third abused during preg-
nancy by male partner). 
 63. Kelly & Lamb, supra note 49, at 300 (“[I]t is important to minimize 
the length of time that infants are separated from their attachment figures; 
extended separations unduly stress developing attachment relationships.”). 
 64. CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATED 
PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN 5 (2000) (showing that over 90% of mothers in 
prison see their children less than once a week, with around half never seeing 
their children during their incarceration). 
 65. WULCZYN ET AL., supra note 2, at 32 (“Much empirical work has do-
cumented that maltreated and foster infants are more likely to exhibit . . . at-
tachment disorders.”); Cohen & Youcha, supra note 41, at 18 (“[C]hildren who 
have experienced physical abuse . . . are more likely to be insecurely attached 
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vent children from forming trust in a caregiver and, more gen-
erally, in the world they inhabit, and they can also prevent 
children from developing self-esteem, a sense of competence, or 
a view of themselves as persons who are worthy of care.66 
In addition, children are harmed by disruption of an estab-
lished attachment relationship.67 It is very difficult to reestab-
lish an attachment once it is disrupted and also very difficult 
for a child later to form an attachment to a new caregiver.68 
Thus, children’s development is adversely affected by removal 
from a parent after an attachment with the parent has formed, 
even though the removal might be necessary for the child’s 
safety or because the parent goes to prison.69 Importantly, 
children are also adversely affected by being removed from fos-
ter parents if they have begun to attach to the foster parents, 
whether the removal is for the purpose of placing the child with 
a “rehabilitated” birth parent or for the purpose of changing 
foster care placements (as traditionally was done when foster 
parents appeared to be getting “too close” to the child).70 Stress 
in general can adversely affect a child’s development,71 and dis-
 
to their parents.”).  
 66. See Goldsmith et al., supra note 37, at 7. 
 67. See WULCZYN ET AL., supra note 2, at 29 (“[T]ransitions in living envi-
ronments have an independent relationship to major indicators of adolescent 
deviance (e.g., delinquency and school dropout).”); Kelly & Lamb, supra note 
49, at 303 (“[T]here is a substantial literature documenting the adverse effects 
of disrupted parent-child relationships on children's development and adjust-
ment.”). 
 68. Kelly & Lamb, supra note 49, at 300–01. 
 69. See Goldsmith et al., supra note 37, at 6, 8–9 (noting that the trauma 
of separation from parents after attachment can cause the child to associate 
the parents with trauma, making reunification difficult). 
 70. WULCZYN ET AL., supra note 2, at 148 (arguing that multiple foster 
care placements lead to behavioral problems); Cohen & Youcha, supra note 41, 
at 16 (“When a baby faces a change in placement, fragile new relationships 
with foster parents are severed, reinforcing feelings of abandonment and dis-
trust.”); Leslie et al., supra note 60, at 141 (noting that placement changes ex-
acerbate attachment problems); ZERO TO THREE, RESTRUCTURING THE FEDER-
AL CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM: ASSURING THE SAFETY, PERMANENCE AND WELL-
BEING OF INFANTS AND TODDLERS IN THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 5 (2007), 
http://www.zerotothree.org/site/DocServer/childwelfare.pdf?docID= 
2521 [hereinafter ZERO TO THREE] (“Multiple foster care placements present a 
host of traumas for very young children. When a baby faces a change in 
placement, fragile new relationships with foster parents are severed reinforc-
ing feelings of abandonment and distrust. Babies grieve when their relation-
ships are disrupted and this sadness adversely effects their development.”). 
 71. See Brotman et al., supra note 43, at 1054; Louise S. Ethier et al., Risk 
Factors Associated with the Chronicity of High Potential for Child Abuse and 
Neglect, 19 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 13, 22 (2004); Nelson, supra note 42, at 216; Ka-
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ruption of any attachment relationship and living situation is 
highly stressful for a child.72 
In turn, attachment disorders cause lifelong difficulties. 
Numerous studies of maternal deprivation have concluded that 
failure of attachment caused by inadequate nurturance in in-
fancy results in “a variety of serious medical problems, physical 
and brain growth deficiencies, cognitive problems, speech and 
language delays, sensory integration difficulties and stereo-
types, and . . . social and behavioral abnormalities.”73 Attach-
ment failure retards socio-emotional development and produces 
emotional withdrawal, indiscriminate socializing, lack of im-
pulse control, failure to internalize moral norms, and psychia-
tric disorders such as depression, anxiety, hyperactivity, and 
disruptive behavior.74 Some children subject to early depriva-
 
therine C. Pears & Deborah M. Capaldi, Intergenerational Transmission of 
Abuse: A Two-Generational Prospective Study of an At-Risk Sample, 25 CHILD 
ABUSE & NEGLECT 1439, 1442 (2001) (discussing Post-Traumatic Stress Dis-
order in abuse victims). 
 72. Goldsmith et al., supra note 37, at 1 (warning of the severe risks to, 
and long-term effects on a child associated with separation from the caregiv-
er); Kelly & Lamb, supra note 49, at 304 (“[T]he loss or attenuation of signifi-
cant relationships in childhood can cause anxiety and a profound sense of loss, 
particularly in the first 2 years, when children have limited cognitive and 
communicative resources to help cope with loss.”). 
 73. Zeanah et al., supra note 46, at 886 (citations omitted); see also SMITH 
& FONG, supra note 45, at 66–67; Nelson, supra note 42, at 216 (“[I]solation 
rearing also results in a host of behavioral impairments, including hyperactiv-
ity, abnormal responses to novelty and stressors, and cognitive deficits in 
adulthood.”). 
 74. See JUSTIN W. PATCHIN, THE FAMILY CONTEXT OF CHILDHOOD DE-
LINQUENCY 5 (2006) (“[L]ack of emotional ties between parents or between 
parent and child contribute to involvement in maladaptive behavior.”); id. at 6 
(“[A]ttachment to one’s parents can result in decreased delinquency through a 
process known as ‘virtual supervision.’” (citation omitted)); id. at 14 
(“[C]hildren attached to both parents are less likely to be delinquent than 
youth attached to only one parent.”); id. at 28 (citing research concluding that 
“youth who are strongly attached to their parents are less likely to engage in 
delinquent behavior”); id. (“[I]nattentive parents who do not take time to posi-
tively socialize their children may actually cause them to act out on impulses 
or negative feelings, thereby leading them toward a ‘persistent’ criminal ca-
reer.” (emphasis removed)); id. at 29–30 (“[P]arents control their children’s 
behavior and buffer them from delinquency by forming strong social and emo-
tional ties that bind children to their parents, and, by extension, to conven-
tional order.”); id. at 30 (“‘If the child is alienated from the parent, he will not 
learn or will have no feeling for moral rules, he will not develop an adequate 
conscience or superego.’” (citation omitted)); id. at 31 (“[Y]outh who are psy-
chologically attached will fear the emotional damage caused by the disobe-
dience.”); id. at 32 (“[D]elinquent peers will become salient only if the attach-
ment to the parents is weak.”); id. at 43 (“Parents play a crucial role in that 
self-control is developed (almost exclusively in the family) in the first few 
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tion recover some lost ground in some areas of development if 
transitioned early to a highly nurturing environment, but much 
damage is irreparable and less recovery in all aspects of devel-
opment is possible the longer a child goes without permanence 
in a good home.75 Merely providing services to neglectful par-
ents or special educational programs for a child is very unlikely 
to remedy the effects of a nonnurturing environment in infan-
cy.76 
A much larger body of social science research demonstrates 
a clear link between proven child maltreatment (which corre-
lates highly with attachment disorders) and numerous adverse 
effects and outcomes for maltreated children. It shows a strong 
correlation between maltreatment and cognitive impairment, 
delayed language development, poor school performance, poor 
physical health and development, mental health problems, lack 
of self-control and behavioral disorders, failure to internalize 
 
years and remains relatively stable across the life course.”); SMITH & FONG, 
supra note 45, at 66–67; Nelson et al., supra note 45, at 205–09; HUDSON ET 
AL., supra note 60, at 14; ZERO TO THREE, INFANT AND EARLY CHILDHOOD 
MENTAL HEALTH: PROMOTING HEALTHY SOCIAL AND EMOTIONAL DEVELOP-
MENT 5 (2004), http://www.zerotothree.org/site/DocServer/IMHState.pdf?docID 
=1723.  
 75. WULCZYN ET AL., supra note 2, at 32 (“[S]ome types of insult to the 
brain, such as neglect and trauma, are more difficult to overcome and may re-
sult in lasting cognitive and social-emotional impairments.”); Cohen & Youcha, 
supra note 41, at 18 (citing a statement by the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion that “there is no scientific evidence to support the effectiveness of some 
specific therapies used to treat [Reactive Attachment] Disorder” (citation omit-
ted)); Cindy S. Lederman et al., When the Bough Breaks the Cradle Will Fall: 
Promoting the Health and Well Being of Infants and Toddlers in Juvenile 
Court, 52 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 33, 34 (2001) (“For young children who have the 
misfortune of entering the juvenile court system in their first few years of life, 
preventive interventions are often too late.”); Nelson, supra note 42, at 220 
(“[A]t least some regions of the brain, at least under some conditions [can re-
cover from early deprivation].”); id. at 221 (noting that for children subjected 
to socio-emotional deprivation in infancy, “the adverse impact of these expe-
riences on the brain may create a situation whereby intervention must be pro-
vided early and intensively to be successful”); Zeanah et al., supra note 46, at 
903 (discussing studies of children adopted from institutions showing that 
“lack of early social interaction had profound effects upon the social and emo-
tional development of the child” and that those socio-emotional effects are not 
greatly ameliorated even by later adoption). 
 76. See, e.g., W. John Curtis & Charles A. Nelson, Toward Building a Bet-
ter Brain: Neurobehavioral Outcomes, Mechanisms, and Processes of Environ-
mental Enrichment, in RESILIENCE AND VULNERABILITY: ADAPTATION IN THE 
CONTEXT OF CHILDHOOD ADVERSITIES 463, 464 (Suniya S. Luthar ed., 2003) 
(“[O]ver the past four decades, scores of enriched preschool intervention pro-
grams have been implemented . . . . [T]he hoped-for and expected enduring ef-
fects on IQ have largely not been obtained.”). 
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moral norms, peer socialization problems, violence and other 
forms of delinquency, running away from home, youth suicide, 
substance abuse, prostitution, teen pregnancy, unemployment, 
criminality in adulthood, partner violence as an adult, and mal-
treatment of the next generation of children.77 Many of these 
adverse outcomes are more pronounced the younger a child is 
when incurring the maltreatment.78 Significantly, some re-
searchers have concluded that psychological maltreatment is 
more detrimental in the long run than is physical maltreat-
ment.79 
Turning to predictive parental characteristics, child mal-
treatment strongly correlates with parental substance abuse, 
mental illness, and prior maltreatment of another child: birth 
parents with substance abuse problems are (a) at a pronounced 
higher risk of child maltreatment, (b) extremely unlikely to 
overcome an addiction prior to the time when their baby needs 
to form a secure attachment to a consistent, nurturing caregiv-
er, regardless of what assistance they receive, (c) very likely to 
 
 77. See PATCHIN, supra note 74, at 7, 39–45; SMITH & FONG, supra note 
45, at 43, 63–65, 72–73; WULCZYN ET AL., supra note 2, at 32–36, 82, 105–06, 
146–49; Cohen & Youcha, supra note 41, at 16, 18; Susan M. Cunningham, 
The Joint Contribution of Experiencing and Witnessing Violence During 
Childhood on Child Abuse in the Parental Role, 18 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 619, 
619–20, 632 (2003); Ethier et al., supra note 71, at 14, 21–22; Jaana Haapasa-
lo & Terhi Aaltonen, Mothers’ Abusive Childhood Predicts Child Abuse, 8 
CHILD ABUSE REV. 231, 242–44 (1999); Diane V. Malbin, Fetal Alcohol Spec-
trum Disorder (FASD) and the Role of Family Court Judges in Improving Out-
comes for Children and Families, 55 JUV. & FAM. CT. J., Spring 2004,at 53, 53–
54; Steven J. Ondersma, Introduction to the First of Two Special Sections on 
Substance Abuse and Child Maltreatment, 12 CHILD MALTREATMENT 3, 4 
(2007); Pears & Capaldi, supra note 71, at 1441–42; Cathy Spatz Widom, Un-
derstanding Child Maltreatment and Juvenile Delinquency: The Research, in 
UNDERSTANDING CHILD MALTREATMENT AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: FROM 
RESEARCH TO EFFECTIVE PROGRAM, PRACTICE, AND SYSTEMIC SOLUTIONS 1, 
1–8 (2003); Aubyn C. Stahmer, et al., Developmental and Behavioral Needs 
and Service Use for Young Children in Child Welfare, 116 PEDIATRICS 891, 
897 (2005); CWIG, Substance Abuse, supra note 61, at 2; OFFICE OF PLANNING, 
RESEARCH, & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, NATION-
AL SURVEY OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT WELL-BEING (NSCAW): CPS SAMPLE 
COMPONENT WAVE 1 DATA ANALYSIS REPORT §§ 11.1, 11.5 (2005), http://www 
.acf.hhs.gov/programs/opre/abuse_neglect/nscaw/reports/cps_sample/cps_toc 
.html [hereinafter NSCAW]. 
 78. See PATCHIN, supra note 74, at 18–22 (citing evidence that the earlier 
children manifest antisocial behavior, the more likely they are to have a “pro-
longed career” of antisocial and criminal behavior); Cunningham, supra note 
77, at 634; Stahmer et al., supra note 77, at 894. 
 79. See Lois A. Weithorn, Protecting Children from Exposure to Domestic 
Violence: The Use and Abuse of Child Maltreatment Statutes, 53 HASTINGS L. 
J. 1, 74–76 (2001). 
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have child protective services (CPS) remove their children from 
their custody at some point anyway, and (d) extremely unlikely 
to reunify successfully following removal.80 The prospects are 
 
 80. See PATCHIN, supra note 74, at 9 (noting the propensity of substance 
abusers’ children to become substance abusers themselves); id. at 9–10 
(“[H]istories of criminal involvement and alcoholism of the mother was found 
to be more prevalent in delinquent youth. . . . Growing up with parents who 
are openly involved in deviant activities can also have detrimental effects for 
youth as they develop their own identity.”); id. at 11 (stating that for parents 
involved in criminal activity “parenting is compromised due to their own illicit 
activities” and “inebriated parents cannot effectively supervise their children 
and may punish inconsistently or harshly”); SMITH & FONG, supra note 45, at 
35, 37, 45, 211–16; Amy D’Andrade & Jill Duerr Berrick, When Policy Meets 
Practice: The Untested Effects of Permanency Reforms in Child Welfare, 33 J. 
SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 31, 37 (2006) (“[E]stimates of the proportion of children 
placed in foster care at least in part due to substance abuse issues of the par-
ents range from 50%–80%.”); Jill Duerr Berrick et al., Reasonable Efforts? Im-
plementation of the Reunification Bypass Provision of ASFA, CHILD WELFARE 
(forthcoming 2008) (“Evidence from a number of studies suggests . . . that sub-
stance abuse has become the predominant problem among many parents in-
volved in child welfare . . . .” (citation omitted)); Leventhal et al., supra note 
61, at 4 (“[B]y 2 years of age, children born to mothers who used cocaine dur-
ing pregnancy were 6.5 times more likely to be maltreated and 5.0 times more 
likely to be placed outside the home compared with a sociodemographically 
similar comparison group.”); id. (“[A]pproximately 25% of the children in the 
cocaine-exposed group spent some time during the first 2 years of their life be-
ing cared for outside their homes.”); Malbin, supra note 77, at 55–56 (listing 
behavioral and judgment-making problems associated with Fetal Alcohol 
Spectrum Disorder, which results from mothers exposing their babies to alco-
hol in utero); Ondersma, supra note 77, at 3–5 (noting several studies showing 
highly elevated rates of child maltreatment among parents with alcohol or 
substance-abuse problems); Kathryn Page, Fetal Alcohol Spectrum—The Hid-
den Epidemic in Our Courts, 52 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 21, 29 (2001); Dana K. 
Smith et al., Child Maltreatment and Foster Care: Unpacking the Effects of 
Prenatal and Postnatal Parental Substance Use, 12 CHILD MALTREATMENT 
150, 151, 155, 157 (2007); Nancy K. Young et al., Parental Substance Use Dis-
orders and Child Maltreatment: Overlap, Gaps, and Opportunities, 12 CHILD 
MALTREATMENT 137, 140–42 (2007) (reviewing the literature showing that a 
high percentage of parents with child maltreatment reports have substance 
abuse problems even though child protection workers fail to detect substance 
abuse problems 61% of the time); id. at 142–43 (showing the percentage of 
parents receiving drug treatment who lose custody of their children and the 
percentage who ultimately have parental rights terminated); id. at 147 (“The 
recovery process often takes longer than is allowed under the ASFA legisla-
tion.”); STEVE CHRISTIAN, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, SUB-
STANCE-EXPOSED NEWBORNS: NEW FEDERAL LAW RAISES SOME OLD ISSUES 4 
(2004), http://www.ncsl.org/print/cyf/newborns.pdf (“[M]aternal alcohol and 
drug use is clearly associated with numerous risk factors. These include chao-
tic and dangerous lifestyles, involvement in abusive relationships, and mental-
health problems that affect parenting.”); id. (“Perinatal substance exposure, 
combined with postnatal risk factors such as unpredictable and inconsistent 
parenting, increases the risk of poor long-term outcomes, including behavioral 
problems and cognitive deficits.”); JOHN D. FLUKE & DANA M. HOLLINSHEAD, 
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similarly bleak for birth parents suffering from serious mental 
illnesses.81 While states generally do a poor job of collecting in-
formation on maltreatment recidivism rates, studies suggest 
that these rates are quite high, so there is good reason to fear 
that parents who have seriously abused or neglected one or 
more children before will abuse or neglect another child they 
conceive if given the opportunity.82 
Studies of children of incarcerated parents also document 
the lifelong damage done to these children by their parents’ ab-
 
NAT’L RES. CTR. ON CHILD MALTREATMENT, CHILD MALTREATMENT RECUR-
RENCE: A LEADERSHIP INITIATIVE OF THE NATIONAL RESOURCE CENTER ON 
CHILD MALTREATMENT 8, 22 (2003), http://www.nrccps.org/PDF/Maltreatment 
Recurrence.pdf (noting studies showing the elevated risk of maltreatment re-
currence when children are returned to parents who have had substance 
abuse problems); NSCAW, supra note 77, § 11.3.3, tbl.A-9; JOSEPH P. RYAN, 
ILL. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., ILLINOIS ALCOHOL AND OTHER 
DRUG ABUSE (AODA) WAIVER DEMONSTRATION: FINAL EVALUATION REPORT 
3-3 (2006), http://cfrcwww.social.uiuc.edu/pubs/pdf.files/AODA.01.06.pdf (re-
porting the results of intensive demonstration project that raised rates of reu-
nification with substance abusing parents only from 11.6% to 15.5% and stat-
ing that “historically, substance abusing families achieve very low rates of 
reunification”); BARBARA E. SMITH ET AL., AM. BAR ASS’N, PARENTAL SUB-
STANCE ABUSE, CHILD PROTECTION AND ASFA: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
MAKERS AND PRACTITIONERS 6 (2005), http://www.abanet.org/child/final_ 
report_dec22.pdf (showing that among substance-abusing parents in the child 
protective systems in Illinois and California, 40% fail even to attempt treat-
ment and 40% enter treatment but relapse); id. at 7 (stating that mothers are 
less likely to overcome addiction than fathers). 
 81. See WULCZYN ET AL., supra note 2, at 132 (noting the association be-
tween maltreatment and parents’ mental-health difficulties); D’Andrade & 
Berrick, supra note 80, at 36 (“[E]motional problems of the parent . . . are as-
sociated with failure to reunify.”); Haapasalo & Aaltonen, supra note 77, at 
234; Terry Lyons, When Reasonable Efforts Hurt Victims of Abuse: Five Years 
of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 26 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 391, 
397–404 (2002) (discussing the mental health problems of victims of partner 
violence and the overlap between families with partner violence and families 
with child abuse); FLUKE & HOLLINSHEAD, supra note 80, at 8 (citing a study 
showing higher rate of maltreatment for parents with mental-health problems 
following return of child to parent custody); NSCAW, supra note 77, § 11.3.3 
(“[A]dult mental illness is a substantial contributor to the problems in parent-
ing that child welfare services attempts to address.”); id. at tbl.A-10. 
 82. Most child maltreatment fatalities occur among infants and most are 
at the hands of parents who were previously subject to investigation for child 
maltreatment. See CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVS. PROGRAM,VA. DEP’T OF SOC. 
SERVS., ANNUAL CHILD MALTREATMENT FATALITY REPORT 11 (2004), http:// 
www.dss.virginia.gov/files/about/reports/children/child_protective_services/200
4/neglect.pdf; NSCAW, supra note 77, § 11.1 (finding that over half of the fam-
ilies reported to CPS agencies for child abuse or neglect have had prior mal-
treatment reports as well); id. § 11.6 (noting “extraordinary level of prior child 
welfare involvement among the families and children in this study”); id. at 
tbls.A-6, A-7. 
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sence and criminal disposition.83 Congress has recognized the 
serious detriment children incur from growing up while a par-
ent is in prison, and it has recognized that criminality in par-
ents is typically coupled with a host of other dysfunctional be-
haviors and characteristics: 
Parental arrest and confinement lead to stress, trauma, stigmatiza-
tion, and separation problems for children. These problems are 
coupled with existing problems that include poverty, violence, paren-
tal substance abuse, high-crime environments, intrafamilial abuse, 
child abuse and neglect, multiple care givers, and/or prior separa-
tions. As a result, these children often exhibit a broad variety of be-
havioral, emotional, health, and educational problems that are often 
compounded by the pain of separation.84 
Teen parents in juvenile detention have these same prob-
lems in addition to being immature.85 Thus, for the state to 
create and continue a legal parent-child relationship between a 
newborn child and a birth parent who is in a prison or juvenile 
correction facility at the time of birth or who is highly likely to 
become incarcerated at a later point, because of a substantial 
history of violence or illegal substance abuse, is to set up the 
child for lifelong suffering and dysfunction. 
In sum, scientific research shows that two things can se-
riously adversely affect an infant’s physiological and psycho-
emotional development—initial placement in the custody of 
parents who are incapable of providing consistent nurturing 
and, alternatively, disruption of a healthy initial attachment 
with good caregivers. The best child welfare policy is therefore 
one that aims to get parentage right at the outset and then 
supports whatever choice of initial parentage is made. Accor-
dingly, certain current practices discussed below are quite de-
trimental to children. The state routinely confers legal parent-
hood and custody on birth parents even when the state is aware 
that the birth parents have serious maltreatment histories 
with other children, have intractable substance abuse or men-
tal health problems, and/or are incarcerated. And when the 
state does take custody of children, temporary foster care is 
 
 83. See, e.g., PATCHIN, supra note 74, at 16 (“[C]hildren of prisoners are 
extremely vulnerable to engage in delinquent behavior possibly due to the 
combination of disruption (being absent) and exposure to deviant parental be-
liefs.”). 
 84. 42 U.S.C. § 629i(a)(1)(D) (Supp. 2004). 
 85. See LESLIE ACOCA & KELLY DEDEL, NO PLACE TO HIDE: UNDERSTAND-
ING AND MEETING THE NEEDS OF GIRLS IN THE CALIFORNIA JUVENILE JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 10 (1998) (“The vast majority of girls in the juvenile justice system are 
experiencing one or more serious physical- and/or mental-health disorders.”). 
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still the norm for placements after removal of all children, in-
cluding infants, and the number of placement transitions for 
children in the foster care system is shockingly high—
nationally, six placements per child on average.86 
B. WHY NEWBORNS ARE DIFFERENT 
More generally, child-protection law fails to differentiate 
among children by age, instead taking a “one rule fits all ages” 
approach.87 Correspondingly, many legal scholars writing about 
the child-protection system write as if all children are affected 
in the same ways by it, regardless of age.88 Yet several things 
clearly differentiate newborn children from older children who 
come to CPS attention. First, as discussed above, the first year 
of life is the most important developmentally. Second, children 
are readily adoptable immediately after birth, but their chances 
for adoption diminish steadily from that point on, especially if 
they incur maltreatment or spend a substantial period of time 
in foster care.89 Third, newborn children have no established 
relationship with birth parents to maintain. 
 
 86. See Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 637, 660 (2006); SMITH ET AL., supra note 80, at 155 (reporting the re-
sults of a 2004 government study of multiple foster care placements); RYAN, 
supra note 80, at 3-3 (showing that out of 1936 children removed from custody 
of substance-abusing parents in Cook County, only one was in a pre-adoptive 
foster care placement). 
 87. See WULCZYN ET AL., supra note 2, at 9 (“[T]he child welfare system 
has a long history of one-size-fits-all solutions that ignore what is known about 
well-being and human development.”); id. at 122 (“[T]he federal framework for 
child welfare services . . . is almost completely silent on ways to account for 
age or development.”); Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The 
Promise and Failure of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. 
L. REV. 637, 667–72 (1999) (noting that AFSA treats different children with 
different needs identically). 
 88. Cf. Dicker & Gordon, supra note 42, at 30 (“[T]he needs of infants . . . 
are often invisible to the court and child welfare system.”); Lederman et al., 
supra note 75, at 33 (noting that infants historically have been largely ig-
nored). 
 89. See BARTHOLET, supra note 36, at 181 (“The potential pool of adoptive 
parents is enormous—it dwarfs the pool of waiting children. About 1.2 million 
women are infertile and 7.1 percent of married couples, or 2.1 million.”); id. at 
241 (“[W]e have a system that holds children too long in their homes of origin 
and in out-of-home care until they have suffered the kind of damage that 
makes it hard for them to adjust and to bond in a new family . . . .”); U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOSTER CARE: RECENT LEGISLATION HELPS STATES FO-
CUS ON FINDING PERMANENT HOMES FOR CHILDREN, BUT LONG-STANDING 
BARRIERS REMAIN, GAO-02-585, at 29 (2002) [hereinafter GAO] (reporting dif-
ficulties states experience in finding adoptive parents for children with beha-
vioral problems); id. at 38 (noting that states are increasingly finding it diffi-
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This last fact, in particular, is typically overlooked by those 
who advocate for family “reunification” efforts in all cases. For 
example, Dorothy Roberts, a prominent critic of the child-
protective system, writes: 
Think for a moment what it means to rip children from their parents 
and their siblings to be placed in the care of strangers. Removing 
children from their homes is perhaps the most severe government in-
trusion into the lives of citizens. It is also one of the most terrifying 
experiences a child can have.90 
What Roberts describes is simply not applicable to children 
taken into state custody at birth or within the first few months 
of life. Those children are not attached to their birth parents 
and experience no terror in the absence of their birth parents.91 
It is not until after some months of life that children begin to 
differentiate among persons in the environment and associate 
particular persons with particular experiences, such as satis-
faction of their physical and emotional needs or, conversely, 
 
cult to find adoptive homes for older children in foster care); WULCZYN ET AL., 
supra note 2, at 112 (noting that the likelihood of adoption decreases as age 
increases); Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of Permanence: A Critical Analysis of 
the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 11 (2001) 
(noting that as children get older it becomes more difficult to find them per-
manent homes); Brian H. Bix, Perfectionist Policies in Family Law, 2007 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1055, 1061 & n.37 (citing statistics and noting that “given the cur-
rent supply and demand for children for adoption, there is every reason to be-
lieve that a baby given up immediately after birth would have no trouble find-
ing a loving home”); Gordon, supra note 87, at 667–68; Martin Guggenheim, 
Somebody’s Children: Sustaining the Family's Place in Child Welfare Policy, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 1716, 1745 (2000) (“By the time the foster children are eli-
gible for adoption—the time it will take to exhaust reunification efforts and 
the time it will take the courts to order termination—children will almost cer-
tainly be older than two years, and often considerably older. These simply are 
not the children that these couples want to adopt.”); Child Welfare Informa-
tion Gateway, Concurrent Planning: What the Evidence Shows, April 2005, at 
5, http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/concurrent 
.pdf [hereinafter CWIG, Concurrent Planning]. 
 90. Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, 2003 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 171, 173. 
 91. See Kelly & Lamb, supra note 49, at 299 (stating that during the first 
two months of life infants accept care from any caregiver and show no prefe-
rence among them whereas between two and seven months infants “begin to 
recognize certain caregivers and prefer interaction with them” but still “do not 
protest when separated from their parents”); Viola Macchi Cassi et al., A Be-
havioural and ERP Investigation of 3-Month-Olds’ Face Preferences, 44 NEU-
ROPSYCHOLOGIA 2113, 2114 (2006) (“[W]hat is classically interpreted as a spe-
cific inborn preferential response to faces is in fact the result of a more general 
preference for any class of top-heavy visual stimuli displaying more patterning 
in the upper portion.”); id. at 2115 (citing studies showing increasing selectivi-
ty, between six and twelve months). 
 430 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:407 
 
trauma.92 And it is not until the period when attachment solidi-
fies, between seven and twenty-four months of age, that child-
ren experience stress from being separated from a particular 
caregiver.93 
In light of newborns’ preattachment reality, it is a misno-
mer to characterize efforts at rehabilitating unfit birth parents 
of newborns as “reunification,” and it is incorrect to character-
ize taking a newborn into CPS custody as disruption of a family 
relationship. A newborn has not been in a relationship with the 
birth parents that could be disrupted, and so cannot logically be 
reunited with them. The question from a CPS perspective in 
the case of a newborn is whether the state will try to create a 
minimally adequate relationship in the first instance between a 
child and birth parents whom the child has never known, and 
either place the newborn in birth parents’ custody or hold the 
newborn in foster care while CPS tries to make such custody 
possible, or will instead immediately create a permanent rela-
tionship for the child with some other adults who are already 
well prepared to be nurturing caregivers. 
If the state chooses the former path, establishing and 
maintaining for a substantial period a legal relationship with 
unfit birth parents, it actually sets up the children for the terri-
fying experience Roberts describes, given the high probability 
of maltreatment in the birth parents’ custody and the substan-
tial possibility of ultimate adoption by someone other than the 
foster parents (resulting in severance of any relationship the 
baby has with the foster parents) in cases where birth parents 
are incapable of taking custody at the child’s birth. What ob-
servers of and participants in the child-protection system need 
to acknowledge is that the prevailing practice of placing child-
ren in foster care and attempting to rehabilitate their parents 
is simply ineffective in a large percentage of cases. Sensible pol-
icy and proper respect for newborns’ needs and moral rights 
should lead agencies to try to identify the newborns whose par-
ents have the poorest prognosis and to take the latter path with 
those babies—that is, immediate placement with adoptive par-
ents. CPS agencies generally do not have sufficient funding to 
provide substantial services to all the parents they now at-
tempt to rehabilitate, so the resources are spread thinly over all 
 
 92. Kelly & Lamb, supra note 49, at 299. 
 93. Id. 
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rather than concentrated on parents who have a reasonable 
chance of becoming capable of adequate care giving.94 
The most common response to acknowledgement of the li-
mited resources for reforming dysfunctional parents is to argue 
that the only policy change needed is to devote massively more 
public resources to the child-protective system and to services 
for unfit parents, and that terminating parental rights is unfair 
so long as the state does not provide parents with effective ser-
vices. There are two problems with this response. First, even 
the best, most resource-intensive parent-rehabilitation pro-
grams, with all the facilities and services and encouragement 
experts typically recommend, have very little success with dys-
functional parents.95 For example, a five-year demonstration 
 
 94. See HUDSON ET AL., supra note 60, at 21 (noting a lack of funding for 
needed mental-health services); GAO, supra note 89, at 42 (noting a lack of 
substance abuse treatment); NSCAW, supra note 77, § 11.6 (“There is no 
doubt that most of the children and families who come to the attention of child 
welfare agencies receive very little direct service from the agency.”); Richard 
P. Barth et al., From Anticipation to Evidence: Research on the Adoption and 
Safe Families Act, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 371, 395 (2005) (“Financing for 
family reunification services is very limited and inflexible. Even when there 
are resources to pay for assisting parents, the parent training technologies for 
family reunification are massively underdeveloped.”); Gordon, supra note 87, 
at 662–66. 
 95. See CAPTA: Successes and Failures at Preventing Child Abuse and 
Neglect: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Education of the Comm. on 
Education and the Workforce, 107th Cong. 70 (2002) [hereinafter CAPTA] 
(statement of Richard Gelles) (“[A]s yet, there is no empirical evidence to sup-
port the effectiveness of child welfare services in general or the newer, more 
innovative intensive family preservation services.” (emphasis removed)); 
SMITH & FONG, supra note 45, at 185 (“[T]here remain, at the present time, no 
intervention techniques that have been proven to be consistently successful 
with families who neglect their children . . . .”); WULCZYN ET AL., supra note 2, 
at 8 (“[R]esearch has so far struggled to find effective services for maltreat-
ment, placement prevention, and family reunification.” (citation omitted)); id. 
at 170 (“[V]ery few interventions that address maltreatment and placement 
have met the standard scientific criteria of effectiveness.”); Ethier et al., supra 
note 71, at 22 (reporting the results of study of parents in rehabilitation pro-
grams, showing that “after 4 years of intervention and services received, 62% 
of the mothers still display a high level of abuse and neglect problems”); 
FLUKE & HOLLINSHEAD, supra note 80, at 12 (citing a study that found “dura-
tion, intensity and breadth of family preservation services had little overall 
impact on the recurrence of child maltreatment” (emphasis removed)); Nat’l 
Conf. of State Legis., States Using Evidence-Based Methods to Prevent Child 
Abuse, PUB. HEALTH NEWS, May 3, 2004, at 1, 2 available at http://www.ncsl 
.org/print/health/preventabuse.pdf [hereinafter NCSL] (discussing studies 
showing that many programs that “look good cosmetically” in fact have not 
been proven effective). Successful parent rehabilitation is especially unlikely 
when children are removed from parent custody in infancy; only around one 
third of newborns taken into state custody ultimately “reunify” with birth par-
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project in Cook County, Illinois that provided 1500 randomly 
selected parents with a comprehensive needs assessment, entry 
into treatment programs within twenty-four hours of assess-
ment, and a “Recovery Coach” to coordinate their services, mon-
itor their progress, advocate on their behalf, and give them en-
couragement succeeded in securing the recommended services 
very quickly for the vast majority of parents in the program, 
but raised the rate at which social workers thought it “safe” to 
return a child to parent custody only from 11.6% to 15.5%.96 
Most parents whose children need to be taken into state custo-
dy have dysfunctions so deep, stemming from damage they 
themselves incurred as children, that they are not going to 
overcome them even in a couple of years,97 and newborns can-
not wait more than six months or so for a permanent and nur-
turing caregiver. 
Second, even if a massively greater investment in parental 
rehabilitation would lead to a timely transformation of enough 
unfit parents to make waiting for their birth parents a good bet 
for at-risk newborns, until that investment is made the child-
ren now being born to unfit parents should have their needs 
addressed based on what is actually available, not what would 
be available in a perfect world. If the current foster care system 
is a failure, as some maintain, then we should be quite uncom-
fortable about placing children in it, especially newborn babies, 
while we make unpromising efforts to effect dramatic changes 
in deeply dysfunctional birth parents. If birth parents are so 
unfit at the time of birth that their having custody of a baby 
would be detrimental to the baby even with CPS oversight, 
then the best bet for the baby is most likely to be immediate 
termination of birth parents’ rights and placement of the baby 
for adoption. 
Importantly, even where there is a good chance of eventual 
birth-parent custody, it makes much less sense for a newborn 
than for an older child to wait for that to occur. It is a mistake 
simplistically to assume that placement with the legal parents, 
following a court determination that that would be safe, is al-
ways or even usually the best outcome for children who enter 
 
ents. See ZERO TO THREE, supra note 70, at 1. 
 96. See RYAN, supra note 80, at 1-1 to 1-11, 3-3. 
 97. Observers of child protection agency practices note that most parents 
reported for child maltreatment have little motivation or capacity to become 
rehabilitated. See, e.g., CAPTA, supra note 95, at 69–70 (statement of Richard 
Gelles); Bartholet, supra note 25, at 339; NSCAW, supra note 77, at tbl.A-11. 
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the foster care system. In most cases in which “reunification” 
does occur today, the placement with birth parents occurs only 
after a year or more of rehabilitative efforts, and roughly half 
occur only after two or more years.98 A year is simply too long 
for a newborn to wait for a biological parent to become capable 
of custody, and transferring custody to a birth parent after a 
year is likely to entail a detrimental disruption of an attach-
ment to the initial caregiver if the child was placed with foster 
parents. Moreover, reunification does not mean that a child will 
then have even a decent upbringing; a substantial percentage 
of children whom the state transfers from foster care to birth-
parent custody end up in the child protective system again, af-
ter another maltreatment report,99 meaning that the child has 
multiple damaging disruptions during the crucial first years of 
life. Further, many of those who do remain in the parents’ 
home thereafter will have only a marginal existence, suffering 
maltreatment that goes undetected or receiving parental care 
that is just above the local CPS agency’s threshold for interven-
tion. 
Placing babies born to criminals in a holding pattern while 
birth parents serve jail terms is also very detrimental to the 
children, because of the impact on attachment and on a child’s 
sense of identity. Even after release, incarcerated parents are 
generally not able for some time to establish a home for and 
take care of a child,100 so the child’s wait for permanency is 
likely to extend well beyond the expected release date, which is 
itself likely to be years down the developmental road if the par-
ents have committed felonies.101 In addition, most incarcerated 
mothers suffer from a host of personal problems—in particular, 
 
 98. See Barth et al., supra note 94, at 394 (“Reunifications often result af-
ter quite a long time, well beyond what the law has now set as the time for the 
first permanency review (i.e., twelve months). Prior investigations have shown 
that about half of reunifications that occur do so in the first six to eighteen 
months, but that the remaining half will require an additional two or more 
years to do so.”); Cohen & Youcha, supra note 41, at 15 (noting that half of ba-
bies who enter foster care before three months of age spend thirty-one months 
or more in foster care); Dicker & Gordon, supra note 42, at 31 (noting that ba-
bies who enter foster care at less than three months of age are the most likely 
to “spend twice as long in care as older children”). 
 99. See Ethier et al., supra note 71, at 22; NCSL, supra note 95, at 1–2. 
 100. See Laurie P. Cohen, A Law’s Fallout: Women in Prison Fight for Cus-
tody, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2006, at A1. 
 101. See Sally Day, Mothers in Prison: How the Adoption and Safe Families 
Act of 1997 Threatens Parental Rights, 20 WIS. WOMEN’S L. J. 217, 225 (2005) 
(“The average state prison inmate-mother serves a term of forty-nine months. 
Mothers in the federal system serve an average of eighty-three months.”). 
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drug addiction, alcoholism, mental illness, and lack of educa-
tion—that will continue to plague them after release, and ac-
cordingly they are quite likely to return to prison after being 
“reunited” with the babies to whom they gave birth while in 
prison.102 
The alternative of placement of newborns for adoption, on 
the other hand, is a safe bet. There is no evidence that being 
raised by adoptive parents per se, rather than by biological 
parents, produces adverse outcomes for children.103 In fact, 
children raised from birth by adoptive parents on average have 
better welfare outcomes than children raised by biological par-
ents in general,104 which is likely explained by the fact that 
adoptive parents, as evidenced by their successful completion of 
an intrusive and somewhat arduous qualification process, on 
average have a stronger motivation to be parents and have 
greater competencies and resources than the general popula-
tion. This reality gives us some sense of the relative importance 
of the biological connection for children; it is significant, but 
positive nurturance is much more important. Tellingly, studies 
of adopted persons who go in search of their biological parents 
(which is certainly not something all adopted persons do) never 
suggest that, upon meeting and getting to know their biological 
parents, any adopted persons say that they wish they had been 
raised by their biological parents rather than by their adoptive 
parents.105 It is subjectively important for many of them to 
 
 102. Id. at 224 (“Women’s convictions tend to come in the context of dismal 
personal histories.”); id. at 225 (detailing “socio-economic and health chal-
lenges” faced by mothers in prison); MUMOLA, supra note 64, at 7 (showing 
that two-thirds of mothers in state prison had a prior conviction and that 
nearly one-half had two or more prior convictions); id. at 8 (showing that 86% 
of mothers in state prisons had a history of illegal drug use); id. at 9 (showing 
that 22.5% of mothers in state prison are mentally ill). 
 103. See Bartholet, supra note 25, at 331 (“Sociobiologists who promote the 
biological favoritism theory have produced little empirical support for its va-
lidity in the realm of human parenting.”). 
 104. See GAO, supra note 89, at 14 (“Limited evidence suggests that few 
adopted children returned to the child welfare system.”); ELIZABETH BARTHO-
LET, FAMILY BONDS 164–86 (1993) (discussing empirical literature). 
 105. See James Gladstone & Anne Westhues, Adoption Reunions: A New 
Side to Intergenerational Family Relationships, 47 FAM. REL. 177, 179 (1998); 
Karen March, The Dilemma of Adoption Reunion: Establishing Open Commu-
nication Between Adoptees and Their Birth Mothers, 46 FAM. REL. 99, 103–04 
(1997); Paul Sachdev, Adoption Reunion and After: A Study of the Search 
Process and Experience of Adoptees, 71 CHILD WELFARE 53, 64–65 (1992); 
Mark Simpson et al., Adoptees in Search of Their Past: Policy Induced Strain 
on Adoptive Families and Birth Parents, 30 FAM. REL. 427, 432 (1981). Adop-
tee searchers are overwhelmingly female and interested only in knowing their 
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make that connection with their biological past, but having a 
good, secure, loving upbringing is vastly more important. 
In short, for a substantial percentage of newborn children 
whose parents have previously manifested unfitness or who are 
currently incapacitated by reason of serious and chronic sub-
stance abuse, severe mental illness, or incarceration, there is 
very little chance of their having a decent life with their birth 
parents, and the only sensible surrogate decision in their behalf 
by the state would be to move for TPR and adoption immediate-
ly after birth. The best-interests equation is much different for 
newborns than it is for older children, and the law can and 
should reflect this difference. It should push CPS agencies to 
view protective intervention and TPR differently for newborns 
than for older children. As Part III explains, recent legislative 
reforms at the federal level aimed to induce more proactive 
child protective intervention, with a particular focus on pre-
venting maltreatment of additional children within the same 
family after a parent has been found to have abused or neg-
lected one child. 
III.  FEDERAL LAWS PUSHING STATES TO BE 
PROACTIVE   
Since the 70s, the federal government has played a signifi-
cant and expanding role in state child protection efforts, 
through funding legislation that conditions grants to states on 
their enacting certain types of laws to govern child maltreat-
ment cases. States have generally conformed their laws to the 
federal funding conditions. Since the mid-90s, the thrust of fed-
eral legislation has been to push states to intervene before 
high-risk parents abuse or neglect a child, with particular con-
cern for at-risk newborns. 
Congress began to construct the current framework of fed-
eral funding conditions with the 1974 Child Abuse Prevention 
and Treatment Act,106 which required states to institute a sys-
tem of mandatory child maltreatment reporting by people in 
certain positions, such as teachers and doctors. Then in 1980, 
Congress reacted to complaints that children were remaining in 
foster care too long because local CPS agencies were not giving 
parents enough help in overcoming problems that led to remov-
al. It passed the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 
 
birth mother, not their biological father. Sachdev, supra, at 57–58. 
 106. Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 5101–5106 (2000)).  
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1980 (“AACWA”),107 which required states to make “reasonable 
efforts” to avoid the need for removing children from parental 
custody following a maltreatment report and, when removal is 
necessary, to secure the reunification of parent and child.108 
Thus, the initial federal focus was on reacting to child abuse or 
neglect after it had occurred, rather than on preventing mal-
treatment in the first instance by intervening on the basis of 
maltreatment risk.109 
In the mid-90s, however, Congress fielded widespread 
complaints that states were doing too little to prevent child 
abuse and neglect, were allowing unfit parents too much time 
to become rehabilitated, were unwisely endeavoring to rehabili-
tate parents who were extremely unlikely to become fit to have 
custody within a reasonable time, were lax in moving children 
in foster care to permanent placements when reunification with 
parents was not possible, and were subjecting children to mul-
tiple foster care placements.110 Congress recognized that these 
practices were damaging children and wasting public funds.111 
 
 107. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) (codified in scattered sections 
of 42 U.S.C. (2000)). 
 108. See id. § 101; Adler, supra note 89, at 3 (noting that AACWA was an 
“effort to address the problem of foster care drift” but still “emphasized family 
preservation”). 
 109. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. H1502 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 2002) (statement of 
Rep. Holt in support of the Adoption and Safe Families Act); WULCZYN ET AL., 
supra note 2, at 12 (“A common thread in the criticism of child welfare services 
is their residual or reactive nature.”). 
 110. See BARTHOLET, supra note 36, at 24 (“[W]e try to avoid removing 
children from their families at all costs and to return children who are re-
moved as quickly as possible.”); id. at 235 (“[Family preservation activists] 
condemn the state for being too reluctant to respond to serious child mal-
treatment with coercive measures, to remove children from harm's way, and to 
terminate parental rights so that children can be moved on to safe, nurturing 
families.”); Adler, supra note 89, at 3 (noting that foster care caseloads “over-
whelmed family preservation resources” and that Congress reacted to 
“[e]gregious incidents of child abuse, occurring as state agencies made futile 
attempts to preserve troubled families”); Barth et al., supra note 94, at 372–74 
(citing foster care drift, efforts “to reunify children with even the most difficult 
families,” and research showing that even infants were experiencing multiple 
foster care placements); Berrick et al., supra note 80; Gordon, supra note 87, 
at 646–48 (noting that ASFA was passed in response to concerns that local 
CPS agencies were undertaking excessive efforts to rehabilitate parents and 
were trying to return children to parents in whose care children could never be 
safe). 
 111. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. S12668 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement 
of Sen. Jeffords) (“[I]f a parent has been found to have murdered another child 
in the family, or has subjected a child to chronic abuse, it is unreasonable—
and irrational—to insist that the state return that child to the family.”); 143 
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Speaking in support of ASFA, legislators blamed states for ex-
aggerating the AACWA reasonable efforts requirement. Sena-
tor DeWine stated: 
We need [this bill] because of an unintended consequence of a bill that 
was passed by this Congress in 1980. . . . [The AACWA], tragically, 
has often been seriously misinterpreted by those responsible for ad-
ministering our foster care system. Too often, reasonable efforts, as 
outlined in the statute, have come to mean unreasonable efforts. It 
has come to mean efforts to reunite families which are families in 
name only. I am speaking now of dangerous, abusive adults who 
represent a threat to the health and safety and even the lives of these 
children. . . . Clearly, the Congress of the United States in 1980 did 
not intend that children should be forced back into the custody of 
adults who are known to be dangerous and known to be abusive.112 
Congress reacted with legislation aimed at shortening 
children’s time in foster care, avoiding wasted efforts with irre-
deemable parents, achieving permanence for children of such 
parents more quickly, and, crucially, encouraging states to take 
a more proactive, preventive approach to child abuse and neg-
lect.113 
To minimize time in foster care for already-maltreated 
children, ASFA requires a “permanency hearing” within twelve 
months of a child’s placement and, under the “15-22 rule,” a pe-
tition for termination of parental rights (TPR) if a child has 
been in foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two 
months.114 Relatedly, ASFA requires states to authorize TPR 
 
CONG. REC. S12,198 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1997) (statement of Sen. Helms) (“Fos-
ter care children should not be returned to unfit, abusive parents. . . . Because 
the current Federal law requires States to make reasonable efforts to reunite 
children with their biological parents, children have tragically been returned 
to their abusive and sometimes murderous parents.”); 143 CONG. REC. H2012 
(daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Pryce) (“[T]he most important 
change we can make is to elevate the rights of children because too often a fos-
ter child’s best interests are abandoned while courts and welfare agencies drag 
their feet. To correct this injustice, H.R. 867 [ASFA] places the safety and 
well-being of children above efforts by the State to reunite them with biologi-
cal parents who have abused or neglected them.”). 
 112. 143 CONG. REC. 12,668 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997); see also H.R. REP. 
105-77 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739 (noting that CAPTA’s rea-
sonable efforts requirement, applied in a manner too protective of parents’ 
rights, had operated as an undesirable obstacle to adoptions that would be 
beneficial to children). 
 113. GAO, supra note 89, at 1–2; D’Andrade & Berrick, supra note 80, at 
31–32. 
 114. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5) (2000). This feature of ASFA appears to have had a 
discernible impact on the operation of local child protection agencies and to 
have increased dramatically the number of adoptions in the United States. See 
Barth et al., supra note 94, at 386. 
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without any efforts to rehabilitate abusive parents (also known 
as “reunification bypass” or “fast-track TPR”) in cases where a 
“parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances,” 
which would at a minimum include more heinous forms of mal-
treatment. This would allow for a severely abused or neglected 
child’s adoption with much less time spent in foster care. In ad-
dition, ASFA clarifies that AACWA’s “reasonable efforts” re-
quirement does not preclude states from “concurrent plan-
ning”—that is, placing a child in a preadoptive foster home and 
completing steps toward adoption while also working toward 
reunification with birth parents, so that if the parents do not 
succeed in rehabilitation, an adoption can happen more expedi-
tiously and without disrupting the child’s life.115 
What was conceptually revolutionary about ASFA, though, 
was its emphasis on preventing maltreatment by reacting to a 
parent’s history of maltreatment with other children. ASFA’s 
“no reasonable efforts” provision requires states to authorize 
TPR without rehabilitate efforts even in some cases as to a 
child who has not yet been abused or neglected, cases in which 
the parents’ past conduct toward another child suggests the 
child is at very high risk of maltreatment. Specifically, ASFA 
required states to authorize local CPS agencies to forego rea-
sonable efforts and move immediately for a permanent place-
ment other than with the biological parent if a biological parent 
has previously had rights terminated as to another offspring, 
has previously culpably killed or attempted to kill another 
offspring, or has previously committed felony assault resulting 
in seriously bodily injury against another offspring.116 In fact, 
ASFA directs states to legally mandate that CPS workers peti-
tion for TPR without rehabilitative efforts as to any child whose 
parent has been convicted of killing, attempting to kill, or 
committing felony assault against another offspring, unless 
CPS chooses to place the child with a relative or documents a 
compelling reason for determining that such a petition would 
not be in the child’s best interests.117 Further, Congressional 
supporters of ASFA were emphatic that the Act’s list of cases in 
 
 115. U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (2000) (“[R]easonable efforts to place a child for 
adoption or with a legal guardian may be made concurrently with reasonable 
efforts [to preserve and reunify families].”). 
 116. Id. § 671(a)(15)(D). Murder of the child’s other parent is also a basis 
for reunification bypass. Id. § 101(a)(15)(D)(ii). 
 117. Id. § 675(5)(E) (2000); see also id. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(xvi). 
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which reasonable efforts were not required was not exclusive, 
and that states were free to add others.118 
Though there is some evidence of a particular congression-
al concern with the damage done to the youngest children,119 
the congressional record does not reflect a specific ASFA aim of 
promoting adoption of children over parental objection imme-
diately after birth. Yet CPS agencies could use this authoriza-
tion to petition for involuntary TPR without reasonable efforts 
as a basis for submitting such a petition immediately after a 
child’s birth and for placing a newborn in an adoptive home, if 
the child’s biological parent has a history of the specified sort. 
A second highly significant federal law aimed at more 
proactive intervention, one that does clearly reflect a concern 
with newborns, is the Keeping Children and Families Safe Act 
of 2003 (KCAFSA). KCAFSA requires states to ensure (1) that 
medical professionals who detect drug exposure in newborns 
report this to the local child protective agency, and (2) that lo-
cal CPS agencies react to such reports with “procedures for the 
immediate screening, risk and safety assessment, and prompt 
investigation of such reports” and “a plan of safe care” for the 
baby.120 This was a bold step for Congress, given the wide-
spread resistance, from the medical community and from advo-
cates for reproductive freedom, to legal rules attaching any 
negative consequences to women’s behavior during pregnan-
cy.121 Supporters of KCAFSA decried the fact that substance 
 
 118. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. S12668 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement 
of Sen. DeWine) (“This bill . . . also includes a list of certain very specific cases 
in which reasonable efforts are not required. . . . Mr. President, let me point 
out now very carefully so there is no risk of misinterpretation on this floor, 
this list that I have just read is not meant to be an exclusive list. The authors 
of this legislation do not—do not—intend these specified items to constitute an 
exclusive definition of which cases do not require reasonable efforts to be 
made. Rather, these are examples—these are just examples—of the kind of 
adult behavior that makes it unnecessary, that makes it unwise, makes it 
simply wrong for the Government to make continued efforts to send children 
back to their care. This is not meant to be an exclusive list. We make this clear 
in the text of the bill.”). 
 119. 143 CONG. REC. H2013 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. 
Pryce) (noting the crucial developmental importance of a child’s first years of 
life). 
 120. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(ii) to (iv) (Supp. 2004). 
 121. See, e.g., Nat’l Abandoned Infants Assistance Res. Center, Substance 
Exposed Infants: Noteworthy Policies & Practices, Sept. 2006, at 2, available at 
http://aia.berkeley.edu/media/pdf/sen_issue_brief.pdf [hereinafter NAIARC] 
(citing opposition by American Academy of Pediatrics to universal testing of 
newborns for drug exposure); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts 
Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 
 440 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:407 
 
abusing mothers routinely take their children home without 
any safeguards in place, noting that a high percentage of such 
children end up abused or neglected, and they expressed the 
belief that this legislation would spare a great number of child-
ren from having to suffer permanent damage before receiving 
proper attention from local child welfare agencies.122 Suppor-
ters also criticized the traditional CPS approach of being reac-
tive, and saw the Act as a significant step toward being more 
proactive.123 
In sum, federal legislative reforms since the mid-90s have 
created the potential for more proactive intervention to prevent 
at-risk children from ever being abused or neglected, and in 
particular for stepping in at the time of birth based on parental 
history or current dysfunction. In some such cases, CPS might 
need only to conduct an assessment of the birth parents’ situa-
tion and offer assistance, such as home visits by a nurse or so-
cial worker.124 In other cases, temporary placement of the baby 
in foster care might be appropriate, if the birth parents suffer 
from a temporary incapacity that they can overcome quickly 
 
HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1419 (1991); Ellen M. Weber, Child Welfare Interventions 
for Drug-Dependent Pregnant Women: Limitations of a Non-Public Health Re-
sponse, 75 UKMC L. REV. 789, 789–95 (2007). 
 122. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. H1511 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2002) (statement of 
Rep. Greenwood) (“Today, children are born all over this country to mothers 
who have substance abuse problems. Their mothers are alcoholic or their 
mothers are drug addicts. These babies are born in hospitals, they are fre-
quently underweight, they are frequently frail. . . . [T]hey are sent home from 
hospitals every day in this country and it is only a matter of time in so many 
instances until they return back to the hospital abused, bruised, beaten, and 
sometimes deceased. That is because we have not developed a system in this 
country to identify these children and intervene in their lives. The amend-
ments that we put in this bill for the first time require the States to set up 
programs so that when these children are born to these addicted families that 
there is intervention. . . . In those cases where the mother is refusing or una-
ble or unwilling to get help to protect her child, to mother properly, to parent 
properly, or where the home situation is just too chaotic and too violent for the 
child to be safe, then there can be intervention and the child can be placed in 
foster care. Over and over again, the newspapers of our country are replete 
with these cases of terribly, terribly abused, battered, sexually abused and 
sometimes beaten-to-death children who could have been saved if only we had 
intervened when we knew there was a problem, when we could see that this 
child was born to a dysfunctional family where substance abuse is the issue. 
Now we will be able to do that.”). 
 123. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. H1513 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 2002) (statement of 
Rep. Holt); 148 CONG. REC. H1509 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 2002) (statement of Rep. 
Miller). 
 124. See Cohen & Youcha, supra note 41, at 18 (discussing such programs 
and when they are likely to be effective); NCSL, supra note 95, at 1. 
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with assistance. As explained in Part II, however, in a signifi-
cant percentage of cases the state action most consistent with 
the welfare of the newborn children will not be to send the child 
home and hope for the best, with or without services, nor to 
place the child in foster care while parent-rehabilitation efforts 
are undertaken, but instead to move immediately to create an 
alternative permanent family for the baby, via TPR and adop-
tion. ASFA and KCAFSA took some steps toward making this 
possible, but for reasons described in Part IV, the reality today 
is that it almost never happens. 
IV.  WHY THE POTENTIAL IS UNREALIZED   
It is somewhat difficult to know for certain to what extent 
states are effectuating the preventive aims of the federal laws 
Part III described. The federal oversight agency, the Children’s 
Bureau at the Department of Health and Human Services, 
gathers little information on state practices in implementing 
ASFA and KCASFA,125 and most states do not collect this in-
formation from their local CPS agencies.126 Evidence from non-
HHS sources is limited but suggests that local agencies still 
almost never seek TPR until after they spend considerable time 
trying to rehabilitate parents, so long as parents are present 
and resist termination. For example, a GAO survey of four 
states found that only 102 of 14,489 children entering foster 
 
 125. See GAO, supra note 89, at 23; Barth, et al., supra note 94, at 379 
(“Because rigorously designed and large-scale evaluations of ASFA do not ex-
ist, uncertainty about the impact of ASFA continues to be great. . . . The Adop-
tion and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) [HHS’s in-
strument for collecting data on state practices] . . . has few variables per case, 
and has not been structured to follow cohorts of children over time. Thus it has 
very limited utility for understanding the way that child welfare services 
might have changed.”); id. at 392 (“[T]here is no federal oversight of the devel-
opment or application of exemption [i.e., “no reasonable efforts”] provisions.”); 
D’Andrade & Berrick, supra note 80, at 37 (“[T]here are no reporting require-
ments associated with this aspect [reunification bypass] of the law. States do 
not have to report or monitor when reunification exception is employed, or 
which of the available conditions are used to deny reunification services to 
parents.”) The implementing regulations are 45 C.F.R. §§ 1355.10 to 1355.57 
(2007). 
 126. See D’Andrade & Berrick, supra note 80, at 37 (“[M]ost states were not 
able to provide data on the use of reunification exceptions.” (citation omitted)); 
id. at 41 (“California does not require that counties track how and when reuni-
fication exception conditions are applied, or which are used.”). I requested 
such information from the Virginia Department of Social Services and was 
told that the Department does not ask localities to report on the statutory 
bases for TPR petitions nor on whether rehabilitation efforts were made prior 
to petitioning for TPR. 
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care were “fast-tracked” for adoption,127 and that only one per-
cent of children adopted from foster care are under age one.128 
That tiny fraction of cases in which adoption occurs soon after 
birth might well comprise solely cases in which birth parents 
acquiesce to TPR. This Part explains why states still almost 
never place children born to unfit parents in adoptive homes 
until after the children have been permanently damaged by 
maltreatment and/or prolonged foster care. 
A. HIGH-RISK PARENTS DO NOT COME TO THE STATE’S 
ATTENTION 
Although ASFA created bases for TPR and adoption imme-
diately after birth for some children whose birth parents have 
previously demonstrated unfitness, it did nothing to ensure 
that such children come to CPS attention at the time of birth. If 
CPS is unaware that a parent who has previously horribly 
abused or killed a child has procreated again, it can do nothing 
to protect the newborn child from also becoming a victim. Such 
parents typically are able to procreate again, because they re-
ceive little or no jail time.129 Likewise, if adults with chronic 
 
 127. GAO, supra note 89, at 24; see also id. at 3 (concluding that states use 
the “fast track” authorization infrequently); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
FOSTER CARE: STATES’ EARLY EXPERIENCES IMPLEMENTING THE ADOPTION 
AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT, GAO/HEHS-00-1, 9 (1999) (noting that only two 
states supplied data on TPR without reasonable efforts, and of those two, one 
reported four instances and the other reported zero); Barth, et al., supra note 
94, at 390 (“Information from over two hundred cases that have experienced 
TPRs in the NSCAW study shows that only five percent of these decisions 
were made earlier than twelve months in to the case. Around three-fourths 
followed an attempt at reunification services that parents did not participate 
in.” (citation omitted)); Berrick, et al, supra note 80, (discussing a California 
study showing courts authorized reunification bypass in fewer than 10% of 
cases in which statutes authorized it). Conversations I have had with local 
CPS directors and CPS attorneys in Virginia are consistent with the impres-
sion these studies create; agencies continue doing business the way they long 
have, automatically placing children they remove, of whatever age, in foster 
care and, unless the parents simply refuse to cooperate, giving the parents a 
year or more to improve. 
 128. GAO, supra note 89, at 22. 
 129. See ELLEN GRAY, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD 
SEXUAL ABUSE 10–11 (2003); Jennifer M. Collins, Lady Madonna, Children at 
Your Feet: The Criminal Justice System’s Romanticization of the Parent-Child 
Relationship, 93 IOWA L. REV. 131, 133 (2007); John Hopkins, Inmate’s Re-
lease: 3-Year Term Ends Today for Killer of Stepdaughter, VA. PILOT, July 20, 
2007, at A1 (discussing the short sentence for a man who pled guilty to molest-
ing and killing a two-year old girl—four years after going unprosecuted for the 
death of his own one-month old daughter—and noting that the mother of the 
one-month old had been “charged with murder, convicted of felony child abuse, 
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and severe substance abuse or mental health problems pro-
create, CPS can do nothing to protect the child they produce if 
no one perceives the problem and notifies CPS. Yet neither fed-
eral nor state law ensures that any newborn children at high 
risk of maltreatment come to the attention of local CPS agen-
cies before being abused or neglected. 
State reporting laws generally do not include as a factual 
trigger for a report to CPS the presence of an ASFA “no reason-
able efforts” ground for TPR—for example, that birth parents 
have previously tortured or abandoned another child, and AS-
FA did not direct states to do so. Reporting laws generally re-
quire some people and permit others to report only suspicions 
that a child has been abused or neglected or that a parent has 
engaged in conduct that puts the child in immediate danger.130 
Indeed, birthing facility staff will typically have no reason to be 
aware of a birth parents’ child maltreatment history. Even if by 
happenstance they are aware of such history, they have no le-
gal grounds for notifying CPS of the birth. Reporting laws gen-
erally also do not require reporting to CPS of births to parents 
who are mentally ill or who are in prison. 
In any state, therefore, a parent who yesterday was con-
victed of felony assault against one child, or had parental rights 
terminated as to another child because of horrible abuse or neg-
lect of the other child and a failure to respond to a program of 
rehabilitative services, can give birth today and walk out of the 
hospital with the new baby without any supervision and with-
out the local CPS agency—who just argued in court that the 
parents were unfit to have custody of a child—even being 
aware of the new child. Regardless of parental history, hospit-
 
and put on probation”). 
 130. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 413 (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2008); 
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6311 (2001 & Supp. 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-
1509(A) (2007 & Supp. 2008). On occasion, hospitals invoke such imminent-
danger provisions as justification for notifying CPS when a birth parent is 
manifestly incapable of caring for a child, perhaps because she is mentally ill. 
See, e.g., Sylvia v. Hampton Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 1557-06-1, 2007 WL 
817444, at *2 (Va. App. Mar. 20, 2007) (upholding the juvenile court’s finding 
that a newborn was “abused and neglected by virtue of appellant’s behavior in 
the hospital” and ordering that the child be taken into CPS custody on that 
basis). But such rules have conventionally been interpreted to refer to situa-
tions of concrete immediate peril to a child, such as a parent poised to do vi-
olence to a child or a home environment in which dangerous items such as 
drug needles or guns are lying about. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-02 
(2006) (including within the definition of “deprived child” a child who is 
“present in an environment subjecting the child to exposure to a controlled 
substance . . . or drug paraphernalia”); Weithorn, supra note 79, at 68. 
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als send newborn children home with birth parents, and local 
CPS agencies are generally unaware of the child’s existence un-
til they get a call informing them that the newborn, after going 
to live with the birth parents, has suffered harm from abuse or 
neglect, at which point CPS workers might lament: “I knew 
we’d be seeing those parents again.”131 
The one situation in which CPS now must be called in at 
the time of a child’s birth is detection of in utero drug exposure, 
following KCAFSA. This might appear an effective way of trig-
gering CPS proactive intervention for a high percentage of at-
risk children, given the high correlation between maternal drug 
abuse and both newborns’ developmental fragility and post-
partum parental abuse or neglect of children. However, KCAF-
SA had major gaps and states are exploiting them. First, 
KCAFSA covers only exposure to illegal drugs, not exposure to 
high amounts of alcohol,132 even though children born to alco-
holic mothers also have special needs and are at heightened 
risk of maltreatment.133 Second, birthing facilities are not re-
quired to test for exposure to illegal drugs; KCAFSA did not 
mandate testing, and state laws generally do not require it.134 
 
 131. Cf. CAPTA, supra note 95, at 64–65 (statement of Richard Gelles) 
(“Between 1,500 and 2,000 children are killed by their caretakers each year—
and half of these children are slain after they or their families have come to 
the attention of authorities.”). 
 132. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000). 
 133. See Malbin, supra note 77, at 53–54 (“Parents of children with FASD 
often themselves have undiagnosed brain damage (i.e., FASD) that compro-
mises their ability to successfully complete court-mandated programs.”); id. at 
54 (noting that most children with fetal alcohol spectrum disorder develop be-
havioral problems including attention deficit disorder, hyperactivity, reactive 
attachment disorder, learning disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, serious 
emotional disturbance, and/or antisocial personality disorder). 
 134. See NAIARC, supra note 121, at 2. Minnesota mandates that a toxi-
cology test be given to a pregnant woman if she has obstetrical complications 
that indicate the possible use of a controlled substance, and of a newborn if 
there is evidence of prenatal exposure to a controlled substance. MINN. STAT. 
§ 626.5562 (2006). Virginia requires that providers of prenatal care “establish 
and implement a medical history protocol for screening pregnant women for 
substance abuse . . . .” VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2403.1(A) (2005). However, detec-
tion of substance abuse by means of such a protocol does not trigger a re-
quirement that the baby be tested for exposure nor a requirement that medi-
cal professionals notify the local CPS agency of the mother’s substance abuse. 
In fact, the law proscribes release of the information to anyone other than the 
woman herself, her representative, or her other health care providers. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 54.1-2403.1(B), (C) (2005). And it dictates that the information is 
to be used to counsel and treat the woman and shall be inadmissible in crimi-
nal proceedings. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2403.1(D) (2005). Other states’ statutes 
might authorize hospitals to test for drug exposure but not require that they 
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Whether physicians or nurses test newborns for drug exposure 
typically depends on hospital policy or individual predilection, 
and evidence suggests it is not done consistently for drugs and 
is rarely done for alcohol.135 Given physicians’ reluctance to re-
port misconduct by their patients to state authorities, some 
who would have tested before KCASFA might now choose not 
to, to avoid being in a position of being legally required to re-
port to CPS. Many might believe, rightly or wrongly, that they 
need parental consent to perform tests on the baby if adverse 
legal consequences could follow,136 and substance abusing par-
ents would likely refuse consent. KCASFA thus might well 
have had the unintended, ironic effect of reducing detection of 
maternal drug abuse. In the U.S. as a whole, thousands of 
newborns are taken into state custody each year because of ma-
ternal drug addiction,137 but experts believe this represents on-
ly a small fraction of the total number of children whose moth-
ers are substance abusers—the vast majority do not come to 
CPS attention.138 
In addition to situations where parents with maltreatment 
histories or substance abuse problems give birth in hospitals 
and then take the child home without CPS awareness, there 
are situations in which birth parents do not take a newborn 
child home with them yet CPS still does not become aware of 
the child’s birth, because the baby is handed off to a relative. 
This might happen informally, by virtue of a birth parent exit-
ing the hospital with a child and immediately leaving the child 
with a grandparent or other relative. Somewhat more formally, 
it routinely occurs when birth parents are in prison. A signifi-
cant number of women who are sentenced to jail are pregnant 
when they enter prison, or somehow become pregnant after en-
tering prison, and so give birth while they are prisoners.139 
Many states do not require prison officials to inform the local 
 
do so. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 214.160(2), (3) (2006); WIS. STAT. 
§ 146.0255(2) (2006). 
 135. See NAIARC, supra note 121, at 2–3, 5. 
 136. See id. at 4 (discussing informed consent); see also WIS. STAT. 
§ 146.0255(2) (2006) (“[N]o physician may test an expectant mother without 
first receiving her informed consent to the testing.”). 
 137. See Dicker & Gordon, supra note 42, at 31. 
 138. Steven J. Ondersma et al., Child Protective Services’ Response to Pre-
natal Drug Exposure: Results From a Nationwide Survey, 25 CHILD ABUSE & 
NEGLECT 657, 661–63 (2001). 
 139. See Mariely Downey, Losing More than Time: Incarcerated Mothers 
and the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 9 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 41, 41 
(2001) (“Five percent of the women entering prison are pregnant.”). 
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CPS of births to inmates. In Virginia, for example, state sta-
tutes direct that any child born in the facility or to an inmate 
“shall be delivered to his father or other member of his family,” 
and only if no relative steps forward are prison officials to in-
volve CPS.140 Placement with a “father or other member of the 
family” usually means placement with non-parent relatives, be-
cause for most children born to imprisoned mothers the biologi-
cal father is not available.141 
Placement with nonparent relatives can be fine for a child; 
the relatives might be good caregivers and might ultimately 
adopt the child. But in most instances, the relatives will not 
adopt the child, and so the child will for some time following 
birth not be in the custody of adults who will be the child’s 
permanent parent figures. Relatives typically intend to care for 
the child just until the birth parent gets out of jail.142 If the 
parent will be out a few months after the birth and immediate-
ly take custody, the disruption in care might not have adverse 
consequences, because the child will not yet have attached to 
the nonparents. But if it will be much later than that, which is 
likely if the parent was convicted of a felony (other than child 
abuse),143 the child will likely either attach to the nonparent 
caregivers, in which case a transfer of custody to the released 
mother will disrupt the attachment, or the child will not attach 
to any caregiver. As explained in Part II, either would even-
tuality be detrimental to the child’s development, 
In addition, as discussed further below, many relatives of 
prison inmates are not good caregivers, and their having custo-
dy can be quite detrimental to a child. Criminals tend to come 
from pervasively dysfunctional families and communities, and 
most of them were themselves abused or neglected as children, 
by the very persons who are most likely, now as grandparents, 
to step forward to take custody of the child.144 A state’s direc-
 
 140. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-714 (2005 & Supp. 2008). See also MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 119 § 23A (2002). 
 141. See Downey, supra note 139, at 45 (“Seventy to ninety percent of in-
carcerated mothers are the sole caregivers for their children.”); MUMOLA, su-
pra note 64, at 3 (stating that only 28% of mothers in state prison received 
childcare assistance from the fathers). 
 142. See Gordon, supra note 87, at 659. 
 143. See Downey, supra note 139, at 47. 
 144. See, e.g., MUMOLA, supra note 64, at 3 (stating that for 53% of mothers 
in state prison, their children are in the care of a grandparent); Laurie Miller 
Brotman et al., Preventive Intervention for Urban, Low-Income Preschoolers at 
Familial Risk for Conduct Problems: A Randomized Pilot Study, 32 J. CLINI-
CAL CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHOL. 246, 246–47 (2003) (noting “environmen-
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tion to place children of inmates in the custody of prisoners’ 
relatives, without notification of CPS so that social workers can 
determine whether such a placement is good for a child, is 
therefore likely to be greatly detrimental to many such child-
ren. 
B. CPS AND COURTS LACK AUTHORITY TO INTERVENE PRIOR TO 
MALTREATMENT 
Even if a child born to high-risk parents comes to CPS at-
tention, there is no clear federal mandate that states take ac-
tion to prevent maltreatment of that child. In all states, the law 
does require local CPS agencies to conduct an assessment or 
investigation of a child’s situation when it receives a report of 
parental conduct that would meet the state’s definition of 
abuse, neglect, or endangerment, and does permit CPS workers 
to take custody of a child where the report is substantiated and 
the child would otherwise suffer harm.145 In most states, how-
ever, nothing in the circumstances of a newborn child prior to 
placement in the birth parents’ home could meet those defini-
tions, absent a very generous and nontraditional interpretation 
of statutory language. Standards for intervention historically 
were drafted with only a reactive focus, an assumption that the 
state should get involved with respect to a given child only af-
ter a parent has maltreated that child, has overtly threatened 
to harm the child, or has put that child in a dangerous situa-
tion, and historically the prevailing understanding of child mal-
treatment was limited to conduct toward a child after birth.146 
 
tal” and community risk factors and stating that it is well documented that 
antisocial behavior is familial); Cohen, supra note 100, at A12 (describing fam-
ilies of women in prison as including other members incarcerated and/or with 
substance abuse problems); SMITH ET AL., supra note 80, at 157. 
 145. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-129 (2007 & Supp. 2008); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 432B.260(1-4) (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1503, 1505 (2007 & Supp. 
2008). 
 146. See, e.g., Reyes v. Sup. Ct. of San Bernardino County, 141 Cal. Rptr. 
912 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (reasoning that criminal child abuse statute applied 
only to living children “susceptible to care or custody”); In re Fletcher, 533 
N.Y.S.2d 241, 243–44 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1988) (holding that state legislature did 
not intend civil child maltreatment statute to cover conduct affecting a child 
before birth). But see MINN. STAT. § 260C.178(b) (2006) (authorizing placement 
of a child in foster care when “the court determines there is reason to believe . 
. . that the child's health or welfare would be immediately endangered . . . . In 
determining whether the child’s health or welfare would be immediately en-
dangered, the court shall consider whether the child would reside with a per-
petrator of domestic child abuse”); MINN. STAT. § 260C.007(2)(iii) (2006) (defin-
ing “[c]hild in need of protection or services” to include a child who “resides 
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Thus, a newborn in the hospital cannot have been maltreated 
or even yet put at risk of maltreatment; that can only happen 
after birth parents take the baby home. And CPS typically will 
not know how high-risk parents are treating a baby at home 
unless and until they receive a report of abuse or neglect. 
Despite its aim of promoting more proactive intervention, 
ASFA did nothing to change that conventional, reactive ap-
proach to investigation and initial CPS protective action. ASFA 
did not require states to amend their definitions of abuse, neg-
lect, dependency, or other standard of maltreatment, for pur-
poses of CPS authority to investigate and intervene, so that 
they include maltreatment of other children by the same par-
ent. Though state law might authorize TPR with respect to a 
newborn child who is still at the hospital, pursuant to ASFA’s 
no reasonable efforts component, there will generally be no le-
gal basis for CPS even to conduct an investigation of the par-
ent’s situation, let alone take protective custody, before the 
parent takes the newborn home and abuses or neglects the ba-
by. Thus, should a hospital employee happen to notify a CPS 
social worker that a parent who previously committed felony 
sexual assault or some other egregious conduct against another 
child just became a parent again, the social worker would have 
to say “thanks for letting us know, but we have no authority 
even to come down and talk to the birth parent.” That informa-
tion would likely not itself meet the state’s definition of abuse 
or neglect for purposes of assessment, investigation, or remov-
al, so the social worker would be unable to take any action to 
learn more or to protect the child. 
Again KCASFA ostensibly creates an exception to the gen-
eral rule, one limited to newborns who happen to be tested for 
drug exposure and who test positive. It requires that local CPS 
agencies have “procedures for the immediate screening, risk 
and safety assessment, and prompt investigation of such re-
ports” and “a plan of safe care” for any baby reported to have a 
positive toxicology screening.147 In practice, however, there is 
widespread evasion of this federal directive. States have gener-
ally complied with KCAFSA to the extent of requiring medical 
professionals to report drug exposure, requiring local CPS 
agencies to respond to any such report by conducting an initial 
assessment or investigation, authorizing CPS to file a petition 
in juvenile court for a removal order or other protective order, 
 
with or would reside with a perpetrator of domestic child abuse”). 
 147. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5106a(b)(2)(A)(ii) to (iv) (Supp. 2006). 
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and authorizing courts to order a removal of the child and 
placement in foster care.148 However, most states’ statutes do 
not require CPS to file a petition of any sort with a court when 
they verify the drug exposure of a baby; they merely permit 
CPS to do so.149 As discussed further below, there is a strong 
cultural bias among CPS workers against intervention on the 
basis of pre-natal harm, so giving them the authority but not a 
mandate to bring a baby’s situation before a judge for review is 
likely insufficient to ensure safety for such babies. Moreover, 
the law in most states also does not require courts to react to a 
CPS petition if filed; the law similarly just permits judges to is-
sue an order in response if they so choose,150 and many judges 
are also predisposed not to take any coercive action against a 
woman based on her conduct during pregnancy. In short, there 
are three institutions that all must act if the newborn child of a 
drug addict is to receive protection—a medical facility, a local 
CPS agency, and a court, and each of them is legally free not to 
act if sympathy for the birth mother makes them averse to act-
ing. 
In addition, at least one state, Virginia, has created an 
enormous loophole in what limited directive there is with re-
spect to implementation of the investigation and “plan of safe-
ty” mandate, an exception to the KCAFSA-mandated provisions 
that in fact precludes local CPS agencies from acting in many 
cases even if they are alarmed by the baby’s situation and want 
to act. Virginia’s Department of Social Services, with some 
supportive signaling from the General Assembly,151 has issued 
 
 148. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 587-89 (2006); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 
603(16.1) (Supp. 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 4004-B, 4011-B (Supp. 
2007); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6386 (Supp. 2008); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.2-
1503(I), 63.2-1505(B)(1), 63.2-1509, 16.1-241.3 (2003 & Supp. 2007); 22 VA. 
ADMIN. CODE 40-705-40(A)(4)(d) (West 2006) (“[Local agencies must] imme-
diately determine whether to petition a juvenile and domestic relations dis-
trict court for any necessary services or court orders needed to ensure the safe-
ty and health of the infant.”). 
 149. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-710(b) (LexisNexis 2007) 
(“[T]he local department may: (i) file a petition alleging that the child is in 
need of assistance under Title 3, Subtitle 8 of the Courts Article . . .” (empha-
sis added)); MINN. STAT. § 260C.148 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1505(B)(1) 
(2007) (“[I]f the report or complaint was based upon [positive toxicology in a 
newborn] the local department may file a petition . . . .”). 
 150. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.020 (2007); IND. CODE § 31-33-8-8 
(2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4007 (2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119 
§ 24 (2007); MINN. STAT.§ 260C.148 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241.3 (2003). 
 151. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1505(B)(2) (West 2008) (creating an exception to 
the general requirement that local CPS agencies report to the state Depart-
 450 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:407 
 
regulations instructing local CPS agencies to “invalidate” new-
born toxicology reports if “(i) the mother of the infant sought 
substance abuse counseling or treatment during her pregnancy 
prior to the infant’s birth and (ii) there is no evidence of child 
abuse and/or neglect by the mother after the infant’s birth.”152 
Thus, CPS must invalidate a report of a drug-exposed baby and 
walk away from the situation if the mother received any coun-
seling or treatment during pregnancy or even if she did not re-
ceive any counseling or treatment, so long as she attempted to 
receive one or the other and so long as the baby has not yet 
been maltreated when CPS interviews the mother. DSS regula-
tions define counseling and treatment in a quite broad way, 
such that it “includes, but is not limited to, education about the 
impact of alcohol, controlled substances and other drugs on the 
fetus and on the maternal relationship; education about relapse 
prevention to recognize personal and environmental cues which 
may trigger a return to the use of alcohol or other drugs.”153 
Such education might be quite minimal and might make little 
impression on a drug addict. Indeed, the positive toxicology test 
at birth will almost always mean that whatever counseling or 
treatment a birth mother did receive was ineffective. This ma-
jor exception to the state rule purportedly implementing 
KCAFSA makes irrelevant whether any counseling or treat-
ment was effective in getting the mother to stop her substance 
abuse. Yet her inability to stop at such a time when she should 
be most highly motivated to stop—that is, when she knows she 
is poisoning her unborn child—suggests that she will be unable 
to get her addiction under control anytime soon after the child 
is born, and this in turn suggests that the baby is at high risk 
 
ment of Social Services all cases that they investigate, for cases in which the 
basis for investigation is a positive newborn toxicology report and in which 
“the mother sought substance abuse counseling or treatment prior to the 
child’s birth”). 
 152. 22 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 40-705-40(A)(4)(e) (2006). This loophole is li-
mited to some degree by this further direction:  
If the mother sought counseling or treatment but did not receive such 
services, then the local department must determine whether the 
mother made a substantive effort to receive substance abuse treat-
ment before the child’s birth. If the mother made a substantive effort 
to receive treatment or counseling prior to the child’s birth, but did 
not receive such services due to no fault of her own, then the local de-
partment should invalidate the complaint or report. 
Id. See also MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-710(b) (2007) (authorizing CPS, 
upon receiving a positive toxicology report, either to initialize judicial proceed-
ings or to offer the mother admission into a drug treatment program). 
 153. 22 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 40-705-40(A)(4)(f ) (2006). 
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of abuse or neglect.154 But Virginia makes such risk irrelevant. 
Further, for a child protection agency to do anything more 
than offer services to a parent, in most states there would have 
to be a “founded” report of abuse or neglect,155 and in most 
states drug exposure in utero does not satisfy the statutory de-
finition of abuse or neglect, because child protection laws only 
apply to children after birth.156 Pennsylvania law, for example, 
authorizes only provision of services to the child in response to 
in utero drug exposure.157 Courts in some states might have au-
thority to issue temporary, emergency orders based solely on 
the commencement of an investigation of a drug-exposed baby’s 
situation,158 but continued state involvement requires a CPS 
allegation of abuse or neglect, which CPS cannot make without 
a founded report of conduct that falls within the state’s defini-
tion of abuse or neglect.159 A handful of states do treat in utero 
exposure to controlled substances as abuse or neglect and au-
thorize CPS protective action on that basis,160 but they have 
 
 154. Cf. MURPHY & ROSENBAUM, supra note 62, at 9 (reporting that re-
moval of a child causes most crack-cocaine-addicted mothers to abuse more 
heavily). 
 155. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1508 (2007); 22 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 40-
705-40(A)(4)(i) (2006). 
 156. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.13 (West 2007) (“[A] positive toxi-
cology screen at the time of the delivery of an infant is not in and of itself a 
sufficient basis for reporting child abuse or neglect. However, any indication of 
maternal substance abuse shall lead to an assessment of the needs of the 
mother and child . . . .”). 
 157. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6386 (Supp. 2008). 
 158. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241.3 (2003). 
 159. See id. §§ 16.1-252, 16.1-253(F) (discussing preliminary removal order 
and adjudication following a CPS allegation of abuse or neglect). 
 160. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-18(2) (2008) (treating as prima 
facie evidence of neglect fetal alcohol syndrome and “a medical diagnosis at 
birth of withdrawal symptoms from narcotics or barbiturates”), 750 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 50/1 (creating a rebuttable presumption that the birth mother is unfit 
“where there is a confirmed test result that at birth the child's blood, urine, or 
meconium contained any amount of a controlled substance . . . and the biologi-
cal mother of this child is the biological mother of at least one other child who 
was adjudicated a neglected minor . . .”); MINN. STAT. § 626.556(f ) (2006 & 
Supp. 2007) (“‘Neglect’ means . . . prenatal exposure to a controlled substance, 
as defined in section 253B.02, subdivision 2, used by the mother for a nonmed-
ical purpose, as evidenced by withdrawal symptoms in the child at birth, re-
sults of a toxicology test performed on the mother at delivery or the child at 
birth, or medical effects or developmental delays during the child's first year of 
life that medically indicate prenatal exposure to a controlled substance . . . .”); 
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(R) (Vernon 2002) (authorizing TPR as to a 
parent who has “been the cause of the child being born addicted to alcohol or a 
controlled substance,” if TPR would be in the child’s best interest). 
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come under heavy criticism for doing so, based in part on a 
child-centered concern that making pre-natal conduct a basis 
for intervention will discourage pregnant drug users from se-
curing pre-natal care,161 but also based on adult-centered con-
cerns about privacy and discriminatory application.162 
C. CPS AGENCIES RESIST TPR WITHOUT REHABILITATIVE 
EFFORTS 
Even if newborns at high risk do come to CPS attention, 
even if CPS does investigate and take custody of such a child, 
and even if social workers believe they have the authority to 
petition for immediate TPR, CPS is highly unlikely to seek TPR 
and adoption with respect to the newborn, even in the worst 
cases of maltreatment history or parental dysfunction. This is 
so principally for two reasons: sympathy for parents and a pre-
ference for placement with relatives. 
1. Social Worker Identification with Parents 
In nearly every case, social workers who remove children 
from parental custody place the child in foster care and com-
mence a program of rehabilitative efforts with the parents, so 
long as CPS can locate the parents and the parents do not flatly 
refuse to make any effort to change. No matter how horrible 
birth parents’ child maltreatment history is, and with little re-
gard for the age of the child and the extent of the child’s rela-
tionship with the birth parent, social workers almost never 
seek immediate TPR and adoption.163 Why is this the case? 
First, the law generally does not compel social workers to 
proceed directly to TPR and adoption in many or any cases. 
Statutory language authorizing CPS agencies to seek TPR con-
ventionally has been permissive, not mandatory, so the decision 
to petition has been entirely discretionary on the part of 
CPS.164 ASFA contained a provision requiring states to make 
petitioning for TPR without reasonable efforts mandatory for 
 
 161. See NAIARC, supra note 120, at 6–7. 
 162. Nancy Feigenbaum, New Statute Discriminatory: Critics Say Drug-
Test Policy May Be Unfair, DAILY PRESS (Newport News, Va.), April 26, 1998, 
at A9. 
 163. Berrick et al. found some tendency among CPS agencies in California 
to traverse the “reunification bypass” more often with younger children, but 
still at an extremely low rate, in only a small fraction of cases in which the law 
would allow reunification bypass. Berrick, et al., supra note 80. 
 164. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(a) (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 36-1-113(g) (2005). 
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CPS agencies in certain cases—that is, those in which the par-
ent previously committed a violent felony against another 
child.165 But that is narrower even than the category of reunifi-
cation bypass situations explicitly authorized by ASFA, leaving 
out cases in which parents had prior TPRs or aggravated cir-
cumstances.166 
Such a mandate would be superfluous if all CPS agencies 
were inclined to pursue TPR without first undertaking a plan 
of parent rehabilitation whenever doing so would be best for a 
child, but they generally are not. It is contrary to historical 
practice, the practice dominant when most social workers of to-
day were trained, and the practice encouraged by the “reasona-
ble efforts” command of AACWA.167 It is also contrary to the so-
cial work mentality; social workers are not trained to 
determine when efforts to rehabilitate parents would be futile, 
and they are not trained to determine when adoption would be 
better for a child than attempting to make it possible for the 
child safely to live with birth parents.168 They are trained to 
 
 165. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 
§ 103(a)(3), 111 Stat. 2115, 2118 (1997) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) 
(2000)). 
 166. HHS does not appear to be enforcing even this narrow mandate. Vir-
ginia, for example, currently has no statutory, regulatory, or policy document 
instructing CPS agencies that they must petition for TPR without first at-
tempting rehabilitative efforts in any cases. West Virginia, on the other hand, 
does include TPR as to another child in the list of triggers for a mandatory pe-
tition, as well as prior violent felonies against a child. See W. VA. CODE § 49-6-
5b(a)(3) (2007). 
 167. See CAPTA, supra note 95, at 67 (statement of Richard Gelles) (“Case 
workers claim that the law requires them to make ‘every possible effort’ to 
keep families together.”); Gordon, supra note 87, at 677–78 (“State agencies 
already have a proven record of undermining the Child Welfare Act because of 
their unyielding, one sided belief in reunificiation.”). 
 168. See CAPTA, supra note 95, at 32 (statement of Rep. Greenwood) (“I 
want to again rely a little bit on my experiences. . . . More times than not, I 
felt like I erred on the side of putting these people back together again, and 
the kids didn’t turn out so well in the long run.”); id. at 33 (statement of Ri-
chard Gelles) (“Caseworkers need to understand that some families can be 
changed, some families can’t . . . . And some decisions are going to have to be 
made under the timelines of ASFA, that you are just not going to have enough 
time to change the family, given the child’s developmental interests. CAPTA 
in its 30-year iteration has not done a particularly good job at spurring re-
search and development around these decision-making issues.”); id. at 68 
(“[F]ront-line child welfare workers still enter homes severely lacking in train-
ing, insight, and the proper skills to assess risk and family needs . . . . Schools 
of Social Work in the United States bear much of the responsibility for the 
dearth of professionally trained front-line child welfare workers . . . [because 
they] remain focused on turning out clinicians trained for either private clini-
cal practice or administration . . . [and do not] commit themselves to institut-
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help people overcome problems, and so TPR represents failure 
for them. An observer of ASFA’s passage predicted social work-
er resistance to its aims: 
State agencies already have a proven record of undermining the Child 
Welfare Act because of their unyielding, one-sided belief in reunifica-
tion . . . . [I]n 1997 Congress learned that states still sometimes sent 
children back into households that no amount of family preservation 
could help. Because funding for family preservation is so often paltry, 
this record can only reflect commitment to family reunification re-
gardless of circumstance. Numerous studies confirm that social work-
ers and judges often strain mightily to avoid severing a child’s bonds 
to her parents, even when doing so would ultimately benefit a child. 
To be sure, these attitudes have been changing, and ASFA will shift 
priorities further. But given the status quo inclination of bureaucra-
cies and the bias of social workers as a professional group, such 
change can only come slowly. In fact, in the absence of new support 
for services, ASFA’s effort to promote permanency through adoption 
may only steel professionals’ resolve to resist rules apparently uncon-
cerned about parental needs.169 
This prediction of social worker resistance to ASFA is 
borne out by a recent survey of CPS staff in California. At-
tempting to discover why CPS workers in that state rarely em-
ploy the state’s extensive reunification bypass law, Berrick et 
al. found that many social workers expressed “ambivalence 
about its use due to philosophical perspectives on the social 
work profession.”170 A representative comment by a social 
worker was: “It doesn’t fit with the social work ethic. We are 
social workers. We do this work because we think people can 
change.”171 In my own conversations with numerous CPS agen-
cy directors and social workers in Virginia, I heard the same 
perspective voiced. One local agency official told me emphati-
cally that her agency would never petition for TPR without rea-
sonable efforts, because “we don’t give up on parents,” and “you 
never know when someone might change.” 
 
ing a professional child welfare track and appropriate curriculum.”); Gordon, 
supra note 87, at 677–78. 
 169. Gordon, supra note 87, at 678–79 (citations omitted). 
 170. Berrick et al., supra note 80. 
 171. Id.; see also CAPTA, supra note 95, at 69–70 (statement of Richard 
Gelles) (“At the core of child welfare work is the belief that most, if not all, 
parents want to be good and caring parents and caretakers. . . . If change does 
not occur, it is attributed to a lack of soft or hard resources, not to the parents’ 
lack of willingness or ability to change. . . . In reality, change in general, and 
change in the particular case of caregivers that maltreat their children, is 
much more difficult to bring about. . . . All individuals are not equally ready to 
change.”). 
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Part and parcel of this perspective is an adult-centered 
orientation among many—though certainly not all—CPS social 
workers. In conversation, it becomes clear that they view their 
“clients” as the dysfunctional parents, not the maltreated child-
ren. CPS workers typically have little contact with children af-
ter the initial investigation, even if the children are placed in 
foster care, but are likely to have frequent contacts with par-
ents.172 They might simply collect information about the child 
from foster parents, school officials, and service providers, such 
as a therapist for a child, rather than by meeting with or ob-
serving the child. In discussing policy reforms with local and 
state-level CPS officials in Virginia, I most often heard objec-
tions couched in terms of parents’ rights rather than in terms of 
child welfare.173 When I give presentations to CPS social work-
ers and directors and I raise this concern, there are always a 
couple who approach me afterwards and, in hushed tones, say 
something to the effect of “it is so true; CPS is all about helping 
parents and giving them every last chance, not about doing 
what is best for the children.” 
Even if CPS workers were more focused on making the 
best permanency choice for children, rather than myopically fo-
cused on fixing birth parents, CPS workers would still be un-
likely to petition for TPR immediately after a child’s birth. In 
part this is because their understanding of child development, 
and of the permanent and severe damage that attachment fail-
ure and maltreatment in infancy can cause, is generally quite 
limited.174 In addition, and perhaps in part because of this li-
mited knowledge (and in part because of their focus on parents’ 
supposed rights), social workers have viewed their aim for 
newborns and other children as just ensuring safety, not ensur-
ing an adequate environment for a child’s healthy develop-
 
 172. For example, while regulations governing CPS’s assessments and in-
vestigations in Virginia require an initial in-person observation of the alleged-
ly abused or neglected child, 22 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 40-705-80(A)(1), (B)(1) 
(2008), there are no state statutes or regulations governing on-going case 
management following placement of a child in foster care that require further 
contact with the child. 
 173. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 90, at 178 (“Wrongfully removing child-
ren from the custody of their parents violates parents’ due process right to li-
berty.”). 
 174. See CAPTA, supra note 95, at 66–67 (statement of Richard Gelles) 
(“[C]hild welfare workers often receive only the most minimal pre-service 
training before they are assigned a caseload. . . . In-service training is also mi-
nimal.”); Goldsmith et al., supra note 37, at 2. 
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ment.175 State regulations and policy manuals governing CPS 
also encourage a limited focus on physical safety in the custody 
of biological parents rather than on what setting is best for a 
child.176 There is a large disjuncture, therefore, between the 
ideal of proxy decision making described in Part I of this Ar-
ticle, and the approach state actors today take to making deci-
sions about family placement for newborn children. That ideal 
was meant to replicate or approximate the way autonomous 
adults make decisions for themselves in choosing family mem-
bers, and when adults choose partners they certainly consider 
much more than whether a potential partner would threaten 
their physical safety. 
Moreover, there are practical reasons why CPS agencies 
are reluctant to forego rehabilitation efforts and seek TPR im-
mediately upon removal of a child. Parents might be more like-
ly to litigate and appeal a TPR decision when CPS elects to fo-
rego rehabilitation, and if they do so they are likely to find a 
receptive audience in many judges, who are also adult-centered 
and comfortable with the conventional approach of giving dys-
functional biological parents every last chance to change.177 Be-
cause of the time and expense that litigation at trial and appel-
late levels entail, many social workers and attorneys conclude 
that it is more efficient to make the rehabilitative effort and 
then petition.178 But so long as the goal remains reunification, 
children are likely to linger in temporary foster care. In many 
agencies, there are also cumbersome administrative procedures 
 
 175. See CHRISTIAN, supra note 80, at 4 (“At present, many child welfare 
agencies view foster care primarily as a means of protecting children’s physi-
cal safety and only secondarily as a means of ensuring the healthy social and 
emotional development of very young children who are removed from home for 
reasons of abuse and neglect . . . . The limited perception of foster care may be 
changing because early brain research continues to affect policy . . . .”). 
 176. See, e.g., 22 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 40-705-10 (2008) (defining both “fami-
ly assessment” and “investigation” as “collection of information necessary to 
determine: 1. The immediate safety needs of the child; 2. The protective and 
rehabilitative services needs of the child and family that will deter abuse or 
neglect; 3. Risk of future harm to the child; and 4. Alternative plans for the 
child's safety if protective and rehabilitative services are indicated and the 
family is unable or unwilling to participate in services.”). 
 177. See CAPTA, supra note 95, at 67 (statement of Richard Gelles) (“Case 
workers claim that the law requires them to make ‘every possible effort’ to 
keep families together. They also claim that judges ignore caseworkers’ rec-
ommendations.”); GAO, supra note 89, at 3–4 (“[S]tate officials describe[ ] . . . 
reluctance on the part of some judges to allow the state to bypass reunification 
efforts.”). 
 178. GAO, supra note 89, at 25–26; Berrick et al., supra note 80. 
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for approving bypass recommendations, which further deter so-
cial workers from seeking them.179 And even if an immediate 
TPR would save them time and resources in the long-run, over-
burdened social workers are likely to take the “foster care and 
rehabilitation” route because it is familiar to them and it en-
tails less effort in the short-term.180 
2. Babies Lost in Relative Care 
Even if children are removed at or soon after birth from the 
custody of birth parents who are manifestly unfit, they might 
quickly fall off the CPS radar screen if a court places them with 
relatives of the birth parents. Placement with relatives is gen-
erally an alternative to state assumption of custody and not a 
state-supervised foster care arrangement.181 In some states, a 
child must be in CPS custody in order for CPS to petition for 
TPR, so placement with relatives results in extended imperma-
nence.182 In fact, placing a child with relatives allows CPS to 
avoid the mandatory TPR-filing requirement of ASFA for cases 
in which parents were previously convicted of violent felonies 
against another child.183 Following placement with relatives, 
courts may order that the child continue to receive services and 
may require periodic review of the custodial arrangement, but 
courts are not required to do so, so placement with relatives 
generally results in little or no state oversight of a child’s situa-
tion.184 CPS agencies have great discretion as to what place-
ment they request a court to order and, as discussed further be-
low, most operate with a strong bias toward relative placement. 
 
 179. Berrick et al., supra note 80. 
 180. See Gordon, supra note 87, at 679–81 (“While the decision to leave a 
child in foster care requires five or ten minutes of court time, the effort to ter-
minate parental rights is exponentially more intensive. Lawyers and social 
workers simply looking to stay afloat may be forced to let children continue 
drifting through foster care.”). 
 181. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-278.2(A)(5) (2003). 
 182. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2365(h) (Supp. 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 20-7-768 (Supp. 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-26 (2004 & Supp. 2008); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-314 (Supp. 2008). 
 183. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2000); cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-111a(b) 
(2007) (state law containing such an exemption); FLA. STAT. § 39.8055(2)(a) 
(Supp. 2008) (same); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4052(2-A) (Supp. 2007) 
(same); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW, § 5-525.1(b)(3) (2006) (same); MINN. STAT. 
§ 260C.301 subdiv. 3(b) (2006) (same); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(3)(l)(i) 
(McKinney 2007) (same). 
 184. See CHRISTIAN, supra note 80, at 4 (“[U]nlicensed kinship care . . . 
receives less support and is subject to less monitoring than licensed foster 
care.”). 
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As noted above, placement with relatives can be a good 
thing for a newborn child. If the relatives are good caregivers 
and will be the child’s long-term caregivers, the child can form 
a secure and healthy attachment and bond with them, and the 
relatives can in theory also facilitate whatever amount of con-
tact with the birth parents is good for the child, perhaps more 
easily than could foster parents or adoptive parents outside the 
extended biological family.185 And CPS is supposed to verify 
that relatives are minimally fit and willing caregivers before 
placing a child with them.186 
However, some relatives pass through CPS screening yet 
turn out to be very poor caregivers, either because characteris-
tics that make them unable or disinclined to provide good care 
are not apparent at the time of placement or because social 
workers simply do an inadequate job of screening.187 Moreover, 
some relatives, whatever their merits as caregivers for a child, 
have troubling inter-personal dynamics with the parents.188 
Studies find that children whom CPS places with kin rather 
than non-kin foster parents on average have poorer out-
comes.189 This is likely in part because they tend to receive few-
er services than do children in non-relative foster care despite 
having similar needs,190 but it is no doubt also in part because 
the dysfunction manifested by the parents runs through much 
 
 185. See Gordon, supra note 87, at 658 (“[C]hildren in kinship care can fare 
better than children in foster care along numerous axes.”). 
 186. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-252(F)(1), 16.1-281(C1) (2003 & Supp. 
2008). 
 187. See, e.g., Hopkins, supra note 129, at A1 (describing the death of two-
year old child, whom CPS removed from mother’s custody because of an unex-
plained arm fracture and placed in care of her husband, the child’s step-father, 
who was a convicted drug dealer and whose own daughter had been killed four 
years earlier). 
 188. See Lyons, supra note 81, at 403–04 (explaining that abusive partners 
frequently isolate victims from extended family, so that only members of the 
abuser’s family are available to take custody of a child who is removed, which 
might reinforce the abuser’s control over the victim). 
 189. See D’Andrade & Berrick, supra note 80, at 36 (“Placement with kin, 
and limited or no parental visiting, are associated with non-reunification and 
multiple placements are associated with re-entry [to care].” (citations omit-
ted)). 
 190. See Laurel K. Leslie et al., Developmental Delay in Young Children in 
Child Welfare By Initial Placement Type, 23 INFANT MENTAL HEALTH J. 496, 
500 (2002) (“[C]hildren in kinship care receive fewer services despite similar 
levels of need.”); id. at 512 (suggesting that the reason children in kinship care 
receive fewer services has to do with “family functioning, insurance status, de-
creased case supervision, or other system barriers”). 
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of the extended family and much of the birth parents’ commu-
nity. As Elizabeth Bartholet explains: 
[W]e should be willing to face up to the fact that child maltreatment 
is only rarely aberrational. It ordinarily grows out of a family and 
community context. Keeping the child in that same context will often 
serve the child no better than keeping him or her with the maltreat-
ing parent.191 
In fact, in many cases, relatives simply give the child over 
to the birth parents, without CPS authorization or awareness, 
so that kin care effectively amounts to return to parents, even 
though the parental conditions that originally necessitated re-
moval still exist.192 
With older children, there is more reason to risk possible 
adverse outcomes from placement with relatives. Once a child 
has developed relationships with birth parents, extended fami-
ly members, and others in the birth parents’ community, the 
child has an interest in continuity of interpersonal connections 
and environment that counts in favor of placement with rela-
tives.193 With newborn children, however, that interest in con-
tinuity is absent; there is only an interest in later developing 
family ties to biological parents and relatives. In addition, be-
cause older children are less likely than newborns to be 
adopted,194 placement with relatives might give older children a 
better chance than they would have in non-relative foster care, 
should their birth parents never regain custody, of completing 
childhood in an environment where they feel like they are part 
of a “real” family. That reason for relative placement also does 
not apply to newborns. 
The law governing choice of foster parents and adoptive 
parents in most U.S. states today does give CPS workers the 
flexibility to approach placement of newborns differently from 
placement of older children. However, many CPS officials and 
case workers are confused as to what the law directs. Most ap-
pear to believe that they must always give priority to relatives, 
but that is false. Federal funding law directs states to require 
 
 191. BARTHOLET, supra note 36, at 93; see also SMITH & FONG, supra note 
45, at 49–52, 233–34 (describing problems in communities where a high per-
centage of neglectful parents live). 
 192. See, e.g., Mullins v. Oregon, 57 F.3d 789, 797 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(“[G]randparents sometimes may be unsuitable adoptive parents precisely be-
cause of their blood relationship, especially in cases of abuse such as this in 
which there may be a well founded fear that the grandparents will be unable 
to protect the children from future parental contact and abuse.”). 
 193. See Gordon, supra note 87, at 658–59. 
 194. See id. at 668. 
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that CPS workers consider relatives as substitute caregivers for 
children whose parents are unable to have custody. It declares, 
somewhat obtusely: 
In order for a State to be eligible for payments under this part, it 
shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which. . . . provides that 
the State shall consider giving preference to an adult relative over a 
non-related caregiver when determining a placement for a 
child . . . .195 
The dictate to consider relatives grew in part out of a per-
ception that children have an interest in growing up in a family 
in which they have a biological connection to other members.196 
But it also grew out of a desire to minimize state expenditures 
on children removed from birth parents’ custody, given that un-
licensed relative caregivers used to be ineligible for foster care 
subsidies,197 and out of a sense that children “belong to” partic-
ular communities—the same attitude that has motivated some 
of the opposition to trans-racial adoption.198 These latter con-
siderations might also have motivated local CPS agencies and 
social workers to favor relatives when placing children removed 
from parental custody; they could save money and respect the 
supposed rights of communities to hold onto “their” children. 
Consistent with the federal dictate, however, the law in 
most states does not in fact require that CPS ever give priority 
to relatives at any stage of a child protective intervention. Ra-
ther, it only requires that case workers investigate whether 
there are relatives who are willing and able to take custody and 
then choose the placement that is best for the child, after con-
sidering both relatives and non-relatives.199 Courts in several 
 
 195. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(19) (2000). 
 196. See Eliza Patten, The Subordination of Subsidized Guardianship in 
Child Welfare Proceedings, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 237, 250 (2004). 
 197. See Sonya Gipson Rankin, Why They Won't Take the Money: Black 
Grandparents and the Success of Informal Kinship Care, 10 ELDER L.J. 153, 
166 (2002). 
 198. See Adler, supra note 89, at 18–19; Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do 
Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1163, 1169–70, 1179–82 (1991); Roberts, supra note 90, at 180 (noting 
the National Association of Black Social Workers’ opposition to transracial 
adoption on the grounds that it constitutes “a form of ‘genocide’”). 
 199. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-605 (2008) (court shall consider peti-
tion by relatives but not grant it unless it is in best interests of child); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 41-3-438(4)(a) (2007) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-278.2(A)(5) 
(2003) (authorizing placement with a relative after initial removal but not re-
quiring consideration of placement with a relative); id. § 16.1-283(A) (directing 
that, following a TPR order, “the court shall give a consideration to granting 
custody to relatives of the child, including grandparents”). 
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states have rendered decisions on the basis of such an interpre-
tation that the law requires only consideration of relatives, not 
preference for them.200 In many other states, statutes create 
presumptions of varying strength in favor of placement with 
relatives, but allow for rebuttal of the presumption by a show-
ing that a non-relative placement would be better for the child 
all things considered.201 The problem is that many social work-
ers interpret the requirement of considering or giving a pre-
sumption to relatives as a mandate to place a child with a rela-
tive unless none are willing and minimally qualified, and they 
operate under a “keep the child with the family” ideology that 
draws no distinction among children based on age, that over-
looks the several ways in which a newborn child’s situation dif-
fers from that of an older child. 
D. GROUNDS FOR TPR WITHOUT REHABILITATION EFFORTS ARE 
TOO NARROW 
Beyond the attitudinal and practical obstacles to CPS peti-
tioning for TPR as to newborns with unfit birth parents, there 
are also clear legal obstacles. State statutory provisions autho-
rizing TPR are confined to specific circumstances, not allowing 
for TPR whenever that would simply be best for the child.202 As 
discussed in Part III, state law historically has required egre-
gious conduct by the parent toward the child currently at issue 
and extensive efforts by CPS to locate and rehabilitate the par-
ent, before a court could order TPR. ASFA forced states to alter 
their laws to allow for TPR without rehabilitative efforts in 
some circumstances based on conduct toward another child, but 
 
 200. See, e.g., Div. of Family Servs. v. T.W. & K.A., No. 01-05-02TN, 2002 
WL 1929548, at *14 (Del. Fam. Ct. Jan. 25, 2002); In re Adoption of Irene, 767 
N.E.2d 91, 96 (Mass. Ct. App. 2002); In re C.D.G., 108 S.W.3d 669, 677 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2002); In re Adoption of A.K.S.R., 71 S.W. 3d 715, 719 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2001); Logan v. Fairfax County Dept. of Human Dev., 409 S.E.2d 460, 465 (Va. 
Ct. App. 1991). 
 201. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 210.565 (Supp. 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 41-3-438(4) (2007); WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.130 (Supp. 2008). 
 202. The U.S. Supreme Court once suggested in dicta that states would vi-
olate constitutional rights of biological parents were they to terminate paren-
tal rights based solely on a best interests determination, but it has never held 
this. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (“We have little 
doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended ‘[i]f a State were to at-
tempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the par-
ents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole 
reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest.’” (quoting 
Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862–63 (1977) (Stewart, J., 
concurring))). 
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the specific circumstances are limited to prior TPRs and violent 
felonies.203 ASFA also required authorization of TPR without 
reasonable efforts where a parent commits “aggravated cir-
cumstances” against the child at issue, but Congress’s sug-
gested definition of aggravated circumstances included, in addi-
tion to abandonment, only horrible mistreatment of the present 
child. That definition would not facilitate preventive interven-
tion, rather than just reactive intervention. 
Importantly, ASFA did not explicitly preclude inclusion of 
other bases for TPR without reasonable efforts, and, as noted in 
Part III, some states have interpreted AACWA and current 
federal statutes as allowing them to have additional reunifica-
tion bypass triggers in their TPR statutes. However, as also 
noted in Part III, many states have interpreted the background 
requirement of reasonable efforts to reunify that AACWA im-
posed as precluding what ASFA does not explicitly authorize. 
Accordingly, most states have very limited and narrow grounds 
for TPR without rehabilitative efforts and therefore for seeking 
a good, permanent home immediately after birth for a child 
born to manifestly unfit parents.204 Congress was somewhat 
clearer with ASFA that states were free to add more circums-
tances than those which ASFA mentioned under the heading of 
“aggravated circumstances” toward the child in question,205 yet 
most states have limited aggravated circumstances to just 
those which the federal law lists, which focus on egregious post-
birth conduct by parents toward the child now at issue.206 One 
 
 203. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii)–(iii) (2000). 
 204. See Child Welfare Information Gateway, Reasonable Efforts to Pre-
serve or Reunify Families and Achieve Permanency for Children: Summary of 
State Laws, at 3–4 (2006), http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_ 
policies/statutes/reunifyall.pdf. 
 205. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i) (2000) (requiring that efforts to enable the 
child to return home need not be made if “the parent has subjected the child to 
aggravated circumstances (as defined in State law, which definition may in-
clude but need not be limited to abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and 
sexual abuse)”). 
 206. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-58(a)(4)(A) (2008) (making it possible 
to disregard the requirement to make reasonable steps to reunify a family 
when aggravating circumstances exist, including abandonment, torture, 
chronic abuse, and sexual abuse); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1619(6)(d) (Supp. 
2008) (codifying an exception to the general rule to make reasonable efforts to 
reunify a family when aggravating circumstances exist, including abandone-
ment, torture, chronic abuse, sexual abuse, committed murder, and attempted 
voluntary manslaughter of another child); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 
§ 4002(1-B)(A) (Supp. 2008) (making exception for aggravating circumstances, 
including rape, sexual abuse, kidnapping, abandonment, torture, and chronic 
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necessary remedy is therefore clarification by Congress as to 
which reading of AACWA and the current governing federal 
statute is correct—that is, whether state are free to add 
grounds for TPR without rehabilitative efforts beyond what 
ASFA required. 
One very important set of circumstance ASFA does not di-
rectly address are those involving parental dysfunction that 
has not previously resulted in a TPR or criminal conviction. 
While there is widespread recognition that hardcore drug ad-
dicts, severely mentally ill people, and profoundly mentally 
disabled persons are generally unable to hold jobs that would 
support a family, to manage a household or finances, or other-
wise to exercise control over their own lives, current child pro-
tection law in most states does not reflect the reality that such 
people are also generally incapable of caring adequately for a 
baby and are extremely unlikely to become capable of doing so 
within six months of being offered rehabilitation services. 
Moreover, in the case of maternal drug or alcohol abuse, a child 
who has been damaged neurologically by in utero exposure to 
drugs or alcohol might need not merely an adequate parent or 
even an average parent for his or her healthy development, but 
actually an exceptionally good parent or two, to provide the ex-
tra care the baby needs to remediate that early damage. If a set 
of exceptional potential parents is available to adopt a drug-
exposed newborn, that is most likely to be a much better choice 
for the baby than being suspended in foster or kin care while 
CPS makes unpromising efforts to make drug-addicted, mental-
ly ill, or mentally disabled birth parents minimally adequate. 
ASFA also leaves out from the “no reasonable efforts” 
grounds incarceration. Several states’ statutes nevertheless 
treat incarceration per se as an aggravated circumstance or as 
an independent basis for TPR, in recognition of the fact that be-
ing separated from a child by incarceration straightforwardly 
precludes a birth parent from caring for the child.207 In addi-
 
abuse); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-603(7)(c)(i) (Supp. 2007) (codifying excep-
tions, including abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse). 
 207. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(a)(5)a.3. (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§ 16-2005(1)(e) (Supp. 2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.020(2)(b) (LexisNexis 
Supp. 2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-02 (Supp. 2007) (including within “ag-
gravated circumstances” cases in which a child is under age nine and the par-
ent “[h]as been incarcerated under a sentence for which the latest release date 
is: … after the child is twice the child’s current age, measured in days”); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(a)(2)(i) (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-21.1 (Supp. 
2008) (reunification efforts need not be undertaken when a parent “[i]s incar-
cerated and is unavailable to care for the child during a significant period of 
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tion, most states make abandonment, which Congress included 
in its list of suggested “aggravated circumstances,” a statutory 
basis for TPR without reunification efforts, and in a couple of 
states courts have treated as abandonment a parent’s engaging 
in conduct he knew could cause him to be imprisoned and 
therefore separated from his child.208 But otherwise a parent’s 
unavailability owing to imprisonment is not a basis for seeking 
alternative parents for a newborn. In fact, at least two states 
treat incarceration as an excuse for not taking care of a child!209 
In addition, limiting the “maltreatment of another child” 
basis for reunification bypass to violent felony convictions and 
prior TPRs leaves out situations where a birth parent has 
abused or neglected other children and has been unable to re-
cover custody of them despite rehabilitative efforts CPS has al-
ready made, but as to whom there has not yet been a criminal 
prosecution or TPR. The parent, who is not presently fit to have 
custody of any children, now is faced with the challenge of be-
coming capable of caring not only for the older children but also 
for a newborn baby. The prognosis for that parent becoming a 
consistent, nurturing caregiver for the newborn child in time 
for the child successfully to develop a healthy bond and secure 
attachment is likely to be extremely poor.210 A family court 
judge in upstate New York went so far as to order two such 
parents not to conceive another child, as a condition for return 
of the four children they then had in foster care. She explained: 
It is painfully obvious that a parent who has already lost to foster 
care all 4 of her children born over a 6 year period, with the last one 
having been taken from her even before she could leave the hospital, 
should not get pregnant again soon, if ever. . . . All babies deserve 
more than to be born to parents who have proven they cannot possibly 
raise or parent a child. This neglected existence is an immense bur-
den to place on a child and on society . . . .211 
 
the child’s minority, considering the child’s age and the child’s need for care by 
an adult”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-113(g)(6) (Supp. 2007) (allowing termina-
tion of parental rights if the parent is incarcerated for a period of ten years or 
longer); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(Q) (Supp. 2008); Nat’l Conference 
of State Legislatures, Analysis of State Legislation Enacted In Response to the 
Adoption and Safe Families Act, P.L. 105-89, Aggravated Circumstances 
(1999), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/aggravat.htm [hereinafter NCSL 
(2007)]. 
 208. Dwyer, supra note 14, at 958. 
 209. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-604(2)(k)(IV) (2008); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-
292.02(2) (2004). 
 210. See FLUKE & HOLLINSHEAD, supra note 80, at 8 (noting a study show-
ing higher rate of maltreatment recurrence as family size increases). 
 211. In re Bobbijean P., No. 03626-03, 2004 WL 834480, at *4 (N.Y. Fam. 
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Child welfare experts have stated in more restrained tones 
that “when parents of a child entering care have already lost 
multiple children to the system and have made no subsequent 
change to their lifestyle, providing another 12 months of servic-
es seems unlikely to effect change in the parent, while unduly 
burdening the child with extended stays in foster care.”212 Sev-
eral states already have TPR provisions that look more broadly 
at a parent’s child maltreatment history, rather than only prior 
terminations or felony convictions, but most do not.213 
E. COURTS REFUSE TPR ABSENT EXTENSIVE REHABILITATIVE 
EFFORTS 
Lastly, even if a CPS agency believes it has the authority 
to petition for TPR immediately or soon after a child’s birth, 
there is a good chance the judiciary will rebuff the agency’s at-
tempt to be proactive, and this will deter social workers from 
trying. While courts currently grant most petitions for TPR, the 
rate of approval for TPR petitions is much lower in cases in 
which parents have not walked away from the scene and have 
not been given substantial time and services, even though the 
latter set of cases typically involves the most clearly unfit par-
ents, as to whom social workers believe there is little chance of 
success.214 
There are several possible explanations for this. First, 
judges might interpret the statutory authorization for TPR 
without rehabilitative efforts more narrowly than CPS attor-
neys do. Second, as with statutory rules governing CPS disposi-
 
Ct. Mar. 31, 2004). 
 212. D’Andrade & Berrick, supra note 80, at 33–34; see also SMITH & 
FONG, supra note 45, at 41 (citing studies showing higher rates of maltreat-
ment in larger families). 
 213. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1585(a)(3) (Supp. 2007) (presuming that a 
parent is unfit if “on two or more prior occasions a child in the physical custo-
dy of the parent has been adjudicated a child in need of care”); MINN. STAT. 
§ 260C.301(1)(b) (Supp. 2007) (“It is presumed that a parent is palpably unfit 
to be a party to the parent and child relationship upon a showing that . . . the 
parent’s custodial rights to another child have been involuntarily transferred 
to a relative . . . .”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-21.1 (Supp. 2008) (directing 
that reunification efforts need not be undertaken when a parent has “a docu-
mented history of abuse and neglect associated with chronic alcohol or drug 
abuse”); NCSL (2007), supra note 207. 
 214. See, e.g., GAO, supra note 89, at 3–4 (citing “reluctance on the part of 
some judges to allow the state to bypass reunification efforts”); id. at 26 (find-
ing that in Minnesota, in 25% of all cases in which children in foster care were 
not being fast-tracked, CPS had requested a fast track for the children but 
courts had refused). 
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tional petitions, statutory rules governing court TPR orders in 
most states are permissive rather than mandatory—that is, 
they say that a court may order TPR if it finds certain things, 
but do not require a court to order TPR in any case.215 Thus, 
any judge disinclined to sever a biological parent’s legal connec-
tion to an offspring before the parent has been given every last 
chance to change, out of solicitude for the interests and sup-
posed entitlement of the parent, or out of an exaggerated esti-
mation of a child’s interest in being with biological parents, can 
simply refuse to order TPR regardless of what factual findings 
there are. 
A GAO survey of ASFA implementation revealed just such 
parent-protective judicial attitudes.216 It also found evidence 
that such attitudes operate especially strongly in the case of 
babies whom CPS takes into custody at birth based on mal-
treatment of other children. Because the parents have not yet 
hurt the new baby, judges believe they “should be given an op-
portunity to demonstrate their ability to care for this child.”217 
More generally, many judges simply are “not supportive of AS-
FA’s goals.”218 Judges’ reluctance might stem in part from ad-
hering to a traditional view that biological parents own their 
offspring and from identifying more strongly with parents who 
appear before them than with the babies in question, who typi-
cally do not appear before them.219 It likely stems in part also 
from judges’ limited knowledge of child development and, in 
 
 215. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-18-7(a) (Supp. 2007); ALASKA CODE 
§ 47.10.088(h) (Supp. 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-604 (2008); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 15-11-94(b) (2008); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-21(5) (2007); IOWA 
CODE § 232.116(1) (Supp. 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4055(1) (Supp. 
2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292 (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-1111 
(2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7006-1.1(A) (2007); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 419B.502, 
419B.504 (2007); TEX. FAM. STAT. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (Supp. 2008); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 16.1-283 (Supp. 2008). 
 216. GAO, supra note 89, at 24. 
 217. Id. at 25. 
 218. Id. at 36. 
 219. See, e.g., Lederman et al., supra note 88, at 35 (“Despite the extreme 
risk to children in the child welfare system, they seldom appear in court and 
do not have a voice because they cannot articulate their needs and desires in 
words.”). Judges at the appellate level are especially unlikely to have much 
experience or training in child protection matters or to come face-to-face with 
the child in question. See John E. B. Myers, The Legal System and Child Pro-
tection, in THE APSAC HANDBOOK ON CHILD MALTREATMENT 305, 307–20 (2d 
ed., 2002). 
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particular, of the crucial developmental importance of the first 
year of life.220 
In sum, proactive and preventive intervention to spare 
newborn child from permanently and seriously damaging early 
experiences remains exceedingly rare under current law and 
practices. Despite Congress’s best intentions, the nation’s child 
protective systems remain reactive and parent-focused. Proc-
lamations of a new emphasis on prevention were at best a gross 
over-statement, and arguably a complete ruse. The final Part of 
this Article identifies the further legal reforms that are needed 
to realize the professed aim of sparing children born into high-
risk situations from ever suffering abuse or neglect. 
V.  REMEDIES   
One approach to better effectuating children’s moral right 
against the state’s forcing them into relationships with grossly 
unfit parents might be to require adults in specified, high-risk 
categories to make a showing of their fitness before they can be-
come the legal parent of a biological offspring, just as appli-
cants for adoption must do. For example, persons who previous-
ly had their parental rights terminated as to one child, because 
they severely abused or neglected that child, or who are ad-
dicted to debilitating drugs, might be required to appear before 
a juvenile court judge immediately before or after a baby’s birth 
and present evidence that they are now or soon could be mini-
mally adequate parents, before the state would confer legal pa-
renthood of the newborn child upon them. This approach would 
be limited to high-risk biological parents, would not exclude 
anyone categorically from legal parenthood, and would entail 
applying criteria of parenting preparedness similar to those 
which states now routinely apply to applicants for adoption. 
Nevertheless, such a pre-parentage qualification process 
for birth parents is so unfamiliar in our culture (even though it 
 
 220. See GAO, supra note 89, at 36 (noting that most states “reported that 
not enough training was available for judges”); Lederman et al., supra note 88, 
at 33, 35–36 (observing that infants entering the foster care system “histori-
cally, have been largely ignored. . . . Juvenile courts do not conduct assess-
ments and evaluations of babies and toddlers . . . . Like most adults, judges 
and juvenile court personnel are not aware that early trauma and other deve-
lopmental risk factors to which babies and toddlers in the child welfare system 
are disproportionately exposed can result in long term harm. [J]udges must 
recognize the developmental, social, and emotional harm that can result from 
an unhealthy attachment . . . [and] must begin to make infant mental health a 
priority.”). 
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is standard practice for adoptive parents) that it is politically 
unrealistic to propose it. An alternative approach to avoiding 
state consignment of newborn babies to lives with unfit parent, 
an approach that is more politically realistic because it works 
within the existing conceptual and legal framework, would be 
to create a mechanism for terminating parental rights imme-
diately after birth as to irremediably unfit biological parents. 
That mechanism would operate in tandem with procedures for 
ensuring that newborn children born to such parents are placed 
immediately after birth in a potential adoptive home. As de-
scribed in Part III, recent federal legislative reforms created 
the opportunity for states to move toward such an approach to 
family formation for newborns in the highest-risk situations. 
Part IV explained how and why states have thwarted Congres-
sional reform goals. 
To complete the reforms Congress intended for ASFA and 
KSAFSA to effect, further legislation is necessary to a) expand 
the category of persons deemed presumptively unfit to raise 
children, b) identify at birth the biological offspring of such per-
sons, and c) push CPS agencies and courts to take the neces-
sary actions to prevent maltreatment of those children. The 
last of these will require, in the case of birth parents who can-
not quickly be made adequate caregivers, creating expeditious-
ly an alternative family for the children. These proposals 
would, in combination, effect a substantial transformation of 
child welfare practice. 
A. MORE EXPANSIVE GROUNDS FOR TPR WITHOUT REASONABLE 
EFFORTS 
In thinking about expanding the “no reasonable efforts” 
TPR grounds, one should bear in mind that, prior to ordering 
TPR, courts must always find, by clear and convincing evi-
dence, both that parents have engaged in certain behavior or 
have certain problems and that TPR would be in the child’s 
best interests.221 The best-interests assessment looks beyond 
the parental conduct or characteristic that is the “fault” predi-
cate for TPR, to see whether other factors suggest it is best for 
the child to gamble on parental rehabilitation despite the par-
ent’s history or problems. Courts take into account the nature, 
severity, and persistence of whatever parental conduct poses a 
danger to a child; whether CPS has made efforts in the past to 
 
 221. See Dwyer, supra note 14, at 955–56. 
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rehabilitate the parents; how responsive parents have been to 
such efforts; the availability of an alternative permanent 
placement; whether the other biological parent (rather than 
adoptive parents) would have custody of the child following 
termination; and many other things. Thus, whenever it appears 
best for a child, in light of all relevant considerations and 
available evidence, to develop or maintain a relationship with a 
legal parent, the best interest prong of the TPR rule ensures 
that this will happen. Adding further parental actions or cir-
cumstances that, along with the best interests of the child, can 
trigger TPR without rehabilitation efforts (but will not in every 
case do so) would not change this. 
To address the clearest and most common circumstances in 
which newborns might have a much better life by being placed 
immediately in families with adults other than their birth par-
ents, Congress should require states also to authorize TPR 
without reasonable efforts when birth parents have severe sub-
stance abuse or mental capacity problems, are incarcerated, or 
have substantial maltreatment histories that have not yet re-
sulted in a TPR or criminal conviction. A significant number of 
states today already make substance abuse or mental illness or 
disability a basis for TPR, without a requirement that CPS at-
tempt rehabilitative efforts, at least if the child before the court 
has been abused or neglected already and the parent was pre-
viously offered rehabilitative services but failed to respond 
adequately. For example, Iowa law authorizes immediate TPR 
when a “parent has a severe, chronic substance abuse problem” 
and “the parent’s prognosis indicates that the child will not be 
able to be returned to the custody of the parent within a rea-
sonable period of time considering the child’s age and need for a 
permanent home.”222 Congress should consider requiring all 
states to have such a provision. 
In Virginia, I proposed legislation to address incarceration 
and multiple children in state custody, circumstances some 
other states already address in their TPR rules, as noted above. 
One provision would have added as a basis for TPR without 
reasonable efforts that 1) the child is under age one, 2) the fa-
ther or mother is in prison and is expected to remain there for 
at least a year, and 3) TPR would be in the newborn child’s best 
 
 222. IOWA CODE § 232.116(1)(l) (Supp. 2008); see also NCSL (2007), supra 
note 207 (listing other states that include substance abuse or mental illness 
within “aggravated circumstances”). 
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interests.223 The best interests analysis could take into account, 
among other things, whether the child is in the custody of the 
other parent, rather than in foster care or with relatives who 
will not adopt. The one year period will seem too short to many, 
because one year is not very long for an adult, but in that one 
year—a child’s first year, the child could be damaged perma-
nently by the inability to form a secure attachment with a nur-
turing and permanent caregiver. Another provision of the bill 
would have added as a basis for TPR without rehabilitative ef-
forts that 1) the child is under age one, 2) the parent has two or 
more other children already in CPS custody, and 3) TPR would 
be in the newborn child’s best interests.224 Because of the third 
element, TPR would not be ordered automatically as to all birth 
parents with two children already in foster care; a court would 
still have to find that TPR is in the newborn child’s best inter-
ests, taking into account how the parents are progressing with 
rehabilitation and other relevant factors. It would simply 
create a possibility that does not now exist of moving imme-
diately after birth to free the child legally for a permanent fam-
ily relationship with fit parents, rather than consigning the ba-
by to an indefinite period of foster care and “reunification” 
trials. Moreover, TPR as to the newborn would not mean CPS 
abandons the parents; it would continue to work with the par-
ents on reunification with the older children unless and until 
there is a TPR as to those children as well. 
Objections I received to expanding bases for TPR without 
rehabilitative efforts, objections likely to be echoed by legal 
scholars, include those typically leveled against CPS interven-
tions generally—namely, that they trample the natural rights 
of biological parents and that they have a disparate impact on 
poor and minority-race parents and communities.225 As ex-
 
 223. See S.B. 929, 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2007). 
 224. See id. 
 225. See, e.g., CAPTA, supra note 95, at 77–84 (statement of Patrick Fa-
gan) (alleging violation of parental rights by overaggressive child welfare in-
terventions); Christina White, Federally Mandated Destruction of the Black 
Family: The Adoption and Safe Families Act, 1 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 303, 
313–18 (2006) (arguing the ASFA disproportionately affects the black commu-
nity); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Community Dimension of State Child Protec-
tion, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 23, 29–35 (2005) (lamenting the effects on poor and 
minority race communities of concentrated child protection intervention in 
those communities); Guggenheim, supra note 89, at 1743–44 (decrying “dis-
missal of the value of the rights of biological parents” and “coercive adoptions 
of other people’s children”); Day, supra note 101, at 223–27 (recognizing that a 
higher percentage of minority children have a parent in prison and thus are 
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plained in Part I, the proposition that some adults are morally 
entitled to be in a family relationship with certain children in-
dependently of that being good for the children is untenable, 
just as untenable as would be a claim by one adult that he is 
morally entitled to enter into a marriage with another adult re-
gardless of any decision on her part that she wants that for 
herself. Conversely, as also explained in Part I, children have a 
moral right not to be forced into a family relationship that is 
clearly bad for them, a right that legislators and judges should 
acknowledge and respect. In any event, the expanded “no rea-
sonable efforts” grounds for TPR proposed here would effect lit-
tle change in birth parents’ relationships with newborn child-
ren, because they would operate in cases where parents are 
highly likely to lose custody of their children anyway and ulti-
mately to lose parental rights. Arguably unfit birth parents 
would in many cases be better off, would suffer less, if the state 
effected a TPR immediately after birth, rather than pushing 
the birth parents for a year or more to do something they are 
incapable of doing, repeatedly denying their requests for custo-
dy, explicitly or implicitly condemning them for not transform-
ing themselves, with the TPR threat hanging always over their 
heads. In any event, the principal effect of my proposal would 
be on the children, and the effect would be to act before they 
suffer maltreatment or attachment failure rather than after 
and to hasten permanence for them, which newborns need to 
have as quickly as possible after birth. 
Complaints about child protective systems having a dispa-
rate impact are also unpersuasive. First, one cannot conclude 
simplistically from the fact of disparity across groups that 
many interventions and removals in the case of children from 
poor and/or minority families are unwarranted. To the extent 
they cite any evidentiary support for such complaints, CPS crit-
ics typically point to studies showing, if anything, not that CPS 
is routinely investigating and removing children of poor and 
minority-race families for no good reason, but rather that CPS 
is under-investigating and too infrequently removing children 
of more affluent and white families.226 If current interventions 
 
more likely to enter foster care); NSCAW, supra note 77, § 11.3.3. Opponents 
of ASFA expressed this concern about a disparate impact. See, e.g., Barth, et 
al., supra note 94, at 377 (expressing opposition to ASFA because of its dispa-
rate impact). 
 226. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Under-Intervention Versus Over-
Intervention, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 371, 372 (2005) (citing a 
study showing “doctors were twice as likely to miss abuse in the case of white 
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are generally appropriate, then there is no basis for alleging 
harm to poor or minority populations. Indeed, from a child-
centered rather than adult-centered perspective, there is a rel-
ative advantaging of persons in low-income families or of mi-
nority race, insofar as children of poor parents or of minority 
race are disproportionately receiving state assistance in avoid-
ing maltreatment and death. If children from more affluent 
families and/or of white race are unduly under-represented in 
the child protective system—that is, if CPS agencies are failing 
to protect many wealthy white children who are subject to mal-
treatment, then the adverse disparate impact is to those weal-
thy white children, and the remedy should be more CPS in-
volvement with wealthier, white families, not withdrawing 
needed protection from children in poor or minority race fami-
lies. 
Second, available empirical evidence shows that CPS 
workers are generally not reacting to poverty per se or to fami-
lies’ race or culture, but rather are reacting to real threats to 
children’s well being. The most extensive survey to date of 
children entering foster care concluded: 
Overall, the findings show that the children who are placed into out-
of-home care have significantly more family risks, greater exposure to 
violence, and more serious levels of maltreatment than children who 
receive services at home. These findings go a long way to vanquish 
the arguments of those who would argue that children are placed into 
child welfare services for reasons of poverty alone or following a deci-
sion-making process that is largely random or that is fundamentally 
determined by the race of the child.227 
Numerous studies, including some aimed at measuring 
child maltreatment independent of CPS involvement, show 
maltreatment is in fact much higher in poor families, most like-
ly because there is a high correlation between low income and 
 
children than of non-white children” and a study suggesting doctors failed to 
notify CPS of suspicious injuries to white children). Children reported to CPS 
as maltreated who remain at home have needs similar to those who are re-
moved, yet receive fewer services to address those needs. See Stahmer et al., 
supra note 77, at 898 (“[Y]oung children remaining at home, are much less 
likely to receive services even in the presence of need.”); id. at 891–92 
(“[Y]oung children who are active in CW [child welfare] but remain with their 
biological parent(s) also have significant developmental and behavioral is-
sues.”); Laurel K. Leslie et al., The Physical, Developmental, and Mental 
Health Needs of Young Children in Child Welfare by Initial Placement Type, 
26 DEVELOPMENTAL & BEHAV. PEDIATRICS 177, 180–82 (2005). This supports 
a conclusion that if CPS leaves more maltreated white children at home be-
cause of racial bias, the bias harms the underserved white children. 
 227. NSCAW, supra note 77, at 11–14. 
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certain parental characteristics and circumstances that make 
abuse or neglect more likely—namely, depression, stress, poor 
health, antisocial behavior, single parenting, having a large 
number of children, social isolation, lower cognitive function-
ing, and living in neighborhoods with high rates of drug use 
and crime.228 Many studies of children in foster care document 
that they do in fact have great needs arising from deficiencies 
in their care at home.229 Moreover, studies of attitudes toward 
CPS intervention have found no difference between social 
workers and members of lower-income and minority-race com-
munities in their views of what parental conduct warrants CPS 
involvement.230 The notoriously high caseloads for CPS social 
workers generally lead them to focus only on the worst cases,231 
so it is facially implausible to suggest that they are routinely 
removing children from parental custody without cause. 
Critics of child protective interventions typically point out 
that most children who are removed have experienced only neg-
lect, not abuse, and suggest that this means many removals are 
inappropriate, but empirical research also shows that neglect is 
 
 228. See SMITH & FONG, supra note 45, at 4–5: id. at 48 (“Poverty is a per-
vasive and persistent correlate of families who neglect their children.”); id. at 
49 (stating that other conditions highly correlated with poverty are root causes 
of neglect, such as unsafe housing, lack of education, employment problems, 
criminal activity, and drug use); id. at 219 (reporting higher rate of substance 
abuse among black parents than among white parents); id. at 221 (noting so-
cial isolation of substance abusing parents); id. at 229 (“It is clear–children 
who grow up in poverty are at higher risk for neglect than those who do not.”) 
(citing numerous studies); id. at 231–38; Ethier et al., supra note 71, at 13–15, 
21–22; Haapasalo & Aaltonen, supra note 77, at 234; Barbara Needell & Ri-
chard P. Barth, Infants Entering Foster Care Compared to Other Infants Using 
Birth Status Indicators, 22 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1179, 1179–80 (1998); 
Pears & Capaldi, supra note 71, at 1442, 1454; Andrea J. Sedlak & Diane D. 
Broadhurst, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Executive Summary of the 
Third National Incidence Study of Child Abuse and Neglect 10 (1996), availa-
ble at http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/statsinfo/nis3.cfm; see also ALEX KOT-
LOWITZ, THERE ARE NO CHILDREN HERE: THE STORY OF TWO BOYS GROWING 
UP IN THE OTHER AMERICA (1991). 
 229. See Leslie et al., supra note 226, at 180–82. 
 230. See SMITH & FONG, supra note 45, at 22–26. My conversations with 
CPS officials in poor urban areas of Virginia with a large black population, 
many of whom are themselves African-American, suggest that they are very 
protective of black parents and sensitive to black communities’ perceptions of 
their activities. 
 231. See, e.g., CAPTA, supra note 95, at 10 (statement of Rep. James C. 
Greenwood) (testifying from personal experience as a child welfare caseworker 
that cases on the margins were overlooked because there were so many severe 
cases). 
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at least as dangerous and detrimental as is abuse.232 This point 
also overlooks the fact, documented in Part II above, that an in-
fant’s life prospects are substantially harmed not only by physi-
cal maltreatment that results in injuries, impairments, malnu-
trition, or exposure to disease and the elements, but also by 
social and emotional deprivation and attachment disruption. 
The near-exclusive focus on physical safety among CPS em-
ployees, judges, and legal scholars is clearly unjustifiable in the 
case of newborn children. 
Advocates for poor and minority communities (among 
whom I include myself) might still justifiably complain about 
the lack of state commitment to eliminating the poverty and 
community dysfunction into which many minority race children 
are born. However, until the economic justice these advocates 
seek becomes a reality, CPS agencies should not be faulted for 
having a strong presence in poor, minority communities. In 
fact, to the extent that the state causes fewer children to grow 
up in such dysfunctional environments, it arguably makes eli-
mination of the poverty and dysfunction more realizable. Eliza-
beth Bartholet aptly observes: “Keeping them [maltreated 
children] in their families and their kinship and racial groups 
when they won’t get decent care in those situations may alle-
viate guilt, but it isn’t actually going to do anything to promote 
racial and social justice. . . . It is simply going to victimize a 
new generation.”233 
Underlying the disparate impact criticism is an unders-
tandable basic sense of unfairness, that certain groups of adults 
have the misfortune of losing custody of offspring piled on top 
of many other misfortunes in their lives. Such sympathy, 
though, however admirable, cannot justifiably lead to sacrific-
 
 232. See, e.g., SMITH & FONG, supra note 45, at 1–4, 7 (“[N]eglect in early 
stages of life may lead to severe, chronic and irreversible damage.…[N]eglect 
experienced in childhood has a more negative impact on early adolescent out-
comes than physical abuse. . . . [N]eglect has an effect that is at least as devas-
tating as abuse.”); id. at 252–53; SUSAN ORR, CHILD PROTECTION AT THE 
CROSSROADS: CHILD ABUSE, CHILD PROTECTION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
REFORM, POLICY STUDY NO. 262, 1–2 (1999) (noting that overintervention 
complaints point out that most CPS cases involve neglect rather than abuse, 
but responding that “it is precisely neglect cases that eventually turn deadly”); 
WULCZYN ET AL., supra note 2, at 76 (“[T]he youngest children are the most 
likely to have a most serious type of neglect (i.e., failure to provide or failure to 
supervise) . . . .”); D’Andrade & Berrick, supra note 80, at 35 (“Child deaths 
are more often associated with neglect than any other type of maltreatment 
. . . .”). 
 233. BARTHOLET, supra note 36, at 6. 
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ing the welfare of today’s newborn children and consigning 
them to the same lives of misfortune. 
For the state to force newborn babies into family relation-
ships with grossly unfit parents because taking away “their” 
children would add insult to the injury of poverty and inade-
quate public assistance treats the children as mere instruments 
for the gratification of others and is a condemnable abuse of 
state power.234 
Other objections to more expansive TPR grounds might be 
couched in more child-centered terms. Some might emphasize 
the trauma to children of being separated from and losing a re-
lationship with a parent, even if the parent is “less than ideal,” 
and the uncertainty that TPR will lead to a better situation for 
a child. As explained in Part II, this argument has little pur-
chase in connection with newborns, because newborns have no 
social relationship with birth parents and are readily adopta-
ble. Adoptions do sometimes unravel, but that is largely limited 
to cases in which children were adopted at an older age after 
already being damaged by maltreatment and/or multiple foster 
care placements.235 Some adoptive parents do turn out to be 
abusive or neglectful, but the rate of maltreatment among 
adoptive parents is extremely low, much lower than the rate of 
maltreatment among birth parents, and far less than the rate 
 
 234. A comparison of parentage laws with marriage laws is instructive in 
thinking about this fairness issue also. Marriage law—in particular, the re-
quirement of mutual consent—also results in a disparate, adverse impact on 
people who are poor or of minority race. People who are poor are, all else being 
equal, less attractive as mates to most other people, in part because of their 
relative lack of resources for supporting a household, family, and lifestyle and 
in part because certain dysfunctions are correlated with poverty, such as drug 
use, lack of self-control, criminality, lack of education, and mental health prob-
lems. See SMITH & FONG, supra note 45, at 233–35. Race in turn correlates 
highly with wealth in the U.S.; persons who are black or Hispanic are much 
more likely to be poor than are white people. See id. at 233. Accordingly, the 
aspect of marriage law that requires consent by both parties has a disparate 
impact; marriage rates are lower for poor people and for people of certain mi-
nority races, and many poor and minority communities appear to suffer from 
the paucity of stable nuclear families. 
Yet no one ever suggests as a policy solution to this disparate impact that 
the state should force some people to marry poor people who otherwise cannot 
find a mate. We do not in the context of adult-adult relationships consider it 
proper to use some people’s lives to compensate others for their misfortunes or 
to bolster fractured communities, by forcing some to forego opportunities for a 
better family life with other people whom they would choose. It is no more 
proper to do so in the context of adult-child relationships. 
 235. See DAVID M. BRODZINSKY ET AL., CHILDREN’S ADJUSTMENT TO ADOP-
TION: DEVELOPMENTAL AND CLINICAL ISSUES 46 (1998). 
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of repeat maltreatment by birth parents after a child is re-
moved and then returned, and again is mostly confined to situ-
ations in which children are adopted at an older age.236 Delay-
ing an inevitable TPR as to birth parents thus has the 
consequence of not only making adoption less likely, but of also 
making it more likely that any adoption that does occur will fail 
or entail maltreatment. 
An additional objection that might be couched in child-
centered terms is that some parents eventually overcome their 
addictions, psychological problems, criminality, and other caus-
es of absence or maltreatment, so the state should not be so 
hasty in pulling the plug on them. What is relevant from a 
child welfare perspective, however, is not whether there is any 
chance that a birth parent can ever overcome his or her prob-
lems, but rather how likely it is that the birth parent can over-
come his or her problems in time to avoid the substantial and 
lasting damage to the newborn child that is likely to arise ei-
ther from maltreatment and failure of attachment or from the 
delays and disruptions that foster care typically entails. With 
the types of circumstances and conditions identified above as 
potential additional bases for TPR without rehabilitation ef-
forts, the prospects for quickly overcoming parental problems 
are extremely poor. Many critics of ASFA’s 15-22 rule in fact 
base their criticism on the reality that treatment for substance 
abuse is typically very lengthy, and unlikely to succeed within 
the twelve months that ASFA allows for rehabilitation ef-
forts,237 and that imprisoned parents cannot be expected to be-
come good caregivers right after release from prison.238 With 
older children, that fact might counsel in favor of relaxing the 
15 to 22 provision (though that rule already contains a “best-
 
 236. See RICHARD P. BARTH & MARIANNE BERRY, ADOPTION AND DISRUP-
TION: RATES, RISKS, AND RESPONSES 69–71 (1988) (citing studies of child 
abuse and neglect showing adoptive parents are alleged perpetrators in 1% of 
reports though representing approximately 3% of the general population and 
stating that abuse rates are likely to be higher in older child placements but 
still below those of the general population); Richard P. Barth, The Value of 
Special Needs Adoptions, in ADOPTION POLICY AND SPECIAL NEEDS CHILDREN 
173–74 (Rosemary J. Avery ed., 1997). 
 237. See Barth et al., supra note 94, at 377; Jim Moye & Roberta Rinker, 
It’s a Hard Knock Life: Does the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 Ade-
quately Address Problems in the Child Welfare System?, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
375, 388–89 (2002). 
 238. See Cohen, supra note 100, at A12 (quoting a social worker who coun-
sels women in prison as saying “[i]t is unreasonable to expect these women to 
resume parenting and make good choices”). 
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interests exception” that states now use more often than 
not).239 Conversely, with newborns, it counsels in favor of im-
mediate TPR and adoption. 
Others argue that a lengthy foster care period, while CPS 
agencies undertake rehabilitative efforts, does not harm child-
ren, because most adopted children are adopted by their foster 
parents.240 The belief is that delayed TPR just means a some-
what longer wait for legal formalization of the child’s relation-
ship with foster parents, during which time life is no different 
for the child and his or her families than it will be post-TPR 
and post-adoption. However, the fact that most children 
adopted from the child protective system are adopted by foster 
parents does not mean that children remain in the home that 
was their initial post-removal placement. It simply means that 
adoptive parents typically serve as foster parents first. The fos-
ter parents who adopt might be the second, third, or sixth set of 
foster parents with whom the child lived.241 
In addition, even when a child’s first placement is with ca-
retakers who will adopt, life is not the same emotionally and 
psychologically for a child’s new family before and after the 
court decisions creating legal protection for their relationship. 
Adoptive parents report high levels of anxiety while waiting for 
the legal process to run its course, and foster parents report a 
certain level of detachment from children, to protect both them-
selves and the children emotionally, in case the state ultimate-
ly removes the child from the foster home and places him or her 
with the birth parents. The adoption process itself usually 
takes a year or more,242 so if the state does not commence that 
 
 239. See GAO, supra note 89, at 27 (noting that in the limited number of 
states that reported on the use of the 15 of 22 provision, “the number of child-
ren exempted from the provision greatly exceeded the number of children to 
whom it was applied”). 
 240. See CASEY FAMILY SERS., RECOMMENDATIONS TO INCREASE AND 
SPEED PERMANENCY THROUGH ADOPTION 7 (2003) (finding in Connecticut 
that 63% of children adopted are adopted by the caregivers with whom they 
lived at the time of TPR). 
 241. See GAO, supra note 89, at 14–15 (stating that, in 2000, the median 
length of foster care for children ultimately adopted was thirty-nine months, 
while, in that same year, the average time spent living with the adoptive par-
ents prior to adoption was eighteen months); id. at 18 (showing that, in 2000, 
67 percent of adopted children had two or more foster care placements before 
the adoption and roughly forty percent had three or more); Barth, et al., supra 
note 94, at 374 (discussing research showing infants typically experience mul-
tiple foster care placements). 
 242. See, e.g., CASEY FAMILY SERVS., supra note 240, at 6 (discussing a 
study of adoption in Connecticut from 2002 to 2003 showing “a median of 13 
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process until after a TPR is final, including any appeals, an in-
fant and adopting parent might wait several years for perma-
nency.243 Risk of foster parent fatigue is especially likely with 
babies who have suffered in utero exposure to drugs or alcohol, 
because of the developmental challenges such babies face even 
in the most nurturing post-natal environment.244 
One way partially to address these concerns is to establish 
a regular practice of “concurrent planning”245 with respect to 
newborns taken into state custody, under which CPS identifies 
and prepares an adoptive home immediately upon assuming 
custody of a child, while also undertaking rehabilitative efforts 
with birth parents. Concurrent planning shortens the time be-
tween foster care placement and adoption finalization, if adop-
tion is the ultimate outcome, because CPS can complete many 
steps of the adoption process during the time it attempts paren-
tal rehabilitation, rather than beginning the process only after 
rehabilitation efforts end and the TPR process is completed.246 
In addition, it avoids multiple placements for a child if under-
taken immediately after a child is first taken into state custody; 
the first foster care placement is with the people who will adopt 
if birth parents’ rights are ultimately terminated.247 At the 
same time, it allows CPS to give birth parents another chance 
to become fit.248 
At present, however, concurrent planning rarely occurs.249 
In part this is because CPS case workers do not understand it, 
 
months for an adoption petition to be filed after they were freed”). 
 243. See CHRISTIAN, supra note 80, at 4 (“Infants also tend to stay in foster 
care significantly longer than children age 1 and older . . . . Foster placement 
itself poses risks to infants’ healthy development and formation of healthy at-
tachment relationships.”). 
 244. See id. (“Because drug-exposed infants often have more health needs 
than non-drug-exposed infants, foster caregivers of such children tend to ‘burn 
out’ more quickly and return the children in their care to CPS.”). 
 245. For descriptions of concurrent planning, see D’Andrade & Berrick, su-
pra note 80, at 42–46; CWIG: Concurrent Planning, supra note 89, at 6–11. 
 246. See CWIG: Concurrent Planning, supra note 89, at 9–10 (discussing 
the effectiveness of concurrent planning in San Mateo County, California in 
decreasing the time between foster care placement and adoption). 
 247. See id. at 8–9 (outlining the key elements of Colorado’s concurrent 
planning program that result in “timely permanency”). 
 248. See id. at 4 (showing the concurrent planning provides birth parents 
with opportunities to remain engaged in the child’s life). 
 249. See id. at 3 (“A Federal summary and analysis of State reviews found 
that ‘concurrent planning efforts are not being implemented on a consistent 
basis when appropriate’ in a majority of States . . . . In some States with for-
mal concurrent planning policies, little or no evidence of concurrent planning 
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do not have time to do it, expect strong resistance from judges 
and parents’ attorneys, or are opposed to the practice because it 
seems—to them and/or to the parents—to compromise their 
commitment to working with the parents on rehabilitation.250 It 
is also in part because there is a substantial shortage of poten-
tial adoptive parents willing to participate.251 Many applicants 
for adoption decline to participate in a concurrent planning sit-
uation because there is still a lengthy period of uncertainty and 
attendant anxiety. Additionally, concurrent planning typically 
requires them to be substantially involved in the process of re-
habilitating the birth parents—at a minimum, cooperating with 
a visitation schedule, and, in some jurisdictions, having to 
serve as mentors to birth parents.252 
In any event, even when social workers are inclined and 
able to engage in concurrent planning, TPR might be prefera-
ble, especially with newborns. If the ultimate outcome in a giv-
en concurrent planning case is placement in the custody of 
birth parents, the baby’s attachment to the fost-adopt parents, 
which is likely to resemble the normal case of child attachment 
to parents, is severed. This severing is detrimental to the child 
and might not be outweighed by the benefit of being raised by a 
biological parent. The birth parent or parents are likely to be 
marginal caregivers even after being deemed legally minimally 
capable of assuming custody, and, in a substantial percentage 
of cases, birth parents will lose custody again, resulting in fur-
 
practices was found in case reviews.” (citation omitted)). 
 250. See D’Andrade & Berrick, supra note 80, at 46–47 (relating the confu-
sion that social workers in California face over the meaning of “reasonable ef-
forts” in concurrent planning); CWIG: Concurrent Planning, supra note 89, at 
2 (noting opposition by courts and attorneys); id. at 3 (“In a number of States, 
concurrent goals were written in the case files, but case reviews showed that 
efforts toward the goals were sequential rather than concurrent. A number of 
reports indicated that staff ’s understanding of concurrent planning was un-
clear . . . .”). 
 251. See CWIG: Concurrent Planning, supra note 89, at 8 (“Not surprising-
ly, the literature commonly points to the recruitment . . . of foster/adoptive 
families as one of the most challenging aspects of concurrent planning.”). 
 252. D’Andrade & Berrick, supra note 80, at 42–43 (“[C]oncurrent planning 
places a significant burden upon fost-adopt caregivers. The practice requires 
fost-adopt caregivers to commit to a permanent relationship with a child be-
fore it is known whether the child will be available for adoption, and to sup-
port the parents in reunification efforts at the same time. The emotionally tax-
ing nature of fost-adopting may result in agencies having some difficulty 
recruiting these special caregivers.” (internal citation omitted)); Laura Frame 
et al., Essential Elements of Implementing a System of Concurrent Planning, 
11 CHILD & FAM. SOC. WORK 357, 364–65 (2006); CWIG: Concurrent Planning, 
supra note 89, at 8. 
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ther disruption and trauma for the child.253 A judge in New 
York State laments: “Judges have seen repeatedly the re-entry 
of children into foster care based on the relapse by the biologi-
cal parents and the positive toxicology of subsequently born 
siblings. Whenever a child born with a positive toxicology is re-
turned to the parents, the judge prays that the child is safe 
. . . .”254 
In short, among situations in which the state must assume 
custody of a newborn child because of parental unfitness, there 
might be few times in which the best decision, from a purely 
child-focused standpoint, is to keep open the possibility of birth 
parents’ one day assuming custody. Even when there is a good 
chance that birth parents can be made minimally adequate 
parents within a year or two, the best choice for the newborn is 
likely to be immediate TPR and adoption. 
Comparison with adult relationship decisions might be il-
luminating here as well. Few adults, upon encountering for the 
first time another adult who has some characteristic that 
makes them very attractive as a partner, but who also happens 
to suffer from drug addiction, mental illness, or imprisonment, 
would promise to marry that other adult if and when he or she 
ever manages to overcome his or her problem, and forego other 
relationship opportunities in the meantime, even if there were 
a good chance the other person could get the problem under 
control within a year or two. The vast majority of adults would 
pursue and invest themselves emotionally in other available re-
lationships, rather than hold out for such an unpromising one. 
Yet there is much less cost for an adult who waits a year or two 
for a potential partner than there is for a newborn baby who is 
forced to wait a year or two to find a permanent family. 
 
 253. See OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REREPORTING AND RECURRENCE OF 
CHILD MALTREATMENT: FINDINGS FROM NCANDS 14 (2005) (showing that av-
erage rate of subsequent maltreatment report for children overall once re-
ported as maltreated was 0.51 reports per child); Dicker & Gordon, supra note 
42, at 31 (“[I]nfants move through the child welfare system differently than 
older children—they remain in care longer and re-enter care after discharge in 
alarming numbers . . . . [N]early one-third of all infants discharged from foster 
care return to the child welfare system, a strong indication that the problems 
leading to initial placement have remained unresolved.”); B. A. Ellaway et al., 
Are Abused Babies Protected from Further Abuse?, 89 ARCHIVES DISEASE 
CHILDHOOD 845–46 (2004). 
 254. Sharon S. Townsend, Babies Can’t Wait: A Judicial Response, JUV. & 
FAM. CT. J., Spring 2004, at 43. 
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This subpart focuses on ultimate outcomes for babies born 
to unfit parents and on identifying additional circumstances 
when the law should facilitate immediate creation of legal fami-
ly relationships between babies and caregivers other than the 
birth parents. For that to occur, though, much more is needed 
than just amending TPR rules. As explained in Part III, states 
also need to back up new reunification bypass provisions with 
rules to ensure that such babies come to CPS attention and 
that CPS and courts react expeditiously. The remaining sub-
parts below suggest how they might do so. 
B. IDENTIFY AT BIRTH CHILDREN AT HIGH RISK OF 
MALTREATMENT 
At present, states constructively “know” when a child is 
born whose birth parents have serious child maltreatment his-
tories, have a criminal history that suggests they might endan-
ger the child’s welfare, are currently in a jail, or have at some 
point been involuntarily committed to a psychiatric facility. 
These are all things as to which the state keeps careful records. 
The problem from the standpoint of enabling CPS to assess the 
danger to the child of being in the birth parents’ custody and 
perhaps acting to protect the child from harm is that the two 
relevant pieces of information—that is, the child’s birth and the 
parent’s history—are not in the possession of the same state 
agency, and specifically not in the possession of a child welfare 
agency. 
All states require birthing facilities to report all births to a 
state agency, such as a department of health or vital records, 
including in the report not just the child’s name but also identi-
fying information for the birth parents, if known, such as social 
security numbers or driver-license numbers.255 In addition, 
state CPS offices maintain a registry of prior adjudications of 
child abuse and neglect, and all terminations of parental rights, 
with identifying information for the abusive or neglectful par-
ents.256 However, the two databases are not put together. There 
 
 255. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-9A-7 (2008) (requiring a birth certificate to 
be filed with the Office of Vital Statistics); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-101 (2007) 
(mandating the filing of a birth certificate regardless of the gestation period); 
35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 450.401 (2008) (requiring a birth certificate to be 
filed with the local registar). 
 256. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 905 (2003) (stating that the Divi-
sion of Family Services of the Department of Services for Children, Youth, and 
Their Families shall maintain a “Child Protection Registry”); MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 210.109 (2007) (establishing a state-wide child protection system); MASS. 
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are also state and national databases listing all persons pre-
viously convicted of serious crimes, and sex offenders and other 
ex-convicts have to notify local law enforcement officials when 
they move to town, in some places being prohibited from living 
anywhere near where other people’s children go to school or day 
care.257 But the law does nothing to ensure that any local agen-
cy is aware if such persons procreate and have custody of child-
ren in their very homes, even if their past offenses were against 
children in their custody. And as noted in Part IV, in some 
states CPS does not learn of births to people who are in prison 
unless no relative is willing to take possession of the newborn. 
Likewise, birth records and records of past commitment to 
mental institution are never cross-checked. Moreover, KCAF-
SA’s exclusion of alcohol exposure from its reporting require-
ment and omission of a testing requirement leaves undetected 
untold number of babies at risk because of parental substance 
abuse. 
One approach to addressing this situation, in order to ena-
ble CPS to take preventive action with respect to many more 
children who clearly are at heightened risk (which is not to say 
their birth parents are certain to abuse or neglect them, but ra-
ther just that there is sufficient cause for CPS’s assessing the 
children’s home situation), would be to require hospitals and 
other birthing facilities to report identifying information, re-
garding any persons who come to the facility as expectant par-
ents, to the state agency overseeing child protection work in the 
state, just as schools and day care centers do with respect to 
anyone who applies for any sort of job. The state agency would 
have a computer program to check that information against 
state and/or national child maltreatment registries and against 
a criminal record database, and it would communicate any 
 
GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51D (2002) (creating “multi-disciplinary service teams” 
to “review and monitor . . . service plan[s]”); 22 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 40-705-130 
(2008) (requiring CPS agencies to report founded dispositions to a central regi-
stry). The federal government is currently working on creating a national da-
tabase to deal with parents who move from one state to another. 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 16990 (Supp. 2008) (requiring the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices to “create a national registry of substantiated cases of child abuse and 
neglect”). 
 257. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 16916 (Supp. 2008) (mandating that certain con-
victed sex offenders update their whereabouts every three months). For a fifty-
state survey of sex offender registration laws, see generally Thomson West: 
Sex Offender Registration (2007), http://www.westlaw.com (search for “sex of-
fender registration” in the Fifty State Surveys database). 
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matches to the appropriate local CPS agency.258 Likewise, pris-
ons could be required to notify a state agency or the local CPS 
office of any births to inmates. All of this information transmis-
sion and cross-checking could occur electronically, with minim-
al human labor. In addition, states could mandate newborn tox-
icology testing and include pre-natal alcohol exposure in their 
testing and reporting provisions.259 
I drafted a bill to amend Virginia’s reporting and CPS re-
sponse laws along these lines. In promoting the draft bill, I en-
countered a consistent, hostile reaction to its channeling of 
birth information to CPS. No one argued that CPS should never 
be aware of at-risk newborn children or that, should CPS hap-
pen to become aware of an at-risk newborn, it should take no 
action. Rather the voiced concern was with the impact of the 
process by which CPS becomes aware, that it would infringe 
adults’ privacy rights and aggrandize the power of the state to 
have all births reported to the state CPS office. This was the 
first and strongest reaction even among individuals who identi-
fy as child protection workers. 
Such privacy concerns arise in many child welfare con-
texts, and of course also in many contexts of crime prevention 
and criminal law enforcement. A similar parent-protective pri-
vacy objection was advanced, for example, in opposition to child 
support enforcement legislation in the 90s that entailed routine 
reporting of personal financial and employment information to 
state agencies.260 Yet ultimately that legislation passed, and 
today if any of us opens a new bank account or takes a new job, 
our bank or employer must report it to a government agency 
that will check our identifying information against a database 
of child support delinquents.261 Arguably, the fact of a child’s 
 
 258. One state, Michigan, now does this to a limited extent; its “new birth 
match” program entails an automated check of birth parents against a data-
base of prior TPR. See Julie Bykowicz & Gadi Dechter, Lawmakers Seek Closer 
Monitoring After Abuse, BALT. SUN, Jan. 11, 2008, at A1 (discussing legislative 
effort to enact similar program in Maryland). 
 259. Some states now mandate testing of pregnant women for certain dis-
eases. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 214.160 (LexisNexis 2007) (requiring 
physicians to test pregnant women for syphilis and hepatitis B). 
 260. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.). 
 261. See Office of Child Support Enforcement, U.S. Dept. of Health and 
Human Services, Employer Services—Private Sector Employers—New Hire 
Reporting, Mar. 7, 2006, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/newhire/ 
employer/private/newhire.htm. 
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entry into the world is information that should be viewed as 
less private than someone’s opening a new savings account, and 
it is in fact information already reported to a state agency, as 
just noted. My proposal is simply that the same information be 
sent to a second state agency. This could be done by having a 
state’s department of health or vital records transmit the in-
formation it receives from hospitals on to the state child protec-
tion office. An expedient CPS response to child endangerment, 
however, might require that hospitals report directly to the 
state child protection office and that they do so at the time of a 
birth mother’s admission to the hospital rather than after the 
birth, so that in high-risk cases a social worker could meet with 
birth parents at the birthing facility before they take a child 
home. Moreover, the purpose for which the state would use the 
information—to find out, before birth parents take a child 
home, whether they have killed or maimed or sexually abused 
another child (which is also information that the state already 
collects)—is arguably much more compelling than child support 
enforcement, which in a large percentage of cases benefits only 
the state welfare office and not children.262 
These privacy and big government objections were also 
among those made against that aspect of KCAFSA which re-
quires medical professionals to report birth mothers’ drug use 
to CPS. Yet that is also information more personal than the 
fact of having given birth to another human being, and the 
state uses that information for the very same purpose that I 
propose—that is, to trigger a CPS assessment of a child’s situa-
tion. If most of us are comfortable with the state’s identifying 
birth mothers who have taken drugs while pregnant, why 
would we be uncomfortable with the state’s identifying birth 
mothers or fathers who previously threw their babies in dump-
sters after birth? 
Furthermore, this proposed cross-checking of state data-
bases is far less invasive than current state-mandated, routine, 
extensive background checking of people who want to adopt a 
child who is not a biological offspring, and it has greater justifi-
cation than the mandatory background checking of people who 
just want to work in a job or take up a hobby that involves li-
mited contact with children. To become a parent by adoption 
entails accepting intrusive and detailed investigation of one’s 
personal life and state oversight of one’s caretaking for some 
 
 262. See Solangel Maldonado, Deadbeat or Deadbroke: Redefining Child 
Support for Poor Fathers, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991, 1014–15 (2006). 
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period after receiving custody of a child.263 If someone applies 
to work as a janitor in a high school or offers to coach a child-
ren’s basketball team, he or she will be subjected to a back-
ground check for past child maltreatment and criminal convic-
tions. And if something turns up, that person is likely to be 
barred from the position, without an opportunity to show that 
he or she has overcome past problems. There is a concern in 
those cases with adults harming children who are not “theirs,” 
and that concern seems to obviate any privacy-based objections. 
But the danger is likely greater that past child abusers will 
abuse the children in their homes than that they will harm 
other people’s children in public places. On child welfare 
grounds, the starkly different attitude toward the sort of check-
ing on birth parents that I propose is unwarranted, and it is 
further confirmation of the parent-protective orientation of 
state employees who call themselves child protection workers 
and officials. 
An additional objection voiced in response to the notion of 
screening some parents at birth, made by academics and policy 
makers at a conference I hosted, was based on a discomfort 
with making “predictive judgments” about people—that is, bas-
ing legal action on a prediction that certain people would harm 
a child if allowed custody. TPR after a parent has abused or 
neglected the child in question is different, it was said, because 
not based on a prediction. This objection is simply nonsensical. 
Every preventive measure the state or any private party makes 
in any aspect of life is based on prediction of future costs or 
harms. Incarceration of criminals is in part justified on preven-
tion grounds, and therefore on a supposition that someone who 
has committed a crime is likely to do it again. And a decision to 
terminate parental rights as to a child after parents have 
abused or neglect that child and have failed to become rehabili-
tated after a year or more of services is in fact also based on a 
prediction—namely, a prediction that maltreatment would re-
cur. TPRs are not meant to be punishment for past maltreat-
ment, but rather a preventive measure for the future welfare of 
the child—hence the requirement that TPR be in the child’s 
best interests. That a parent has already abused or neglected a 
child might strengthen a prediction of future, further mal-
treatment of that child, but in some cases the prediction is 
strong enough before the child suffers any maltreatment and it 
 
 263. See Dwyer, supra note 14, at 881–904. 
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would be irrational for the state, acting as proxy for the child, 
to wait for the maltreatment to occur. 
A more politically palatable approach would be legislation 
directing courts who adjudicate parents as having severely 
abused or neglected a child or who convict parents for commit-
ting felonies against children to include as part of their final 
disposition an order requiring such parents to notify the CPS 
agency in the locality where they live if and when they produce 
another child. This approach would resemble current state law 
requirements that convicted sex offenders report their presence 
to local police. The advantage of this approach would be that no 
parents would experience the privacy loss that cross-checking 
is said to entail unless they have previously harmed a child. 
The shortcomings of this approach are the difficulty of monitor-
ing compliance and the fact that it would do nothing to protect 
children born to parents who pose a great risk to them but who 
have not previously been adjudicated or convicted for harming 
another child. 
C. COMPEL CPS AND COURTS TO ACT EXPEDITIOUSLY 
At a minimum, CPS agencies must have authority, when 
they become aware of the birth of children at high risk of mal-
treatment or parental absence, to investigate the birth parents’ 
condition and circumstances and to offer assistance to the par-
ents if they appear to need it. Because existing state statutory 
provisions governing investigation and removal generally do 
not refer to parental maltreatment of other children, parental 
alcohol abuse or mental illness, or parental incarceration, they 
require amendment to authorize CPS scrutiny based on all of 
these circumstances in addition to reports of maltreatment, en-
dangerment, or in utero drug exposure of the current child. 
Further, to deal with CPS resistance to pre-maltreatment 
action, state statutes should be amended so that if the CPS in-
vestigation reveals that a newborn child would be at substan-
tial risk of maltreatment in parental custody, CPS must peti-
tion for custody of the child, to trigger a court review of the 
baby’s situation. In turn, state law should provide that if evi-
dence presented in court confirms CPS’s conclusion, judges 
must order CPS custody. Current statutory language in many 
states is insufficiently clear as to whether CPS is even permit-
ted to act before a child is harmed or endangered by affirma-
tive, post-birth parental conduct. Certainly explicit restrictions 
on child-protective efforts should be reexamined and, absent 
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clear child-welfare-based justification, eliminated. There are 
legitimate concerns about pregnant women avoiding medical 
facilities for fear of being reported, and an obvious intent be-
hind an exception for women who seek help with an addiction 
would be to motivate pregnant women to secure treatment. It 
seems unlikely, however, that many substance-abusing preg-
nant women are sufficiently familiar with such restrictions on 
CPS action in the administrative code that it affects their be-
havior. And an obvious alternative way of addressing the con-
cern about pregnant women not seeking care their babies need 
is to treat their failing to do so as neglect that itself can be a 
basis for removal. The ordinary response to a concern that de-
terring people from doing one bad thing will lead them to do 
some other bad thing is to attach negative consequences to 
doing the other bad thing as well, if feasible. We do not ordina-
rily respond by permitting them to do both bad things. Impor-
tantly, the aim and effect of such rules should be solely protec-
tion of babies’ well being, not moral condemnation and 
punishment of mothers; if it is best for a baby to be raised by 
his or her mother, then that is what should happen, regardless 
of what the mother has done in the past. 
A further necessary reform is to require that CPS, when it 
assumes custody of a newborn child, seek a pre-adoptive foster 
care placement. Thus, if a court does ultimately order a TPR as 
to birth parents, the child would remain with the same caregiv-
ers from birth onward. Following any removal, CPS would as-
sess the likelihood of parents’ being capable of assuming custo-
dy within six months of the birth, using well-established 
instruments for conducting such assessments.264 The maximum 
time allowed birth parents to become capable of caring for a 
child should be much shorter in the case of a newborn.265 If the 
prognosis for birth parent custody within six months is poor, 
CPS should immediately petition for TPR unless it has strong 
reason to believe some other disposition would better serve the 
child’s interests. Even when immediate TPR is not the disposi-
tion and instead CPS endeavors to rehabilitate the birth par-
ents, CPS should immediately begin the agency process for ap-
proval of an adoption—that is, engage in concurrent planning, 
 
 264. See D’Andrade & Berrick, supra note 80, at 43–46 (describing use of 
“prognosis indicators” in context of concurrent planning). 
 265. Cf. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(a)(2) (West 2008) (limiting court-
ordered services to six months for children who were under three years of age 
at the initial time of removal). 
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unless it is clear that the condition currently making custody 
with birth parents unsafe is likely to end soon.266 Every effort 
should be made to avoid multiple foster care placements for in-
fants. 
Moreover, there should be a presumption against place-
ment of a removed newborn child with relatives. Such a pre-
sumption makes sense in virtue of the tendency of dysfunction 
to run throughout families and in light of the fact that new-
borns have no existing ties to biological relatives to preserve. 
There are also the dangers that relatives will feign interest in 
adopting in order to keep a child near the birth parents and 
that, even if they do adopt, they might give birth parents more 
access to the child than is beneficial for the child, because of 
sympathy for or fear of the parents. Introducing a child to unfit 
birth parents later in life might be a good thing for the child, 
but on the whole a newborn is likely to fare best if removed en-
tirely from the environment that produced the dysfunctional 
parents. 
Lastly, a separate dispositional provision applicable only to 
newborn children could require the court having jurisdiction of 
any children removed at birth because of substantial mal-
treatment risk to render whatever disposition is in a child’s best 
interests, including immediate TPR if the prognosis for paren-
tal rehabilitation is very poor, taking especially into account 
newborns’ pressing need for permanency. Amending existing 
TPR statutes, governing all children, to change permissive lan-
guage to mandatory would also be desirable, requiring rather 
than merely permitting courts to order termination if they find 
that the statutory standards for TPR are met, including that 
TPR would be in the child’s best interests.267 An additional or 
alternative means of pushing judges to order TPR without re-
habilitative efforts when that is best for a child would be to es-
tablish a statutory presumption in favor of TPR when the pa-
rental-conduct predicate for a fast-track TPR is satisfied, 
shifting the burden to the parents to show TPR would not be in 
the child’s best interests.268 
 
 266. Cf. MINN. STAT. § 260C.301 subdiv. 3(a) (2006) (commanding the 
county attorney to petition for TPR in certain circumstances and to undertake 
concurrent planning). 
 267. Cf. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.19b(5) (2008) (mandating that courts 
order TPR upon making certain factual findings, absent a demonstration that 
TPR would be contrary to the child’s best interests). I recently proposed such 
an amendment in Virginia. See Va. Senate Bill 928 (2007). 
 268. Cf. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D)(k) (1999 & Supp. 2008) (stating that 
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In discussing such proposals for getting newborns at risk 
through all the necessary steps toward permanency, the prin-
cipal objection I have encountered focuses on use of mandatory 
language—that is, statutory language stating that CPS shall 
investigate, remove, and petition in certain circumstances and 
that courts shall order removal and termination in certain cir-
cumstances. For some, the concern was with limiting agency 
and court discretion. This concern is baseless, however, because 
the substantive standards in child protection rules—in particu-
lar, the “best interests” standard—are broadly worded, calling 
for somewhat subjective determinations by CPS and the courts, 
and so leave agencies and courts with ample discretion for de-
ciding what outcome is best for a child in a given case.269 
Changing permissive language to mandatory might simply sig-
nal to social workers and courts a legislative determination 
that they should act decisively to protect young children from 
lifelong harm, and that sympathy for parents is no reason for 
failing to do so. It might also give guardians ad litem for child-
ren a statutory basis for demanding expeditious agency or court 
action if and when social workers or judges do make certain 
factual findings. ASFA’s requirement that states mandate, ra-
ther than merely permit, petitions for TPR in some of the “no 
reasonable efforts” cases and under the 15 to 22 provision sug-
gests a recognition at the federal level that local CPS agencies 
sometimes need to be commanded to take certain steps toward 
permanency, because without a mandate they will not act. A 
few states’ statutes already mandate agency filing of TPR peti-
tions even in some circumstances not dictated by ASFA,270 and 
a few use mandatory language in statutory provisions govern-
ing court decision making as to TPR.271 
 
positive toxicology screening creates a rebuttable presumption that birth 
mother is unfit to parent the child); id. at 50/1(D)(i) (1999 & Supp. 2008) (pro-
viding that murder or attempted murder of one child creates presumption that 
the parent is “depraved”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1585 (repealed 2006) (showing 
the numerous triggers for presumption of parental unfitness); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 22, § 4055(1-A)(C) (2004) (stating that chronic substance abuse 
creates a presumption that the parent is unable to protect the child from 
harm). 
 269. Cf. GAO, supra note 89, at 27 (noting the high rate at which states 
invoke an exception to the 15 of 22 provision). 
 270. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-15.1(a) (West 2008) (mandating the 
initiation of a petition to terminate if certain standards are met). 
 271. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.19b(5) (2002) (forcing the court to 
terminate parental rights in certain circumstances); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-
7(a) (2003) (mandating termination of parental rights if certain conditions are 
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Additional training of social workers and judges regarding 
the crucial importance of permanency for newborns, with in-
struction as to attachment, bonding, and brain development, 
might also go some way toward changing their inclinations in a 
child-centered direction. Alternatively, CPS agencies might 
need to employ persons who are not social workers but who are 
instead trained to conduct investigations, to make prognoses of 
parental rehabilitation, and to make best-interest decisions for 
newborns, and to give those employees authority to decide 
which disposition the agency will seek. Agencies might limit so-
cial workers’ function to overseeing parental rehabilitation ef-
forts after prognosis specialists and courts have decided that 
that will be the goal. Enhancement of the GAL role in child 
protection cases might also be desirable. Ensuring appointment 
of a GAL in all cases in which a newborn at risk is identified 
and training at least some GALs in the special needs of new-
borns and the proposed special legal provisions for newborns 
could help to expedite permanency for these children. Authoriz-
ing foster parents, prospective adoptive parents, and GALs to 
petition for TPR might be a further desirable remedy for CPS’s 
reluctance to petition.272 
An additional concern with my proposal was budgetary. 
The cross-checking of databases is nearly costless once the 
proper computer program is created, but having a CPS case 
worker investigate all the parents identified as having a se-
rious maltreatment history or a debilitating condition would be 
far from costless. The usual response to such a concern is to say 
that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure—that is, 
that preventing child maltreatment today will save the state an 
enormous amount of money down the road, with fewer citizens 
damaged by childhood maltreatment. Surely that is true, but 
the realist rejoinder is that legislators are not moved by the 
thought of savings to be realized decades down the road in very 
diffuse ways. In this context, though, there is reason to believe 
prevention will generate significant cost savings very quickly 
and within CPS agencies’ own budgets. Newborns at high risk 
are, under current practices, likely to be abused during the first 
year or two of their lives and at that point come into the CPS 
 
fulfilled); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 3-504 (2002) (providing the grounds for 
termination of the parent and child relationship). 
 272. Cf. IOWA CODE § 232.111(1) (2006) (authorizing a child’s GAL or cus-
todian to petition for TPR); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4052(1) (2004 & 
Supp. 2007) (authorizing “the custodian of the child or . . . the department” to 
file a TPR petition). 
 2008] CHILD PROTECTION 491 
 
system. CPS then must not only conduct an investigation and 
line up alternative caregivers, but must also pay large sums for 
foster care, services for parents, and remediation for the child-
ren. And the child is likely to return to the system multiple 
times in the following several years. Any given CPS agency 
might therefore see reduced costs within a very short period of 
time. Legislatures enacting these reforms could allow agencies 
some time to phase in new categories of parents to be investi-
gated, so that there is not a shock to the system at the outset. 
In the most basic sense, then, what is needed are state 
laws to build on and back up the TPR rules mandated by AS-
FA. ASFA’s authorization of terminations based on parents’ 
having demonstrated their unfitness through conduct toward 
other children will remain ineffective in preventing maltreat-
ment so long as later-born children of unfit parents are not, be-
fore they are harmed, identified, brought into the child protec-
tion agency process, and brought before a court for a 
determination of what is best for them in light of their birth 
parents’ unfitness. And ASFA’s “no reasonable efforts” rule will 
leave a large portion of at-risk newborns unprotected unless it 
is widened to include more cases in which parents have abused 
or neglected other children and cases in which parents are in-
capacitated by substance abuse, mental illness, or incarcera-
tion. 
  CONCLUSION   
This Article emphasizes terminating parental rights to 
prevent maltreatment of newborn children because it focuses 
on the worst cases, those in which parental rights are likely to 
be terminated anyway, and it proposes that states work harder 
to identify these cases at birth and terminate sooner rather 
than later. The urgency arises from the fundamental develop-
mental needs of newborn babies. This approach for the worst 
cases actually comports with greater investment in societal 
programs that try to enable biological parents to retain parent-
ing rights. Earlier TPRs in the worst cases would free up state 
resources to be devoted to the more hopeful cases. It would be 
foolish and dangerous, however, to believe that all birth par-
ents can be made adequate parents by offering them assistance 
and services. Many simply face too many obstacles to becoming 
fit parents, and the reality is that the state is not very good at 
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reforming deeply dysfunctional people.273 Moreover, babies 
cannot wait for a greater societal commitment to helping adults 
overcome problems that make them unfit to parent. In addi-
tion, most treatment programs for abused and neglected child-
ren show very limited effectiveness in overcoming early dam-
age, so we also cannot expect the state to fix the mistakes it 
makes in assigning children to parents in the first instance. 
Consequently, the state’s approach to minimizing child 
maltreatment should be altered in the following ways: First, 
ensure that CPS is aware of newborns at high risk of mal-
treatment. Second, have CPS parent-prognosis specialists as-
sess, at the time those children are born, whether the birth 
parents’ history and current condition make it unlikely that 
they can quickly become adequate parents. Third, for those 
birth parents who cannot, immediately terminate parental 
rights and place the babies for adoption, with a rebuttable pre-
sumption against placement with relatives of the birth parents. 
Fourth, concentrate rehabilitation resources on those birth 
parents who are likely to be able to take custody within a few 
months after birth and who are likely to succeed in the long run 
as parents, shifting CPS expenditures from low-probability 
parents to higher-probability parents. 
This approach would bring the state much closer to the 
model of ideal proxy decision making described in Part I. This 
alternative approach would substantially benefit children and 
the public. Damaged children represent a moral tragedy and an 
enormous social cost. The choice we face as a society, therefore, 
is between clinging to an untenable and extremely expensive 
notion that manifestly unfit biological parents are entitled to 
one or more opportunities to become fit before a newborn child 
can have a good permanent home and, alternatively, respecting 
the moral right of children to enter into family relationships 
that they would choose if they were able. 
 
 273. See ORR, supra note 232, at 7 (“[P]revention programs like ‘Healthy 
Families’ already have a track record that is not very promising.” (footnote 
omitted)); SMITH & FONG, supra note 45, at 182 (“[S]tandard child welfare ser-
vices have been shown to be ineffective in reducing neglecting behavior in fam-
ilies.” (internal emphasis omitted)); WULCZYN ET AL., supra note 2, at 129–32 
(noting methodological problems with studies suggesting effectiveness of early 
intervention programs); id. at 134 (noting little effect for high-risk families 
from parent education programs); id. at 138 (“The extant evidence suggests 
that prevention programs have very modest if any beneficial impacts on pa-
renting knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors.”). 
